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The Law School Critique in Historical
Perspective
A. Benjamin Spencer*
Abstract
Contemporary critiques of legal education abound. This arises
from what can be described as a perfect storm: the confluence of
softness in the legal employment market, the skyrocketing costs of
law school, and the unwillingness of clients and law firms to
continue subsidizing the further training of lawyers who failed to
learn how to practice in law school. As legal jobs become
increasingly scarce and salaries stagnate, the value proposition of
law school is rightly being questioned from all directions.
Although numerous valid criticisms have been put forth, some
seem to be untethered from a full appreciation for how the current
model of legal education developed. Indeed, a historical
perspective on legal education is sorely missing from this debate,
as many of the criticisms merely echo charges that have been
lodged against legal education for well over a century, but do not
draw lessons from how those former critiques ultimately failed to
deliver fundamental change. This Article reviews the historical
development of legal education in America, including the critiques
and reforms made along the way, to gain insight that will inform
our own efforts to make law schools better at preparing lawyers for
practice.
* Associate Dean for Research, Frances Lewis Law Center Director &
Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; Chair, Virginia
State Bar Section on the Education of Lawyers. Copyright © 2012 A. Benjamin
Spencer. This Article was written during my time as a Visiting Professor at the
University of Virginia School of Law, which I would like to thank for its
generous grant assistance that enabled this research and for the wonderful
research assistance provided by its reference librarians. I would also like to
thank those who were able to give helpful comments on the piece, including
participants of a workshop on this piece at the University of Virginia School of
Law and the Cardozo School of Law.
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I. A Perfect Storm
“The training received by American lawyers to-day has thus
become a curious complex. It cannot be understood unless its
main features, and the causes that have produced them, are
presented in their historical sequence.”
—Alfred Zantzinger Reed, 19211

Legal education is under attack.2 The value of a law degree is
being questioned3 given the deterioration of the traditional legal
job market4 and the substantial and growing size of the student
1. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN
ENGLAND AND CANADA, Bulletin No. 15, at 4 (1921) [hereinafter REED REPORT].
2. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Russell D. Mangas, First Thing We Do,
Let’s Kill All the Law Schools, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020463220457712844330685389
0.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing that state bar associations should
work with undergraduate colleges to offer law majors that entitle graduates to
take the bar exam, thus removing the need for expensive law schools, lowering
legal fees, and increasing the supply of lawyers) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Martha Nell, 12 More Law Schools Sued Over Reporting
of Law Grad Employment and Salary Stats, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:39 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/12_more_law_schools_sued_in_consume
r-fraud_class_action_re_reported_law/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (reporting on
lawsuits filed by former law students alleging that schools had falsely
advertised post-graduation employment prospects) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Regrets? Yes. And Money Was the Root of Them All, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/regretstheyve-had-a-few-dozen/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (quoting one commenter,
when asked about a big financial decision they would reverse, who said,
“Simple: I would never go to law school. What a complete waste of time and
money”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Careared,
Comment to id., (Oct. 21, 2010, 9:13 AM)
I regret law school, but more specifically I regret not fully considering
the debt I would be facing after law school and weighing that against
the prospect of committing my 20s to paying off that debt. Finding out
I had chosen the wrong profession for me was bad enough, but being
trapped in that career for many years just to break even was worse.
4. Jobs in the legal services area are disappearing; between September
2010 and September 2011, there was a loss of 3,200 jobs in this sector. See News
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation News Release, Table
B-1 (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_10072011.htm. As of June 2011, of 2010 graduates whose employment
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loan debt of recent graduates.5 Further, law schools are being
charged with failing to prepare their graduates adequately for
practice.6 Thus, we have what appears to be a perfect storm7 in
status was known, only 68.4% had jobs requiring bar passage, with only 64%
overall being full-time legal positions. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law
Placement (NALP), Class of 2010 Graduates Saddled with Falling Average
Starting Salaries as Private Practice Jobs Erode 3 (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/Classof2010StartingSalaryFindings
PressRelease.pdf (providing a summary of the employment status of Class 2010
law students).
5. See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School
Bubble, 98 A.B.A. J. 30, 30 (2012) (“In 2010, 85 percent of law graduates from
ABA-accredited schools boasted an average debt load of $98,500 . . . .”). Student
loan repayment burdens are worse for students graduating from law schools
placed at the lower tiers of the U.S. News rankings, as they tend to have median
annual income well below graduates of higher ranked schools. See NALP FOUND.
FOR L. CAREER RES. & EDUC. & AM. B. FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 42 (2004) [hereinafter NALP, AFTER THE JD]
(providing an in-depth study of the legal profession, including demographics,
work satisfaction, compensation, professional mobility, and legal education).
6. See, e.g., William R. Rakes, Conclaves on Legal Education: Catalyst for
Improvement of the Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1997) (“The
practicing bar is demanding that law schools provide more training to prepare
graduates to hit the ground running when they enter practice.”); John Caher,
N.Y. State Bar Asks ABA to Support ‘Practice Ready’ Law School Education,
LAW.COM (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=12025095
95910&slreturn=1 (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (“Legal education should have
more of an emphasis on making sure graduates are ready to practice law . . . . It
is something that has been de-emphasized, and it shows. Our research and our
own experience show that graduates are less prepared to practice law.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); David Segal, What They Don’t
Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learnto-be-lawyers.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) (“What
they did not get, for all that time and money, was much practical training. Law
schools have long emphasized the theoretical over the useful . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Throughout this Article, I will use the
phrase “prepared for practice” or “practice-readiness” to refer to students who
have sufficient mastery of the specialized knowledge, skills, and values of the
legal profession to serve as competent attorneys and counselors without
supervision. Thus, practice-readiness is not simply about having the technical
skills required for practice but also about having a solid understanding of legal
doctrine, acute analytical abilities, and an understanding of the ethical
framework within which lawyers must operate.
7. David Thomson uses this phrase to describe the current situation in
legal education in which changes in the legal market, dissatisfaction with law
schools, and a new generation of students with more technological savvy are
combining to make this a critical moment for change. See DAVID I. C. THOMSON,
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legal education: Law school graduates are under-employed, overindebted, and under-prepared for practice.
As the economic downturn has forced legal service providers
to deliver services with leaner staffs8 or outsourced resources,9
technology has developed to the point that fewer attorneys are
needed to complete many legal tasks than was the case in the
past.10 For example, artificial intelligence has advanced such that
computerized document review has become faster, cheaper, and of
a higher quality than traditional human review.11 This means
that many lost legal jobs, related to discovery work or other legal
tasks, may not be coming back.12 Additionally, law firms and
LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 11 (2009).
8. See The Layoff List, THE AM. LAWYER, http://www.americanlawyer.
com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202425647706&THE_LAYOFF_LIST&slreturn=20
120726205814 (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (providing links to news stories about
layoffs at law firms across the country) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
9. See Karen Sloan, Elite Firms Seem to Have Lost Their Appetites, NAT’L
LAW J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202543428334&slreturn=1 (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (“Some of that more
routine legal work that used to be handled by a lot of associates is now being
done by contract attorneys or outside providers.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); THOMSON, supra note 7, at 16 (“Many corporations send
routine legal work to large shops of relatively low-paid attorneys in India. Law
firms are doing it too—in a recent study, 80 percent of the largest firms
admitted to having outsourced projects.”).
10. See Joe Dysart, A New View of Review: Predictive Coding Vows to Cut
E-Discovery Drudgery, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/a_new_view_of_review_predictive_coding_vows_to
_cut_e-discovery_drudgery (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (noting the development
of efficient computer software that is capable of conducting document review)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See, e.g., id. (“Research has shown that, under the best circumstances,
manual review will identify about 70 percent of the responsive documents in a
large data collection. Some technology-assisted approaches have been shown to
perform at least as well as that, if not better, at far less cost.”).
12. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES 2 (2008)
I argue that the market is increasingly unlikely to tolerate expensive
lawyers for tasks (guiding, advising, drafting, researching, problemsolving, and more) that can equally or better be discharged by less
expert people, supported by sophisticated systems and processes. It
follows, I say, that the jobs of many traditional lawyers will be
substantially eroded and often eliminated.
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corporate law departments have recognized that there are some
legal tasks that do not necessarily require the same level of
training or expertise to complete.13 Thus, some firms have
established differentiated career tracks that create nonpartnertrack staff attorneys who receive lower compensation for
completing more routine and less demanding legal tasks.14
Corporate law departments have kept more work in-house with
their employees15 or used low-paid contract attorneys to do
routine legal work.16 Two commentators cited statistics predicting
that the paucity of legal jobs will be stark going forward, as the
American Bar Association (ABA)-approved law schools will be
producing roughly 45,000 graduates annually to fill only 25,000
lawyer positions.17
13. See Rama Lakshmi, U.S. Legal Work Booms in India, WASH. POST, May
11, 2008, at A20 (noting that in 2008, the legal outsourcing industry had grown
“about 60 percent annually” for the past three years because corporate firms
outsource work spurred by the passage of e-discovery laws).
14. See Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/
24lawyers.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (describing “twotier” systems in which “permanent associates” earn less than half the pay of
traditional associates to do routine legal work as employees of major law firms)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law review).
15. One corporate general counsel reports, “[i]t’s simply a situation where,
for the most part, law firms have priced themselves out of a whole bunch of
work I used to have them do . . . . If work is going to repeat at all, I’ll bring the
expertise in-house. My in-house teams have simply gotten much bigger, and my
outside counsel use has gone down . . . .” Jay Pinkert, Straight Talk from
General Counsels on How to Win Their Business, SHATTERBOX (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.shatterbox.biz/2012/02/straight-talk-from-general-counsels-on-howto-win-their-business/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (quoting Eric Whitaker,
General Counsel of Tesla Motors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
16. See Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s A First-Year Lawyer
Worth?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at B1 (“Of course, the more menial tasks still
need to get done. But many corporate legal departments are either farming
them to their own employees or giving them to so-called contract attorneys,
lower-cost outside lawyers who work independently from the large law-firm
ecosystem.”).
17. Stanley Fish, Bad News for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012,
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/the-bad-news-lawschools/# (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Matt Leichter, Clever Plans to Reform Legal Education Won’t
Make Legal Services Any Cheaper, AMLAW DAILY (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:04 PM),
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This bursting of the legal job market bubble has laid bare
two major deficiencies in legal education. First, its costs have
risen to levels that could only be sustained as long as cheap
student loans and high-paying legal jobs were available,
conditions that are now eroding.18 Second, the Great Recession
has led clients and thus law firms to have less capacity to
subsidize the on-the-job training of law graduates19 that they had
been expected to provide,20 revealing deficiencies in the ability of

http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/01/clever-plans-to-reform-legaleducation-wont-make-legal-services-any-cheaper.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2012) (criticizing suggestions for reform of the legal education system that rest
on the assumption that contraction in the legal market is due to the increasing
price of legal education, and noting that “actual” employment statistics project a
“shallow” legal market in 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
18. See Nancy M. Jackson, Student Loans Becoming Scarce, FOX BUS.
(Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2011/09/20/
student-loans-becoming-scarce/print (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (“[T]he money
to boost the Pell Grant program was raised by making cuts to the federal
student loan program, eliminating the interest subsidy on loans to graduate
students for loans after July 1, 2012, and eliminating the Education
Department’s Direct Loan Program repayment incentives.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the
Twenty-First Century, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1659 (“Law partners who have to
spend more time tending to their books of business have less time for building
the firm’s value through activities like training younger lawyers. Also, increased
competition reduces firms’ freedom to bill training time to clients.”); see also
Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 16 (citing a survey reporting that more than 20%
of responding in-house legal departments refuse to pay for the work of first- or
second-year attorneys); id. (quoting the general counsel of a company as saying
“Training someone on putting together an asset-purchase agreement shouldn’t
be done on our nickel”); THOMSON, supra note 7, at 18 (“[F]irms are less and less
interested in taking on this role . . . . [W]ith annual salaries for new attorneys
ballooning in some cities to $150,000 and more, firms tend understandably to be
less patient with new associates who need significant training before they are
truly useful.”).
20. See Carrie Hempel & Carroll Seron, An Innovative Approach to Legal
Education and the Founding of the University of California, Irvine School of
Law, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
JUSTICE 169 (Scott L. Cummings, ed., 2011), available at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851702& (“For the better part of the
twentieth century, there has been an informal division of labor between law
schools, which are in the business of credentialing knowledge, and first
employers responsible for passing on the skills of day-to-day practice.”).
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law schools to adequately prepare a sufficient number of their
students to handle legal matters for clients.21
But this latter critique is not a new development; over the
past 130 years we have heard from many sources22 that law
schools are not truly fulfilling their obligation to prepare students
for legal practice.23 This would strike many outside the profession
as odd since—as Judge Richard Posner once suggested and as
most would assume—the “basic focus” of law schools should be
“the training of practicing lawyers.”24 This is far from a truism, in
21. See, e.g., N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 38 (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION] (“Too many law students and recent

graduates are not as well prepared for the profession as they might be.”).
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER,
LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 191–92 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (“In the
standard model [of law schools], in which cognitive apprenticeship . . .
dominates, the other practical and ethical-social apprenticeships are . . . judged
as adjuncts to the first.”); AM. B. ASS’N SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE B., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; AM. B. ASS’N SEC.
OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE B., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979)
[hereinafter CRAMTON REPORT]; REED REPORT, supra note 1.
23. Long ago, Albert Harno, in his 1953 study on legal education in
America, noted the criticisms that were leveled at law schools, which, he wrote,
“all can be grouped under one heading, that the schools do not adequately
prepare students for the tasks they will have to perform in the practice.” ALBERT
J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (1953); see also
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 (“[S]urveys understandably indicate that
practicing lawyers believe that their law school training left them deficient in
skills that they were forced to acquire after graduation.”); CRAMTON REPORT,
supra note 22, at 8 (“Chief Justice Burger and others have spoken, in recent
years, of a serious problem of ‘incompetency’ among those lawyers trying cases
before the federal courts and among the trial bar generally.”).
24. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1113, 1129 (1981); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for
the 21st Century, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (“[L]aw schools exist
preeminently for training students to be lawyers . . . .”). Harno defined the
mission of legal education as the production of “well-trained and capable
lawyers—lawyers who are skilled in legal procedures, who are versatile in the
tasks of the law, who have an understanding and a vision of the purposes and
mission of the law, and who are guided by a sense of moral responsibility.”
HARNO, supra note 23, at 164.
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light of the perspective expressed by many that law schools
should be primarily scholarly institutions in which the law can be
studied and understood as an academic and intellectual pursuit
rather than professional schools that provide vocational
training.25 To be sure, there is ground to allow both
perspectives;26 a law school must train lawyers but also can be “a
25. The late Charles E. Clark, Second Circuit Judge, former Yale Law
School Dean, and father of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was a harsh
critic of efforts to involve law schools in vocational training in practical legal
skills:
I regard the repetitive attempts to coerce law schools into offering socalled practical training as at best curiously naïve, and in general at
odds with sound concepts of legal education. Such attempts might be
dismissed as a comparatively harmless and not unusual professional
baiting of the schools except that law deans and professors are
acutely attuned to professional criticism and hence may be led to
waste their substance in doing what they cannot do effectively and
what if they could would not be pedagogically worth while . . . . I shall
argue that law school training is now effectively efficient . . . that
there is no real basis for the criticism implicit in this pressure for
practical training; that the latter is limited, partial and fragmentary
at best; and that the present-day legal education in problem analysis
and exposition and in thorough documentation of sources is much
more important and valuable, as well as more within the practical
competence of the schools.
Charles E. Clark, “Practical” Legal Training an Illusion, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423,
423 (1951); see also Robert S. Summers, Fuller on Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 8, 9 (1984) (“Some legal educators today hold that training of
practitioners is at most a secondary function of law schools. Rather, the primary
function is to create and disseminate new knowledge and understanding about
law.”).
26. See Thomas Swan, Report of Thomas W. Swan, Dean, to the President
and Fellows of Yale University, in REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING PROVOST
AND SECRETARY OF YALE UNIVERSITY AND OF THE DEANS AND DIRECTORS OF ITS
SEVERAL SCHOOLS AND DEPARTMENTS FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR, 1919–1920, at 393
(1920), available at http://books.google.com/books/reader?id=RrNJAAAAYAAJ&
printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PP7 (“A university law school has
two functions. It aims by the case method of instruction to train its students so
that they may become successful practitioners in their chosen profession. It
aims also or at least it should aim, though too few schools have recognized this
obligation, to aid in improving the law . . . .”); see also LON L. FULLER ET AL.,
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 4 (1947) (noting that the two purposes of training lawyers
and promoting understanding and improvement of the law “are so closely
related that it is unrewarding to discuss which is primary and which is
secondary”).
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centre [sic] of research, criticism, and contribution to the better
understanding of the laws” with the goal of improving the law.27
It is for each school to determine the extent to which it is
committed to the latter goal; however, it should be the aim of all
to be effective at achieving the former.28
Unfortunately, the law school of today is not optimally
designed to prepare students for practice. The focus across most
of the three years of law school is on teaching legal doctrine,29
using principally a method of limited effectiveness,30 with too few
students being thoroughly instructed in the practice skills and
core competencies needed to be a successful lawyer.31 These
27. Cecil A. Wright, The University Law Schools, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409, 412
(1950).
28. The ABA Standards require that “a law school . . . maintain an
educational program that prepares its students for admission to the bar, and
effective and responsible participation in the legal profession.” AM. B. ASS’N,
2012–2013 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS,
Standard 301(a) (2012) [hereinafter 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS], available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/
2012_2013_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam.pdf.
29. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (noting the concentration of
courses on legal doctrine throughout all three years of law school).
30. Critiques of the Socratic case method abound. See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET
AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 112 (2007) (“[T]he Socratic dialogue
and case method leaves students confused, teachers often use it poorly, and it
contributes to a hostile, competitive classroom environment that is
psychologically harmful to a significant percentage of students.”); id. at 97–104
(cataloging criticisms of the Socratic method); HARNO, supra note 23, at 138–39
(“One of [the] limitations [of the case method] is the fact that after the first year
of law study, there is a distinct lag of interest in the reading of cases on the part
of law students. The method by that time has lost much of its sparkle.”). The
Socratic case-dialogue method will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.B
below.
31. See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competencies, 61 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2009) (“[N]o school has addressed the core competencies that
it takes to be an effective lawyer in a variety of organizations over a multi-job
career.”). In fact, the practical skills training and experiential learning
opportunities that many law schools offer tend to be elective and are taken up in
earnest by a minority of law students overall, when compared with the
extensive doctrinal instruction all law students receive. NALP FOUND., 2010
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS 6–
7 (2011) [hereinafter NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL
LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS], available at http://www.nalp.
org/may2011research_exp_learning?s=2010surveyoflawschoolexperientiallearning
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defects have their origins in the innovations of Christopher
Columbus Langdell, the late nineteenth century Dean of the
Harvard Law School who envisioned law as a scientific discipline
that should be taught by full-time academics using the casedialog method more so than as a craft to be learned by
apprentices studying at the feet of experienced practitioners.32
Much has changed in law schools since Langdell’s time, but to a
remarkable degree, much is still fundamentally the same.
Appreciating both the legal education system to which Langdell
was responding and the nature and rationale of Langdell’s
various reforms is useful in permitting us to think critically about
the basic design of law schools today, especially as we consider
how that model should change in response to contemporary
challenges.
But why should we care? Members of the bar are rightly
giving their attention to this issue, but there are likely some
academics who would scoff at the notion that one should concern
oneself with this question or that any real problem exists.
Whether there is a problem, no one should seriously doubt.33 Nor
should anyone doubt whether it is for legal academics to devote
our attention to this matter; maintaining the quality of the legal
education system is vital to any effort to improve the law and the
administration of justice.34 Furthermore, in an environment
opportunitiesandbenefits (showing 30.2% of survey respondents had participated
in at least one legal clinic, 36.2% of respondents had taken part in an
externship, and 40% of respondents had taken three or more practice skills
courses).
32. See infra Part II.E (discussing Dean Langdell’s teaching philosophy
towards the law).
33. Of course, there are those who doubt there is a problem. See, e.g.,
Steven Harper, The Law School Quandary, AMLAW DAILY (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/01/the-law-school-quandary.html
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“If the vast majority of students are happy with the
law school experience and changing it won’t improve their job prospects,
perhaps the legal academy and its critics should consider focusing attention
elsewhere.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. William G. Hammond et. al., Report of the Committee on Legal
Education, 14 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 320–21 (1891) [hereinafter Hammond et. al., 14
AM. BAR ASS’N REP.]
No lesson has been more clearly taught by the history of our science
from the beginning than that, wherever the law has been best
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where legal jobs are more difficult to attain and the costs and
debt associated with legal education are on the rise, allowing the
quality of legal education to erode through indifference is a
disservice to the students we serve.
Taking the need for reform of some kind to be necessary, the
first step in the reform process should be a thorough
consideration of what brought us to this point and why our
schools take the approach to legal training that they do. Why is
law school designed the way that it is today, as a three-year
program led by scholars removed from practice focusing on
doctrinal legal instruction? What efforts have already been made
to move legal education away from that model and why have
those efforts failed at achieving any fundamental alteration of
how we deliver legal education? What criticisms have been lodged
against legal education in the past and what insights might we
gain from them for our time? And what suggestions for reform
have been made but ignored that could offer ideas whose time
may now be ripe? Part II of this Article will plumb some of the
history of legal education in this country, while Part III traverses
the long line of critiques that have been leveled at legal
education. Part IV explores the state of legal education today,
with Part V featuring a discussion of the lessons to be learned
from this history for contemporary reform efforts.
II. From Blackstone to Langdell
The system of legal education that we have today is the
product of an evolutionary process in which subsequent
approaches reflect efforts to build on and improve what has come
before. This means that law school, as it exists today, is an
artifact of its past, with a structure and tradition that is rooted in
history more so than being founded on rational design. As a
result, although many innovations characterize the modern
approach to law school, these adjustments tend to be more
administered and most truly worthy of its high mission, its votaries
have been most careful of the education of students and in the
statement of its principles, so that such students could thoroughly
master them.
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superstructure than substitute, supplementing traditional law
school education rather than supplanting it.35 As I will argue,
however, real and lasting change in legal education requires
fundamental rethinking rather than accretive reform. Getting
beyond evolution to a revolution in how we educate lawyers,
however, requires that we first understand the history that has
brought us to where we are. Thus, in this Part and the next, we
will review the historical development of formal legal education
to its present form to understand the “why” behind the current
system, to identify some of the roots of its shortcomings, and to
inform our current critique with some of the wisdom and insights
from the past.
A. Private Reading and Office Apprenticeships
“Why disgust and discourage a young man by telling him he
must break into his profession through such a wall as this?”
—Daniel Webster, 185836

Pre-Revolutionary lawyers in America imported the English
common law and with it the rudiments of the English approach to
training aspiring lawyers for practice.37 This consisted of the
office apprenticeship, in which an aspirant was assigned the
reading of classic common law texts of varying utility,38 and
35. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 76 (“[T]oday’s trend is to
supplement rather than replace the inherited reliance on this venerable casedialogue teaching in the first phase of doctrinal instruction.”).
36. 1 DANIEL WEBSTER, Biographical Memoir, in THE WORKS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER xiii, xxvii (11th ed. 1858) (reflecting on his legal training as an office
apprentice, during which he was tasked with reading obscure commentaries on
the English common law by Sir Edward Coke).
37. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 27 (“In America, . . . legal education until
well past the middle of the 1800’s followed the English pattern.”).
38. Joseph Story has commented on this phase of his legal preparation,
writing that he was told to read Coke on Littleton during his apprenticeship,
which he described as “intricate, crabbed, and obsolete learning.” JOSEPH STORY,
Autobiography, in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 1, 19 (1852).
Story went on to state, “I took [Coke on Littleton] up, and after trying it day
after day with very little success, I sat myself down and wept bitterly” but that
“[w]hen I had completed the reading of this most formidable work, I felt that I
breathed a purer air, and that I had acquired a new power.” Id. at 20. Daniel
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placed “at the desk of some skilful [sic] attorney[,] in order to
initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and render them
more dexterous in the mechanical part of business.”39 Such
preparation was sufficient to become an attorney given the
weakness of—or even the absence of—regulations setting forth
requirements to practice law during late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries.40 For example, James Flint, an Indiana
attorney, wrote in 1819, “Blackstone’s Commentaries are
considered the great medium of instruction. The young man who
has carefully read these, and who has for a short time written for
a practicing attorney, is admitted to the bar.”41
The apprenticeship approach to legal education left much to
be desired.42 As Blackstone pointed out in his famous
Commentaries in remarking on the office apprenticeship:
[A] lawyer thus educated to the bar, in subservience to
attorneys and solicitors, will find he has begun at the wrong
end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also be
the whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the
Webster, who similarly was assigned Coke on Littleton as an apprentice,
remarked, “A boy of twenty, with no previous knowledge of such subjects, cannot
understand Coke. It is folly to set him upon such an author.” WEBSTER, supra
note 36, at xxvii.
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32; see also Roscoe Pound, The
Law School and the Professional Tradition, 24 MICH. L. REV. 156, 158 (1925)
(“[T]raditional ideals of the common-law books and the professional tradition
brought over from England by pre-Revolutionary lawyers [were] handed down
from lawyer to lawyer in the apprentice training of the old-time law office.”).
40. Harno describes the early practice regulations as requiring a number of
years of preparation, which did not mean formal legal education at the time,
with New Jersey requiring an examination. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 33.
41. Michael H. Harris, The Frontier Lawyer’s Library: Southern Indiana,
1800–1850, As a Test Case, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 239, 241 (1972).
42. The MacCrate Report aptly describes the deficits of the system when it
states:
The experienced attorney received cheap labor in exchange for the
use of his library, but provided the apprentice with very little in the
way of actual legal training. Often, experienced attorneys were too
busy practicing law to spend time with their apprentices. There was
no guarantee that a skilled practitioner was an adequate teacher.
Many apprentices spent their time tediously copying documents for
their masters, not studying legal tenets.
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 104 (citations omitted).
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elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is
founded, the least variation from established precedents will
totally distract and bewilder him.43

To that critique, Blackstone added that the apprenticeship model
would fail to yield lawyers who could comprehend “arguments
drawn a priori, from the spirit of the laws and the natural
foundations of justice,” and would never attract “a gentleman of
distinction or learning” to the bar, leaving it “wholly in[] the
hands of obscure or illiterate men.”44 Much later, Roscoe Pound
would criticize the apprenticeship model on different grounds:
that it was ill suited for preparing lawyers in an increasingly
urbanized and industrialized America.45 In Pound’s view, the
growing complexity of the economic and social structure that
came with industrialization “call[ed] for a deeper and wider
training of lawyers than the training in rules of thumb and in
procedure which was afforded by the law office.”46 As another
twentieth century commentator noted, “That the study of law
through mediums of that sort would produce lawyers of limited
knowledge and perspective is not a subject for wonder.”47
This is not to say that the office apprenticeship system
lacked its advantages. Pound identified certain benefits that were
lost with the passage of the apprenticeship approach to academic
instruction, including the “handing down of professional
traditions from lawyer to lawyer” and “that the law student in his
formative days came in contact immediately with the leaders of
the bar”:
By daily contact he absorbed from them certain traditions,
certain ideals of the things that are done and are not done by
good lawyers, and a certain feeling as to what was incumbent
on him as a member of the profession. We cannot transmit
43. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32.
44. Id.
45. See Pound, supra note 39, at 159 (describing how industrialization of
society shifted the role of lawyers from “the great trial lawyer” to “the steward of
the leaders of industry” and thus necessitated knowledge of business as well as
law, something that could not be provided solely through the apprenticeship
model).
46. Id.
47. HARNO, supra note 23, at 19–20.
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these things with like efficacy by any system of formal
instruction.48

Ultimately, however, this approach was not enough; it
focused on lawyering as a craft with undue attention to the need
for lawyers to have a fuller understanding of the law and the
ability to engage in more sophisticated legal analysis in a society
of increasing legal complexity.
B. Professorships in Law
Returning to Blackstone’s time, his proposed solution to the
deficits of apprenticeship training was to make academic
instruction in the law a prerequisite to office-based training. In
his words, “The inconveniences [associated with the
apprenticeship model] can never be effectually prevented, but by
making academical [sic] education a previous step to the
profession of the common law, and at the same time making the
rudiments of the law a part of academical [sic] education.”49 The
creation of professorships in law early in the history of our
country within universities was an effort to respond to
Blackstone’s suggestion and to his example as a professor in law
at Oxford.50 The first such professorship was established in 1779
48. Pound, supra note 39, at 160; see also Michael Burrage, From Practice
to School-Based Professional Education: Patterns of Conflict and
Accommodation in England, France, and the United States, in THE EUROPEAN
AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SINCE 1800, at 142 (Sheldon Rothblatt & Bjorn
Wittrock eds., 1993) (“[P]rofessional schools often displaced or discredited
alternative practice-based forms of professional education. There are, therefore,
opportunity costs and another side of its history, the side of the losers, of the
viable, traditional institutions directly under the control of practising [sic]
professionals.”).
49. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32.
50. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 23 (“One immediate effect traceable to
Blackstone’s influence was the establishment of chairs of law in several
American colleges and universities.”); see also Pound, supra note 39, at 160
(“One might say with truth, even if somewhat paradoxically, that American
legal education begins with Blackstone’s professorship at Oxford.”); James
Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 170
(1895) (describing how “Blackstone’s example was immediately followed here [in
the United States]” at William and Mary College, Harvard College, and
Litchfield Law School).
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at William and Mary and filled by George Wythe.51 Aided greatly
by Blackstone’s Commentarieswhich taught early American
lawyers “the continuity, the unity, and the reason of the Common
Law”52figures such as St. George Tucker at William and Mary
and James Kent at Columbia College taught in the Blackstone
tradition and were pioneers in matters of legal scholarship.53
These professors were expositors and systematizers of the law,
who lectured on legal history, the broad principles that served as
the foundation for the law, and the jurisprudence of the day in
various subject areas.54 Several of these law professorships were
established at various American colleges during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.55 However, legal
51. HARNO, supra note 23, at 23.
52. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 177 (1911)
[hereinafter WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR].
53. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 23−26. St. George Tucker based his
lectures on Blackstone’s Commentaries, supplemented with his own notes on
American law. Id. at 23. His notes became the basis for an annotated edition of
Blackstone. Id. James Kent also based his lectures on Blackstone and used his
lectures as the foundation for his own Commentaries on American Law. Id. at
25.
54. To receive the Royall Professorship in law at Harvard College, the
incumbent was required to deliver certain lectures, including:
[T]he theory of law in its most comprehensive sense; the principles
and practical operation of the Constitution and Government of the
United States . . . ; an explanation of the principles of the Common
Law of England, the mode of its introduction into this country, and
the sources and reasons of its obligation therein; also the various
modifications by usage, judicial decision, and Statute; and, generally,
those topics connected with law as a science which will best lead the
minds of students to such inquiries and researches as will qualify
them to become useful and distinguished supporters of our free
system of government, as well as able and honorable advocates of the
rights of the citizen.
1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL
CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 298 (1908) [hereinafter 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL] (quoting the statutes of the Royall Professorship); see
also id. at 301 (quoting Isaac Parker as saying that “law is a comprehensive
system of human wisdom” and, thus, a “science . . . worthy to be taught”).
55. Other professorships established during this period include the Royall
Professorship of law filled in 1815 at Harvard College, a professorship of law at
the College of Philadelphia in 1790, a professorship of law at Yale College in
1801, a professorship of law at the University of Maryland in 1816, and a chair
of Law and Politics at the University of Virginia in 1826. HARNO, supra note 23,
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education in universities under professors of law was conceived of
as “a broad foundation for the further education of prospective
lawyers,”56 not as a substitute for training to become a practicing
lawyer.57 Thus, aspirants to a career as a lawyer remained
obliged to pursue an office apprenticeship to be admitted to the
bar,58 establishing a distinction between academic legal education
in colleges and training for practice in law offices.59
C. The Litchfield Law School
These law professorships did not immediately lead to the
development of schools of law within universities as had been
hoped.60 Indeed, the first established law school, the Litchfield
at 23−24, 37−38.
56. Id. at 27.
57. See MARIAN CECILIA MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW
SCHOOL 59 (Oceana 1986) (“None of these professorships, as the record clearly
shows, attempted to offer a complete technical education for law students.”); see
also Pound, supra note 39, at 160 (“But their lectures were not and were not
meant to be professional training in law.”).
58. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 27 (“The educational route to the practice
of law was then, as it was to be for some time yet to come, through office
apprenticeships, and those who attended these lectures were not relieved from
traveling that route.”); see also REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 (“The special
obstacle in northern states [to university based legal education], during these
early years, was the still prevailing requirement of a period of clerkship.”).
Admissions requirements in Virginia during this time were reported to have
been weaker than those found in the northern states. See id. at 44 (“In
[Virginia] . . . the requirements for admission to the bar were already so weak
that William and Mary’s law department had no difficulty in securing its start
at once.”).
59. This distinction held for the training of barristers in England at this
time, as law professors at Oxford and Cambridge had no hand in their training,
which was managed by the Inns of Court—the practitioner “clubs” that oversaw
student barristers during their pupilage. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 144–45
(“Oxford and Cambridge professors of law never sought to challenge the Inns’
control of the education of the common lawyers. They gave lectures on Roman
law, international law, jurisprudence, and constitutional history but hardly
referred to the law used by practising [sic] English lawyers.”).
60. See JAMES BARR AMES, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES
ON LEGAL HISTORY 354, 359 (1913) (“The hopes that may have been entertained
of developing schools of law out of these professorships were in the main doomed
to disappointment.”).
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Law School in Connecticut, was independent of the university
system and arose as an expansion from office apprenticeships in
the law office of Tapping Reeve.61 This became possible once state
bar admissions authorities abandoned efforts to limit the number
of apprentices that could study under an attorney at any given
time.62 The course of instruction offered by Reeve at Litchfield
covered all of Anglo-American private law with no special
attention given to the law of any one state or to areas of public
law.63 The weekly Saturday examinations were three hours in
length and mainly oral, consisting of “a thorough investigation of
the principles of each rule [of law], and not merely of such
questions as can be answered from memory without any exercise
of the judgement [sic] . . . .”64
An alumnus of the school, James Gould, would later become
an associate of Reeve and subsequently shared in the lecturing
responsibilities at the school.65 He restructured the curriculum to
include topics such as master and servant, bailments, and real
property.66 It is worth noting that Gould discouraged the reading
of cases as the primary means of legal instruction, remarking:
I always dissuade them from reading reports in course, until
they have acquired a pretty thorough knowledge of the outline
61. HARNO, supra note 23, at 29.
62. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 45 (“What saved the situation . . .
was the fact that attempts to limit the number of clerks who might study under
one attorney were soon abandoned. This paved the way for the thoroughly
natural development of a private attorney’s law office into a private class or
school . . . .”).
63. MCKENNA, supra note 57, at 63, 65–66.
64. Id. at 85 (quoting CATALOGUE OF THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL 5 (photo.
reprint) (1900)).
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id. at 64, 108. Other subjects included municipal law, baron and feme
(husband and wife), parent and child, guardian and ward, executors and
administrators, sheriffs and gaolers (jailors), contracts, fraudulent conveyances,
inns and innkeepers, covenant broken, action of debt, action of account, notice of
request, assumpsit, defenses to actions, private wrongs, evidence, systems of
pleading, new trials, bills of exceptions, writs of error, practice in Connecticut,
bills of exchange and promissory notes, insurance, charter parties, joint owners
of vessels, partnership, stoppage in transitu, sailors’ contracts, powers of
chancery, criminal law, estates upon condition, modes of acquiring estates,
devises, title by deed, and actions for injuries to things real. Id. at 64.
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of the science by studying each principal [subject] separately;
being fully convinced that reading in the former mode is of
little comparative profit in an early stage of legal studies.67

Although the life of this school was only from 1784 to 1833, it
had a remarkable record of producing illustrious graduates.68 Its
other legacy was to take legal education some degree beyond the
office apprenticeship with a more systematic approach to
instruction in law, though still occurring nominally in a law office
setting.69 Other independent schools, though less notable than
Litchfield, were in existence during this time as well.70 In these
schools, we see the attempt to wed academic education and
practical training in one setting—the law office rather than the
university. This approach, however, would not last.
D. University Law Schools
Some of the early holders of law professorships in
universities were able to achieve the development of entire law
schools within their institutions. Chief Justice Isaac Parker, the
first holder of the Royall Professorship in law at Harvard and the
leader of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was keen
for Harvard to found a graduate school to instruct aspiring
lawyers in the law before entering “into the office of a counselor
to obtain a knowledge of practice.”71 Harvard Law School was

67. Id. at 184.
68. A compendium of alumni by Samuel H. Fisher reports twenty-eight
U.S. Senators, 101 members of Congress, thirty-four state supreme court
justices, fourteen governors of states and ten lieutenant governors, three U.S.
vice presidents, three U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and six members of the
Cabinet. HARNO, supra note 23, at 31.
69. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 133 (“The significance of this group
of school in our educational development is that they served temporarily to
bridge the gap between the students who wished systematized instruction in the
law and the colleges that were not yet prepared to give it.”).
70. Charles Warren mentions some of these private schools in Virginia,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. See WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BAR, supra note 52, at 364−65.
71. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at
302.
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founded in 1817, adding Asahel Stearns as a professor.72
Although Yale’s first professor of law, Elizur Goodrich, ended his
nine-year tenure in 1810 without founding a law school there, the
head of a private law school in New Haven, Judge David Daggett,
was appointed to succeed Goodrich in 1826, bringing his private
law school into the College as Yale Law School.73 Several other
universities soon followed and established law schools, but Harno
reports that “[t]hese were not distinguished schools” and “not one
that was in operation contemporaneously with the Litchfield
School enjoyed at that time the favorable reputation of that
School.”74
More university law schools were founded throughout the
nineteenth century, bringing the number to thirty-one by 1870.75
The schools were not offering the three-year law degree of today
but rather offered one- to two-year courses of study consisting of
lectures and readings of treatises in the areas of law considered
important at the time: constitutional law, American
jurisprudence, English common law, equity, pleading, evidence,
bailments, insurance, bills and notes, partnerships, domestic
relations, conflict of laws, sales, and real property.76 Liberal
education in other topics such as history, philosophy, ethics, and
the law of nature, although viewed as important in the effort to
produce lawyers of professional excellence,77 was presumed to
have been obtained elsewhere.78 As Harno points out, this
presumption was a fallacious one, given that none of the law

72. Id. at 307.
73. See WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR, supra note 52, at 364;
see also HARNO, supra note 23, at 38.
74. HARNO, supra note 23, at 38.
75. Id. at 51.
76. 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 218
(1908).
77. See JOSEPH STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 529 (1852) (“It is by such
studies, and such accomplishments, that the means are to be prepared for
excellence in the highest order of the profession.”).
78. See id. at 536 (“[T]he course of the academical [sic] instruction in this
University already provided for . . . the subjects of ethics, natural law, and
theology, [which were] assigned to other professors.”).
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schools established by 1870 required a college education as a
prerequisite to admission.79
Notwithstanding the development of formalized legal
education within the university, the office apprenticeship
remained the common method of preparing for a career as a
lawyer.80 Indeed, Justice Story—upon being inaugurated into the
Dane Professorship at Harvard Law School in 1829confessed,
after describing all that would be required to prepare a lawyer for
practice, that “[l]ittle, indeed, of what has been sketched out in
this discourse, can be attained by any academical [sic] instruction
during the usual period assigned for the preparatory studies for
the bar . . . . What we propose is no more than . . . something to
assist the student in the first steps of his studies . . . .”81 This
reflected the continuing sense that academic legal instruction
was only preparatory for and supplemental to apprenticeship
learning of the legal craft in law offices.82 Further, such limited
training was sufficient preparation for the small-scale, local
practices that were typical of the profession at the time.83
The advances in the formalization of legal education
described above were not accompanied by similar advances in the
standards for bar admission. To the contrary, as university-based
law school education enhanced the intellectual abilities of
aspirants to law office apprenticeships, bar admissions standards
79. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 51. Harvard Law School did not require a
previous college degree as a prerequisite to admission until 1894, when it
announced such a requirement for the class that would enter in 1896. Id. at 82–
83.
80. See id. at 39, 52; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
241 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that by the 1840s, “[f]or most people, the path to
practice still went through a clerkship at a lawyer’s office”).
81. STORY, The Value and Importance of Legal Studies, supra note 77, at
532.
82. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 152 (“American universities . . . provided
law lectures merely as a part of a liberal education as part of the education of a
gentleman.”).
83. See Harry J. Lambeth, Practicing Law in 1878, 64 A.B.A. J. 1014,
1015–23 (1978) (“Imagine a business world of virtually no telephones[,]. . . [n]o
typewriters[,] . . . [n]o automobiles[, and] . . . [n]o uniform organized system for
legal research . . . . Instead it was a world of circuit-riding lawyers and storefront, walk-up law offices with brass spittoons, pot-bellied stoves, and overhead
gaslights . . . .”).
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languished and waned under the influence of Jacksonian
democratic ideology.84 Under this philosophy, screening
mechanisms and educational prerequisites were distrusted as
obstacles that made law practice accessible only to elites.85 The
practicing bar thus remained hostile to formal legal education,
declining to refine bar admissions requirements to include such
education as a prerequisite to being licensed to practice.86 This
is a skepticism that endured until the late nineteenth century,
when the ABA first adopted a resolution calling for each state to
require three years of study in law school before applying to sit
for the bar examination.87 Still, in the early twentieth century,
one finds bar examinations that bore little connection to the
84. See Richard P. Cole, Orthodox and Heresy: The Nineteenth Century
History of the Rule of Law Reconsidered, 32 IND. L. REV. 1335, 1365 (1999)
(“Within the context of the democratic and anti-monopolistic ideology of the
Jacksonian period . . . [p]rofessional legal education markedly declined.
Local bar associations no longer set standards of admission for law practice and
legislative statutes seemed to make it easier to become a lawyer.” (citing DAVID
RAY PAKE, HERETICS IN THE TEMPLE: AMERICANS WHO REJECT THE NATION’S
LEGAL FAITH (1998))). Jacksonian philosophy also impacted the process by which
judges were selected, leading many states to move toward an elected rather
than appointed judiciary. See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United
States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176, 176 (1980) (“People resented the
fact that property owners controlled the judiciary. They were determined to end
this privilege of the upper class and to ensure the popular sovereignty we
describe as Jacksonian Democracy.”).
85. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 39 (“It was a period in American history
that exalted the rights and powers of the common man . . . . [T]his creed seemed
to hold that all male citizens had the inherent right to practice law.”).
86. See id. at 40, 78–79 (“A substantial part of the practicing bar was
unconvinced, if not distrustful, of the benefits that might flow to a lawyer
through either a university or law school training. This unbelief . . . stifled
efforts to establish educational requirements for admission to the schools and to
the bar.”).
87. Transactions of the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, 20 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 31–33 (1897). The language of the adopted
resolution was as follows:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association approves the
lengthening of the course of instruction in law schools to a period of
three years, and that it expresses the hope that as soon as practicable
a rule may be adopted in each State which will require candidates for
admission to the bar to study law for three years before applying for
admission.
Id. at 31.

1972

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012)

lessons from law school or the needed abilities of a practicing
attorney.88
Thus, from the time of Blackstone through the
establishment of university law schools, we can see that
formalized legal education was focused on instruction in the
English common law and modern American legal doctrine as a
foundation for subsequent training in practical skills after law
school under the tutelage of practicing attorneys.89 No effort was
made to attend to the preparatory education students needed
before taking up legal studies in universities, nor was any effort
made at the university level to train students in practical legal
skills.90 Academic legal instruction was not developed or
designed to serve as a substitute for apprenticeship training in
the practical skills of legal practice.91 Rather, it was a response
to the sentiment reflected by Blackstone that an office
apprenticeship by itself was not enough.92 In this context,
academic legal education and subsequent practical training
through apprenticeships were necessary partners in the effort to
prepare well-qualified lawyers for practice. It makes sense,
then, that with the background understanding that academic
and practical training worked in tandem, academic legal
education gave no attention to practical skills, focusing purely
on instruction in legal principles and doctrines. What remained
to be refined was the method to be used for such instruction and
the character of those who would be principally called to deliver
it.

88. See I. Maurice Wormser, The Results of a Comparative Study of the
Examination Questions Framed by State Boards of Bar Examiners, 24 YALE L.J.
34, 34 (1914).
89. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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E. Langdell and the Modern American Law School
“I entered upon the duties of my present position . . . with a
settled conviction that law could only be taught or learned
effectively by means of cases in some form.”
—Christopher Columbus Langdell, 187193

Christopher Columbus Langdell, who became the Dane
Professor and Dean at the Harvard Law School in 1870,94 was a
pivotal figure in the history of legal education in this country.
During his time at Harvard Law School, he ushered in several
innovations that characterize the modern American law school
today.
1. The Case Method
The most well-known and enduring innovation Langdell
introduced was the instruction of students in legal doctrine
through the study of written opinions in decided judicial cases—
the case method. Up to this point, the method of legal instruction
in law schools was a combination of the lecture method and the
text method, meaning students read texts that related and
summarized particular bodies of law, and professors lectured on
that material in class.95 As Theodore W. Dwight, Dean of the
Columbia College Law School in New York, explained the
method, “The student is assigned daily a certain portion of an
approved text-book for his reading prior to listening to
expositions of the subject involved . . . . [H]e is asked questions
upon the topic . . . . Pertinent illustrations are resorted to . . . .”96

93. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, at v (Legal Classics Library ed. 1983) (1871).
94. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at
359–60. Warren described Langdell as “a young man of no legal reputation . . . ,
a man of no national fame, and a lawyer who had had substantially no court
practice.” Id. at 360.
95. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 7–8, 12 (1914).
96. Theodore W. Dwight, Columbia College Law School, New York, 1
GREEN BAG 141, 145 (1889).
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Such an approach did not jibe with Langdell’s view of the
law; he firmly believed that law was an inductive science and
that the best preparation for a career as a lawyer was to study
and master its fundamental principles, not through second-hand
accounts but right from the source:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the
business of every earnest student of law. Each of these
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees . . .
in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced in
the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest and
best, if not the only way of mastering doctrine effectually is by
studying the cases in which it is embodied.97

In these remarks, one can see two important strains of
thought that would have a tremendous impact on the
development of law school education. First, Langdell’s
understanding of what it means to be a lawyer—reflected in his
comment that “mastery” of “certain principles or doctrines . . . is
what constitutes a true lawyer”98—gives rise to his view that the
best preparation for practice was to study legal rules—principles
and doctrines—rather than learning the skills of legal practice—
law as mere “handicraft.”99 Second, Langdell’s understanding of
the law—that it was a science whose study would be most
effective when focused on examining the sources of legal
principles and doctrines—leads to his determination that
reported cases must be studied rather than summary expositions
of the law contained in texts and treatises.100 In other words,
97. LANGDELL, supra note 93, at vi.
98. Id.
99. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at
374.
100. REDLICH, supra note 95, at 15; see also 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 423 (“The Case System then proceeds
on the theory that law is a science and as a science should be studied in the
original sources, and that the original sources are the adjudged cases, and not
the opinions of text writers based on the adjudged cases.”); id. at 421 (“[T]he
student must look upon law as a science consisting of a body of principles to be
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Langdell believed that law was a form of natural science in that it
consisted of a coherent system of rules derived from general
principles that could only be discerned through the study of
observable phenomena—the judicial opinions in which the
principles were manifested.101 These views of the law and of
lawyering supported and furthered the move away from
practitioner-based apprenticeship in favor of formal instruction
by full-time, legal scholars.102
2. The Cloistered Law Professor
Indeed, the conversion of the professoriate into cloistered
academics, rather than experienced practitioners, was Langdell’s
next innovation. With law school being characterized by a
curriculum focused on doctrinal study, Langdell remarked that
“[w]hat qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law is not
experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in
dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argument of
causes—not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in
learning law . . . .”103 As a result, Langdell took the bold step in
the fall of 1873 of hiring an assistant professor who had only
graduated from law school two years prior and whose experience
was limited to serving as an instructor in French, German, and

found in the adjudged cases, the cases being to him what the specimen is to the
geologist.” (quoting WILLIAM A. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
QUASI CONTRACTS, Preface (1888))).
101. See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What to
Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 632–33 (2007) (“Since Langdell saw this
methodology as a means of discerning general, objectively identifiable principles
of law, he really seemed to believe that his approach was natural science
itself.”).
102. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 5 (“[L]egal positivists . . .
viewed the law as . . . a set of rules and techniques rather than a craft of
interpretation and adaptation . . . . All this spelled the eclipse of traditional
forms of practitioner-directed apprenticeship by academic instruction given by
scholar-teachers.”).
103. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 361
(quoting a speech made by Dean Langdell at the dinner of the Harvard Law
School Association on November 5, 1886).
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history at Harvard College—James Barr Ames.104 Prior to that
time, Harvard’s law professors had been drawn primarily from
the practicing bar.105 As Harvard President Eliot explained,
however, the idea of hiring young, inexperienced persons to teach
law was borrowed from the law schools of Continental Europe:
Those schools have selected young men of mark who have
shown a genius for law and a desire for the life of a teacher,
and . . . made them Professors, at an age so early that the
whole vigor of their youth and prime could be thrown into
teaching and authorship.106

President Eliot went on to predict, quite presciently, that this
innovation would take hold and fundamentally change the legal
academic profession:
Professor Langdell early advocated the appointment, as
teachers of law, of young men who had had no experience
whatever in the active profession . . . . Now that experiment . . .
has not only been extended in our own Law School with perfect
success but it has been adopted by various other law schools
throughout the country . . . . In due course . . . there will be
produced in this country a body of men learned in the law who
have never been on the bench or at the Bar, but who
nevertheless hold position of great weight and influence as
teachers of law, as expounders, systematizers and historians.
This, I venture to predict, is one of the most far reaching
changes in the organization of the profession that has ever
been made in our country.107

Eliot rejected the analogy to medical school training, in which
practitioners are acknowledged to be the best instructors of
clinical training, by insisting—as did Langdell—that “law is to be
learned almost exclusively from the books in which its principles
and precedents are recorded, digested, and explained,” and, thus,
“[t]he law library, and not the court or the law office, is the real
analogue of the hospital.”108 With this vision, the career, legal
104. Id. at 388 (stating that the appointment was an “experiment” and an
“important innovation” for the law school).
105. See id.
106. Id. at 388–89.
107. Id. at 389.
108. Id. at 391–92.
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professoriate was born, purely academic in character and
divorced from the practicing bar.
3. The Socratic Method
A critical companion to the case method was another
Langdellian innovation: the instructional approach used to
discuss the cases with students in class known as the Socratic
method. Langdell conducted his own courses using this method,
having a student analyze the facts and the law in each case,
followed by a series of questions designed to reveal the legal
principles to be found therein.109 In addition to learning legal
doctrine, Langdell’s disciples and subsequent adherents have
rightly noted that the case-dialogue method was also designed to
train students to develop the analytical abilities of a lawyer: “The
student is challenged to reconcile discrepancies, to explain
conflicts, to pick up the tangled threads of thought where they
are left by the decisions and put them in order.”110 By employing
the dialogue approach to the exploration of cases, the idea was
that the case method would not only facilitate the scientific
discovery of legal principles from their sources, but it also would
contribute to the development of students’ ability to engage in
legal reasoning, analysis, and synthesis.111
109. REDLICH, supra note 95, at 12. Redlich described the method as:
Teacher and pupils . . . work[ing] together unremittingly to extract
from the single cases and from the combination or contrasting of
cases their entire legal content, so that in the end those principles of
that particular branch of the law which control the entire mass of
related cases are made clear.
Id.
110. HARNO, supra note 23, at 137–38 (quoting the Preliminary Statement of
the Committee on Legal Education of the Harvard Law School); see also 1
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 421 (“The
student is required to analyze each case, discriminate between the relevant and
irrelevant, between the actual and possible grounds of decision. And after
having thus discussed a case, he is prepared and required to deal with it in its
relation to other cases.” (quoting WILLIAM A. KEENER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS, Preface (1888))).
111. See William A. Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17
AM. B. ASS’N REP. 473, 482 (1894) (“While the student’s reasoning powers are
being thus constantly developed, and while he is gaining the power of analysis
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The case-dialogue method of instruction was seen as an
application of the scientific method to the study of law at a time
when American colleges were moving away from a classical
approach to higher education toward methods reflected in the
modern study of science.112 Langdell recognized this trend and
the need to conform the study of law to it in order to retain its
place within the university: “If law be not a science, a university
will best consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be
not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it.”113
Langdell’s contemporary, Harvard Law School Professor William
Keener, was more explicit in drawing the connection when he
wrote, “[I]f [law] is not a science it has no place in the curriculum
of a university.”114
4. Other Reforms
Langdell was also responsible for several other major reforms
that transformed university-based legal education to the model
we know today. In 1871, the course of study at the Harvard Law
School was extended from eighteen months to two years, a change
prompted by the realization that the case method required a
longer period of time to be successful than eighteen months could
allow.115 Strict examinations were introduced as prerequisites to
proceeding to the next year of study and to receiving the
degree.116 These changes, along with the introduction of the case
and synthesis, he is also gaining the other object of legal education, namely,
knowledge of what the law actually is.”).
112. See REDLICH, supra note 95, at 16 (describing how “the old, strictly
classical ideal of college instruction in America” was “yielding in favor of a new
theory of education” that was based predominantly on the study of the natural
sciences).
113. 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at
374.
114. Keener, supra note 111, at 475.
115. See 1 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at
379 (“Firm in his belief that law was a science, to be taught and learned as such,
Langdell was equally convinced that no student could receive a proper legal
education in so short a period as eighteen months.”).
116. See id. at 380, 397 (noting that students “shall have passed satisfactory
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method, were initially controversial among the practicing bar,
leading to a decline in enrollments compared with the previous
decade.117 In 1875, an admissions examination was instituted and
required of all applicants, beginning in 1877, who lacked prior
collegiate education.118 Finally, for the 1877–1878 academic year,
Langdell extended the course of study to three years.119 Rather
than result in a reduction of enrollment, however, these latter
two changes were followed by an increase in both the size and
quality of the law school’s student body.120
5. Spreading the Langdellian Model
By the early part of the twentieth century, formalized
university-based legal education was well established and highly
developed compared with the system of legal education in other
common law countries.121 These law schools were increasingly
Langdellian; although Langdell ended his tenure as Dean of the
Harvard Law School in 1895, this case method approach to legal
examinations at the end of each year” and that “the whole tone of the School
changed from laxity to strictness”).
117. See id. at 382, 386 (“[T]here was much criticism and even bitter
opposition among lawyers . . . over the new Case System employed by Professor
Langdell. Undoubtedly this kept many students from entering the School.”).
118. See id. at 394–95, 399 (noting that in 1875, the school established an
admission exam applicable “to all candidates for the of the School who are not
already Bachelors of Arts, Science, or Philosophy”).
119. Id. at 399.
120. See id. at 400 (“[T]he prediction . . . that the establishment of an
examination, together with an extension of the course of study from two years to
three years, would cause an immediate and material diminution of our
numbers, had not thus far been verified.”).
121. REDLICH, supra note 95, 5–6. In comparing the advancement of the
American legal education system to other common law countries, Redlich noted:
[T]he existing American system of legal education has hardly a rival
worth mentioning in the entire great jurisdiction of the English
common law. Neither in England itself, nor in the great English
colonies, has systematic instruction in law achieved a development so
intensive and at the same time so comprehensive as in the United
States.
Id. Redlich also reports that in 1914 there were more than 150 American law
schools, with over 20,000 students. Id. at 7 n.1.
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education was continued by his successor, James Barr Ames.122
When William Keener—who had been a Harvard professor under
Langdell—joined Columbia’s faculty in 1890, he brought the case
method with him.123 By 1906, the Langdell method had spread to
law schools at Chicago, Northwestern, Cincinnati, Stanford,
Wisconsin, Hastings, and Tulane—among others.124 Yale had
been an early holdout, preferring a method of instruction that
involved lectures and recitations.125 By 1913, however, the
Langdell method dominated the classes in all three years at Yale;
in 1916 a Harvard Law School graduate—Thomas Swan—was
appointed as Yale’s dean.126 While much of this expansion was
due to the direct transmission of the method by Harvard
professors and graduates, who were its adherents, this
“Harvardization” of American law schools was also motivated by
the desire of prestige: “[O]nce elite law schools had decided to
approve of the system, those aspiring to be considered elite
rapidly followed.”127 No doubt the financial benefits of the method
were an attraction as well; because it could be used with classes
of large size, larger tuition-paying student bodies could be
supported with relatively few professors.128 Regardless of the
122. See Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools, 31 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 1010, 1025 (1907) (“[W]e believe
that men who are trained, by examining the opinions of the greatest judges . . .
are in a better position to know what legal reasoning is and are more likely to
possess the power of solving legal problems . . . .”).
123. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S, at 60 (1983). Stevens reports that other faculty members,
including Theodore Dwight, opposed the case method and resigned beginning in
1891. Id. This defection gave birth to The New York Law School. Id. at 75 n.21.
124. See id. at 60–61, 64 (“[B]y 1907, that number [of schools that had
accepted the case method] had risen to over thirty.”).
125. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 1869–1894, at 28–35 (1937)
(“The traditional scheme of instruction was adhered to. It consisted chiefly of
recitations on required reading supplemented by lectures and moot court
work.”).
126. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 62.
127. Id. at 63.
128. See id. (“The vast success of Langdell’s method enabled the
establishment of the large-size class . . . . Any educational program or
innovation that allowed one man to teach even more students was not
unwelcome to university administrators. The ‘Harvard method of instruction’
meant that law schools could be self-supporting.”).
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reasons, the Langdellian model of legal education ultimately took
hold and spread through law schools across the nation.129
It is worth noting that the rise of the Langdellian law school
coincided with—and was doubtless aided by—the rise of the
organized bar. Up through 1870, law practice varied greatly
across the country but was largely characterized by practitioners
who were not formally organized as a group with clear standards
for preparation and admission.130 Local bar groups began
organizing in cities such as New York and Chicago during the
1870s; in 1878, the American Bar Association (ABA) was founded
for a mixture of reasons, including improving legal education and
standards for admission to the bar.131 As the twentieth century
arrived and progressed, the rise of corporations, administrative
law, and business and banking regulation certainly made the
practice of law more complex, changes that challenged the
traditional, informal approach of reading for the bar.132 It is in
this context that formalized legal education and the ABA’s push
for the same must, at least in part, be understood.

129. The model of university-based legal education did not catch on,
however, in England. The University of London repeatedly tried to wrest the
legal education of barristers from the Inns of Court during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, to no avail. See Burrage, supra note 48, at 145
(noting that between 1884 and 1904 the University of London “made four
separate proposals to establish a school of law jointly with the Inns” but that
“the Inns remained unconvinced and rejected all proposals”). This resistance of
the practicing bar to formalized, university-based legal education held up until
the mid-twentieth century. Id. at 145–46. There was more success in moving the
education of English solicitors into the University in the first half of the
twentieth century, but that ended with a severance between the universities
and the solicitor’s professional association, the Law Society, in 1952, when all
solicitors-in-training were withdrawn from the universities. See id. at 147 (“The
universities paid little heed to the [Law Society’s] criticisms, and in 1952 the
Law Society therefore carried out its oft-repeated threat and withdrew all of its
students from the universities.”).
130. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 285–86 (1950) (discussing the formative history of bar associations in
America).
131. Id. at 286–87.
132. See id. at 308 (“Before [the 1870s] lawyers could educate one another to
a large extent . . . . Before then the intricate web of administrative regulation
had not been woven. After the ‘70s, the printed sources of the law became a
flood . . . and the reach of government vastly expanded.”).

1982

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012)
III. Over a Century of Critique and Reform

“Our law schools, as usually conducted, offer nothing. Most of
them do not, in their plan of study, seem ever to recognize the
need.”
—ABA Committee on Legal Education, 1890133

Although the Langdellian model of legal education became
dominant and widely accepted in the early part of the twentieth
century, it was not without its contemporary critics. Indeed, since
the advent of the Langdellian law school, there has been a steady
stream of critiques of legal education, each of which have had
varying degrees of success in encouraging legal education reform.
Sadly, however, when one canvases the various assessments of
formal legal education over the past 130 years, it is remarkable
how consistent the criticisms are and how persistent the
Langdellian model has been in the face of these critiques.
A. Early ABA Reports
An early appraisal of the American law schools, at the time of
Langdell, came from the ABA’s Committee on Legal Education
and Admission to the Bar in 1879:
But it is difficult to deny that there are American [law schools]
not deserving of commendation. Institutions where the course
is unjustifiably limited and circumscribed; where the term of
study is evidently too brief for useful purposes; where students
continue to be invited, when they are unfit by reason of
deficient education and want of contact with liberal studies, to
wrestle with the difficulties of the law; where, in a way
unworthy of the cause of legal learning, a spirit of competition
to attract greater numbers than are to be found in other
establishments, is allowed to obtain control; where
examinations, which are such only in name, take the place of a
searching scrutiny of the student’s acquirements; where there
is no connection with any influence, except that of a faculty
insufficient to meet the demands of a progressive time; where
133. William G. Hammond et al., Report on the Committee of Legal
Education, 13 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 330 (1890) [hereinafter Hammond et. al., 13
AM. BAR ASS’N REP.].
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there are no exercises sufficiently serious to try and develop
the abilities the student may have; and where degrees are
thrown away on the undeserving and the ignorant.134

Although this critique was contemporaneous with Langdell’s
reforms at Harvard, they cannot truly be said to reflect on
Langdell’s Harvard because at that point in time, Langdell’s
model had yet to spread to other law schools.135 Thus, the law
schools being critiqued were largely those of the kind that
preceded Langdell, including the kind that Harvard had been
prior to the implementation of his reforms. Indeed, one can view
Langdell’s reforms as responsive in substance to many of the
charges of the 1879 report: Langdell lengthened the period of
study from eighteen months to three years, he implemented an
undergraduate education requirement for admitted law students,
he strengthened the examinations used to determine students’
qualifications to advance and obtain the degree, and he sought to
strengthen the faculty by moving towards full-time academics
rather than practitioners who had less time to dedicate to the job
of teaching law students.136
In the eyes of the ABA Committee on Legal Education,
however, little had changed in law schools generally by 1890,
when it identified the defects of law schools as including the
“constant temptation to attract more students and to graduate a
large class by allowing all to get through who can ‘cram up’ for a
not very rigid examination, which tests nothing but a mere
recollection of the written letter of the law.”137 The Committee
went on to observe that “all [law schools] suffer from the want of
a proper standard of true legal education, a definite plan of the

134. Carleton Hunt, Report of the Committee on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, 2 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 219 (1879) [hereinafter Hunt, 2 AM.
BAR ASS’N REP.]. It should also be noted that the Committee was critical of the
failure of law schools to give instruction in Roman Civil Law, the law of nations,
admiralty and maritime law, and comparative jurisprudence. Id. at 220–28.
135. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 60–64 (discussing the growth of
Langdell’s method of instruction in the late nineteenth century).
136. See supra Part II.E (providing an overview of Langdell’s reforms to the
legal education system of America).
137. Hammond et. al., 13 AM. BAR ASS’N REP., supra note 133, at 329.
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entire course.”138 In its most damning critique, the ABA
committee concluded its observations with the following analysis:
The defects of the present method may be summed up, we
think, in one very familiar antithesis: they do not educate,
they only instruct. They aim only to heap up in the student’s
mind a great mass of legal “points”—rules, definitions, etc.—
but they do not fashion these into a system, nor even do they
give him the faculty of constructing for himself such a system.
The mutual influences of different rules, the construction of
legal relations and institutions, the processes by which the law
is constantly developing and assuming new phases, are
neglected, or, rather, positively ignored. He is supplied with an
abundance of crude material, but not taught to use it. In office
study, the daily participation in actual business gave the
student at least some empiric training. He learned to use his
acquisitions as an apprentice learns to use the tools of his
trade . . . . The process was a rude and imperfect one, very
uncertain in its results and exceedingly wasteful of time and
labor, but for two or three centuries it has been the way in
which English and American lawyers have been instituted,
and it will not, perhaps cannot, be abandoned without
something better is [sic] offered in its place. Our law schools,
as usually conducted, offer nothing. Most of them do not, in
their plan of study, seem ever to recognize the need. It is
fortunate for them and for their pupils alike that the training
thus omitted may be supplied in the early years of practice, at
least to a very considerable extent.139

We see in this critique charges that could be leveled against
law school education today. An instruction in legal “rules”
dominates; a comprehensive legal education that synthesizes
different areas of the law, teaches how to establish and maintain
legal relationships or entities, and studies the processes—
legislative, administrative, collaborative, and judicial—by which
the law and legal relations are shaped is still “neglected” or
“ignored” in law schools today. The charge that the student “is
supplied with an abundance of crude material, but not taught to
use it” is as true today as it was then at those schools that do not
require extensive practical skills training or experience before
graduation. Indeed, it can still be said of some law faculty that
138.
139.

Id. at 330.
Id.
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they do not “seem ever to recognize the need” to offer training
that approximates what students miss by not going through an
apprenticeship experience. The key difference between now and
then is that the saving grace for the Committee—“that the
training thus omitted may be supplied in the early years of
practice”—no longer accurately characterizes the opportunities
facing most law school graduates today, given the increasing
unwillingness of legal employers to foot the costs of basic training
for new lawyers and the reality that many law graduates do not
obtain work with employers who have the time, ability, or
resources to support such training.
In the year following this report, 1891, the Committee again
issued a report highly critical of the program of legal education at
most law schools, this time focusing on the schools’ emphasis on
rules over principles and on rote memorization rather than
reflection and analytical thinking:
The only method of teaching that deserves entire reprobation
is that which encourages or even permits the student to make
the entire course a mere exercise of memory, without reflection
or judgment; not beginning with the fundamental notions or
principles by which all his reasoning is to be conducted in
actual practice, but laying up rule after rule, decision after
decision, as if they were to constitute the fund of knowledge
upon which he had only to draw during his after life.
Absurd as this method is to anyone who knows the daily work
of an active practitioner, there is a fatal tendency toward it in
much of the school routine . . . . No amount of text-book
learning, no familiarity even with the cases will avail him, if
he cannot reason from one set of facts to another by the use of
the exact terms in which the law sums up its principles.140

This would appear to be a more direct attack on the Langdellian
case method,141 though the larger point of the 1891 and 1890
critiques was the overemphasis of doctrine at the expense of
140. Hammond et. al., 14 AM. BAR ASS’N REP., supra note 34, at 332–33.
141. Such direct attacks continued in the 1892 report of the Committee, in
which it faulted the case method for focusing on disputes rather than settled
doctrines, training a student to be a “gladiator” more so than a counselor who
can “advise a client when he is safe from litigation.” William G. Hammond et al.,
Report of the Committee of Legal Education, 15 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 341 (1892).
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conveying fundamental and enduring legal principles, an
understanding of the larger system formed by the law and the
reason underlying it, and the ability to use such knowledge in
practice.
Another common thread running through each of these
critiques was the insufficiency of the modes of assessment, which
simply required the memorization and regurgitation of rules. Not
surprisingly, bar examination questions of the early twentieth
century—not long after these ABA appraisals of law schools—
were similarly narrow in their approach to assessment, posing
such questions as “How must a partnership exist?” and “Name
the twelve maxims of Equity.”142 Today, law schools remain
focused on doctrinal instruction and summative assessments that
test substantive knowledge and analytical abilities rather than
the full range of skills needed by the active practitioner. Bar
exams similarly remain oriented primarily towards doctrinal
knowledge and analytical ability rather than practical
competence.143
Through the remainder of the nineteenth century and into
the early twentieth century, the Committee on Legal Education
continued to monitor and recommend improvements to legal
education. By 1912, the Committee’s view of law school education
had become more favorable, highlighting what it viewed as

142. Wormser, supra note 88, at 34 (providing a critique of bar examination
questions of the early twentieth century). Wormser, in his critique, questions:
What kind of nonsense, what order of foolishness is it, that impels us
lawyers to agree that the vital necessity for the law-student is his
acquisition of the power of logical analysis and thoughtful
discrimination in handling legal propositions, and at the same time,
leads us to furnish many a bar examination paper calculated to test
little more than his memory . . . ?
Id.; see also Gordon Hickey, After 100 Years, Bar Examiners Still Protecting the
Public, 60 VA. LAW. 18, 18 (2012) (reporting questions from the first Virginia bar
exam, including “What is a freehold estate?” and “What is the distinction
between a vested and a contingent remainder?”).
143. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of B. Examiners, Rules—Section I: Examinations (Aug.
2012), http://www.vbbe.state.va.us/pdf/VBBERules.pdf (noting that each
examination consists of two parts, an essay part that tests the applicant’s
knowledge in twenty-two substantive law areas, and a multistate exam that
tests knowledge in six substantive law areas).
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several advances in legal education that had occurred up to that
time:
1. The recognition of the superiority of the law school over the
office preparation for the Bar.
...
2. The recognition of a definite period of legal study upon the
completion of which, and not before, the applicant can apply
for admission to the Bar.
...
3. The lengthening of the law school course of study to three
years.
...
4. The changed method of law instruction which has
substituted in so many of the law schools of the country the
study of law through cases, either as an exclusive system, or in
combination with the use of text-books, in lieu of the old
system of lectures, or of lectures and text-books.
...
5. The development of a class of law teachers who are
withdrawn from law practice, and whose vocation it is to teach
law.144

Here we see the lauding of the case method of instruction as well
as an approval of a full-time professoriate removed from the
practice of law.145 Not wanting to rest on these laurels, however,
the Committee, in 1913, asked the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching to undertake an investigation of legal
education in the United States, one that would be similar to the
Foundation’s Flexner Report on medical education146 that devised
144. Henry Rogers et al., Report of the Committee on Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, 35 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 602–04 (1912).
145. It should be noted that this statement did not reflect an endorsement of
a law professoriate wholly lacking in any practice experience. To the contrary,
the Committee expressly indicated that “[i]t is desirable that law teachers, while
withdrawn from practice, should have had actual experience at the Bar.” Id. at
604.
146. See ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, BULLETIN NO. 4 (1910), available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.
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and recommended major changes to medical training that were
adopted and characterize medical education today.147 The
Carnegie Foundation obliged, and the products of that request
were the 1914 Redlich Report and the 1921 Reed Report.
B. The Redlich and Reed Reports on Legal Education
For nearly a century, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching has studied legal education and issued
various reports and bulletins on the topic. The first of these, a
report on the case method in American law schools, was
published in 1914.148 This topic was chosen because of the
controversy surrounding the method;149 although legal instruction
at Harvard Law School had come to be characterized by the casedialogue method under Langdell, the law professoriate and the
practicing bar was not universally convinced of its efficacy.150 The
Carnegie Foundation sought to shed light on this debate by
enlisting a law professor from Austria—Josef Redlich—to visit
American law schools and study the method from an impartial
point of view.151
After spending two months visiting ten law schools—four of
which did not employ the case method—Redlich generally
concluded that the case method was meritorious, with a few
caveats.152 Redlich quibbled with Langdell’s claim that law was
org/sites/default/files/elibrary/Carnegie_Flexner_Report.pdf
(providing
the
foundation’s recommendations for changes to physician training).
147. See MOLLY COOK ET AL., EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF
MEDICAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 1 (2010) (“Implementation of [Flexner’s]
blueprint has brought medical education to a high level of excellence.”).
148. See REDLICH, supra note 95.
149. See id. at v (“At the outset of this study, one question quickly presented
itself which involved fundamental ideas as to methods of instruction. Teachers
of law in the United States . . . divided into two rather distinct groups in their
attitude toward what has come to be known as the Case Method.”).
150. See id. at v–vi (describing two distinct groups holding differing opinions
on case method instruction); see also 2 WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 496–518 (providing numerous contemporary
commentaries of case method instruction).
151. See REDLICH, supra note 95, at vi.
152. See id. at viii (describing the virtues and drawbacks of the case method
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an inductive science for which the study of cases, as original
sources, was well suited by pointing out that scientific inquiry is
certainly not limited to inductive methods153 and that legal
reasoning in any given case is actually deductive rather than
inductive:
The judge who, in the individual case, decides according to the
common law, applies . . . to the state of facts then before him,
one of these already existing norms . . . and pronounces . . .
only the rule or norm applicable to the specific case. His
intellectual activity in this is, therefore, essentially deductive;
for by deduction we mean the application of an already
existing general rule to the particular case.154

Redlich also distinguished legal science from the physical
sciences by noting that the law does not consist of naturally
observable facts, but rather of the products of human will
directed at ordering and guiding human behavior, making law
more of an “intellectual science” or “normative science.”155 That
said, Redlich did find that the case method was valuable in that it
exposed students to mastery both of the content of the law and of
the analytical methods lawyers must employ to make use of the
law as practicing attorneys.156
system used in American law schools).
153. See id. at 55 (“Prominent though experimental and inductive methods
are in the sciences which serve physical research, we press a generalization
much too far when we make of the inductive method the sole criterion of
scientific intellectual activity.”).
154. Id. at 56–57.
155. See id. at 56
The science of law does not work, then, with physical facts, but with
the products of the human will, which has been directed to the
ordering and guidance of the individual and social life of
humanity . . . . [L]egal science cannot deal with law in the sense of
the physical investigator, but only with law in the sense of definite
norms, willed by men, and intended to guide and limit the business of
men.
156. See id. at 59
[O]n the ground that it is that method of instruction which is entirely
suited to the established character of the common law, to independent
intellectual assimilation of positive law from its sources, and to the
highest development of the ability to think logically and
systematically—on these grounds the case method must indeed be
recognized as the scientific method of investigation and instruction in
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Redlich’s general endorsement of the method was coupled
with a caveat and a critique. The caveat was that the case
method was appropriate for the study of Anglo-American law
because such law—at that time—was largely unwritten, common
law.157 With common law being case law, studying cases made
sense, compared with the task of judges in civil law countries of
finding the applicable rules and statutes that govern the facts at
hand.158 Although the common law may have been prevalent
during Langdell’s time in the late nineteenth century, in the
twenty-first century other sources of law—constitutional,
statutory, regulatory, and negotiated—dominate the legal
landscape, making it relevant to wonder whether the common
law-based case method legitimately retains its purchase.159
Redlich’s critique of the method was as follows:
It is characteristic of the case method that where it has
thoroughly established itself, legal education has assumed the
form of instruction almost exclusively through analysis of
separate cases. The result of this is that the students never
obtain a general picture of the law as a whole . . . .160

His prescription for remedying this defect was to create an
introductory law school course:
[I]n American university law schools the students ought to be
given an introductory lecture course, which should present, so
to speak, ‘Institutes’ of the common law. Every department
into which the American law is divided, whether as common
the common law.
157. See id. at 35 (“[T]he fundamental reason for this success [of the case
method] is to be found in the present condition of American law, and within this
especially in the unshaken authority of the common law.”).
158. See id. at 36–37
To the Englishman and the American . . . the law appears rather as
the single case of law . . . conducted by the regular judge, and
depending only upon his ‘finding of the law.’ The task of the European
judge is to find which of the rules and principles of law that are
contained in the system of law governs the state of facts in question.
159. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 619 (“To the extent that a national law
school wants to teach the consensus view among state jurisdictions, it should be
teaching the typical or model provisions of state statutes and regulations, not
the common law.”).
160. REDLICH, supra note 95, at 41.
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law or equity, employs certain common elementary ideas and
fundamental legal concepts, which the student ought to be
made to understand before he is introduced into the difficult
analysis of cases.161

This is sound advice even today, given the fact that pre-legal
education does not offer such an overview.162 Pre-legal education
is not formally connected with law school training in any way,163
meaning that students learn little about the legal profession and
law school before deciding to become a lawyer,164 and are not
guaranteed to have had any training or learning preparatory for
the study of law.165 Indeed, American law schools typically offer a
161. Id. at 42.
162. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 127 (“Many of the problems of legal
education owe their being to deficiencies in the pre-legal period.”).
163. See Preparing for Law School, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/pre_law.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2012) (“The ABA does not recommend any undergraduate majors or group of
courses to prepare for a legal education. Students are admitted to law school
from almost every academic discipline.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law
Review).
164. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 228 (“Prospective law
students generally are not knowledgeable about the profession . . . .”).
165. See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, A Report on Prelegal Education, 25 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 199, 209−10 (1950)
It is no secret that our law school authorities generally are far from
satisfied with the intellectual attainments of their incoming
students . . . . To be specific, no instructor in any class in any law
school can make a reference to Plato or Aristotle, to the Bible or
Shakespeare, to the Federalist or even the Constitution itself with
any real assurance that he will be understood . . . . Now even an
allusion by a law school instructor to Adam Smith or Karl Marx is as
likely as not to be lost, notwithstanding the preoccupation of our age
with problems of economics . . . . [There is a] well-nigh universal
criticism respecting the inability of law students to think straight and
to write and speak in clear, forceful, attractive English. Almost
everyone who discusses law school students—or even, it must be
added, young law school graduateshas an unkind word to say about
their lack of adequate powers of oral and written expression in their
native tongue. Such criticism, on analysis, generally relates as much
to defects in thinking as to faults of expression.
The 1980 report of the Special Committee on the Study of Legal Education of
the ABA recommended that undergraduates should be urged to master
advanced writing skills and effective oral communication, adding that prelaw
courses should provide “a basic understanding of accounting, economics,
psychology, and of historical and contemporary social and political processes.”
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course of the kind proposed by Redlich to their foreign LL.M.
students only,166 presumably under the assumption that
American law students pursuing a J.D. would not benefit from
this type of overview.
The Carnegie Foundation followed up the Redlich Report
with a more comprehensive report on legal education authored by
Alfred Zantzinger Reed and published in 1921.167 Right from the
outset, the tenor of the Reed Report was less laudatory of law
schools, as it began by bluntly proclaiming, “Our contemporary
American system of legal education . . . is generally recognized to
be defective in many respects.”168 As Reed traced the movement of
legal education from the office to the school, he lamented the
concomitant loss of practical training:
[W]e are in a fair way of losing entirely the practical training
secured under a practitioner, that was once assumed to be the
only logical means of preparing students in Anglo-American
law. Even its remnants are not usually regarded by the law
schools as worth preserving, now that they have virtually
preempted the entire field of legal education. Moot courts . . .
and “practice courses” are among the devices by which they
AM. B. ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUC., LAW SCHOOLS AND
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
104 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Course Descriptions, PENN STATE L., http://law.psu.edu/
academics/jd/course_descriptions (last visited Sep. 14, 2012) (describing the
LL.M. course, Introduction to the U.S. Legal System, as “introduc[ing] the
United States court system, the role of the Constitution . . . and other
foundation[al] materials in United States law. The goal is to introduce students
to distinctive aspects and/or fundamental principles in U.S. law”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Introduction to the U.S. Legal System,
FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law.fordham.edu/llm-program/27293.htm (last
visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“Welcome to the Introduction to the U.S. Legal System.
As you know, this course is required for all students who do not hold a degree
from a U.S. law school.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For
Redlich’s recommendations, see supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
167. REED REPORT, supra note 1. See also STEVENS, supra note 123, at 112–
13 (describing the Carnegie Foundation funding both the Reed and Redlich
reports). Reed published a further report on legal education funded by the
Carnegie Foundation in 1928. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, BULLETIN NO. 21 (1928)
[hereinafter REED REPORT II].
168. REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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conceal from themselves and others the necessarily theoretical
character of their instruction.169

This neglect of the practical was, for Reed, unconscionable: “The
failure of modern American law school to make any adequate
provision in its curriculum for practical training constitutes a
remarkable educational anomaly.”170
Reed’s concern over the absence of practical training came in
the context of a declining presence of law office apprenticeship
training as supplementary to formal academic legal training. As
early as the late nineteenth century, the ABA was urging that
law school be accepted as a substitute for law office training
rather than its mere predicate.171 By 1895, law school study and
clerkship training had come to be regarded as interchangeable,
rather than indispensable, in legal education, though no state bar
admissions authorities were requiring law school at that time.172
And by Reed’s time, four states were requiring formal legal
education at law school, and in almost all of the remaining
jurisdictions, “law school and law office training had become
alternatives.”173 In a context in which apprenticeship training
had become optional, it is little wonder that Reed found fault with
law school’s failure to attend to practical instruction.
Another major strain of Reed’s critique was of what he
referred to as “the theory of a unitary bar, whose attainments are
to be tested by uniform examinations.”174 This theory held that
rather than having different kinds of lawyers, who were
differently qualified to handle different matters, our political
169. Id. at 48.
170. Id. at 281.
171. See Transactions of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, 42 AM. BAR ASS’N REP. 28–30 (1919) (adopting a resolution that
“time spent in any chartered and properly conducted law school ought to be
counted in any state as equivalent to the same time in an attorney’s office in
such state . . . .”).
172. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 95 (“[T]ime spent in law school came to
be counted as time spent in a law office, as states gradually increased (or
restored) the requirement for some kind of apprenticeship or clerkship. Yet no
state required attendance at law school . . . .”).
173. See id. at 174 (noting that by 1930 only West Virginia, Colorado,
Kentucky, and Wyoming required at least one or more years of legal education).
174. REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.
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philosophy abjured distinctions and ranks among lawyers,
resulting in the “American ‘attorney and counselor-at-law,’
privileged to practice all branches of his profession in all courts
equally.”175 The unitary bar theory, in Reed’s view, obscured the
real distinctions between the law schools, mainly the divide
between the full-time national law schools and the local law or
part-time law schools, which “differ[ed] vastly from one another
in type of law studied, in methods of instruction, and in the
amount of actual work represented by their degree.”176 The
problem here was that the unitary ideal forced each type of law
school to compete with the other, to the detriment of each:
“Coming, however, into direct competition with one another
under the accepted dogma of a unitary bar, each affects
injuriously the other’s development.”177 Further, the notion of a
unitary bar was at odds with the needs of the increasingly
pluralistic society that was 1920s America.178
In Reed’s estimation, the three types of emerging law
schools—full-time national, full-time local, and part-time
evening—represented different approaches to legal education
that should be encouraged and strengthened rather than
homogenized or suppressed:
Each has seen clearly that if all American lawyers were
educated in accordance with the other’s plans, we should be in
a bad way . . . . If [some] thought . . . had been expended upon
175. See id. at 39–40 (describing the transformation of the legal profession
as moving “as a whole into an officially undifferentiated and, as it were,
flattened-out profession”).
176. Id. at 63.
177. Id. at 64. Reed posited that “the night schools are damaged by the
obligation placed upon them to cover the same curriculum as the day schools.”
Id. at 57. The full-time schools “are so fearful of losing students to [the night
schools], that they hesitate to raise their own entrance requirements to the level
that they really believe in.” Id. at 58. Bar examiners, eager not to favor
graduates of one type of school over the other, “are obliged to limit the scope of
their enquiries to those elements that any law school, offering the standardized
curriculum, must provide—something that even the more poorly trained of the
night school students can pass, at least with the aid of special coaching . . . .” Id.
at 59.
178. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 113 (describing Reed’s view of a
pluralistic 1920s America as “st[anding] out sharply against the formal theory of
a unified bar”).
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the problem of dividing the bar along lines that can be
justified . . . we should hardly have been in so bad a situation
as we are now, when the schools are . . . wrangling for
possession of a field too large for any of them to cover in its
entirety. The scholarly law school dean properly seeks to build
up a “nursery for judges” that will make American law what
American law ought to be. The practitioner bar examiner, with
his satellite schools, properly seeks to prepare students for the
immediate practice of the law as it is. The night school
authorities, finally, see most clearly that the interests not only
of the individual but of the community demand that
participation in the making and administration of the law
shall be kept accessible to Lincoln’s plain people. All these are
worthy ideals. Taken together, they roughly embrace the
service that the public expects from its law schools as a whole.
But no single institution, pursuing its special aim, can attain
both the others as well.179

By permitting this differentiation to thrive, Reed estimated that
schools would be able to focus on what they each did best,
producing graduates who were well-suited for the kind of
lawyering that was the focus of their respective schools.180
The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, which in 1919 superseded the abolished Committee on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar,181 received an early draft of
the Reed Report in 1920 and did not like what it saw.182 It
promptly formed a special committee chaired by Elihu Root,
which met in March and May of 1921 and was tasked with
developing its own recommendations for improving legal
education.183 Regarding Reed’s suggestion that the diversity in
179. REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 417–18.
180. See id. at 417–19 (“[T]he independent development of each type of law
school will naturally result in a considerable variation in the kind of
professional work for which its products are especially fitted.”).
181. Constitution and By-Laws of the American Bar Association, 42 AM. B.
ASS’N REP. 121–31 (1919).
182. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 115–16 (“Reed’s suggestion in his first
report that the most democratic, egalitarian, and American solution would be a
differentiated bar, with differing types of law schools . . . managed to offend both
his ABA and AALS audiences.”).
183. See Report of the Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, 44 AM. B. ASS’N REP.
679–88 (1921) [hereinafter Special Committee Report, 44 AM. BAR ASS’N REP.]
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types of law schools should be encouraged, the Root Report stated
as follows:
Turning first, then, to a consideration of what a lawyer’s
training should be, we meet the suggestion that there must be
different kinds of training to produce different kinds of
lawyers.
With this position we do not agree. In spite of the diversity of
human relations with respect to which the work of lawyers is
done, the intellectual requisites are in all cases substantially
the same.184

The Root committee’s view was that differentiating among law
schools meant tolerating law schools of lesser quality: “Nor can
there be tolerated a recognized distinction between good and poor
legal education. There should be no distinction . . . . [W]e cannot
favor the continuation of a class of incompetent practitioners.”185
Uniformity was to be preferred, which the special committee went
about pursuing by recommending that all bar applicants be
required to have graduated from a law school complying with
prescribed standards, that they be required to have completed at
least two years of study in college, and that the course of full-time
study of law be three years.186
The Root committee acknowledged the need for afternoon
and evening law schools to accommodate the student who had to
work to support himself and his family; however, it rejected the
idea that such schools should be operated with what it viewed as
lower educational standards.187 Finally, the Root committee
(describing the proceedings of the special committee chaired by Elihu Reed in
March and May of 1921 to the full Section on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar).
184. Id. at 681.
185. Id. at 681–82.
186. See id. at 683–85 (spelling out the special committee’s
recommendations for uniformity).
187. Id. at 685. Specifically, the special committee noted:
But in recognizing the necessity for afternoon and evening schools we
do not recognize the propriety of permitting such schools to operate
with low educational standards . . . . On the contrary, the democratic
necessity for afternoon and evening schools compels a lifting of these
schools to the highest standards which they can be expected to reach.
Id.
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recommended that “a law school shall not be deemed competent
to educate students for the bar unless it provides an adequate
library available for their use” and that a school “have among its
teachers a sufficient number giving their entire time to the
school.”188 These requirements, of course, would prove to be more
burdensome to night schools and local, practice-connected schools
that might lack sufficient funds to maintain a complete law
library and whose instructors were principally practitioners who
devoted most of their time to law practice during the day. These
requirements all meant to homogenize law schools around
standards that tilted in favor of the national, full-time law
schools, to the detriment of night schools and other alternative
types of law schools that might have otherwise been able to
develop, the latter being schools that non-elites and working class
individuals were more likely to be able to attend.189
One can hardly quarrel with the notion that there should not
be law schools that expressly aspire to lower educational
standards or knowingly produce a class of incompetent
practitioners. But that is a straw man and as such was not the
proposition furthered by Reed in his report.190 Rather, the idea
was that the variation among types of law schools should be
recognized in a way that permits each to focus on their respective
strengths in service of various segments of the public and bar.191
Reed did not know what such a regime would look like in its

188. Id. at 685–86.
189. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS), whose membership
consisted of the elite law schools, similarly opposed the idea of a differentiated
bar or the perpetuation of a separate, lower class of law schools. See STEVENS,
supra note 123, at 116 (describing the membership of the AALS and referring to
the 1921 presidential address by Yale’s Arthur Corbin to the AALS that
“reject[ed] any concept of a differentiated bar”).
190. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 55–56 (describing the development of
different institutions to serve those who can devote all their time to legal
education while addressing “the democratic desire to extend the privileges of
education to the many”).
191. See id. at 56–57 (“If law school graduates enjoyed different privileges in
the practice of law, corresponding to the differences in educational effort
between full-time and part-time work, the two types instead of rivaling would
supplement one another. Each could develop independently along the lines
indicated by its own special aim.”).
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particulars,192 but it is likely that he would endorse moves from
some quarters today to get the ABA to amend its approval
standards to allow creative flexibility among the law schools; that
is, efforts such as those that relax the tenure requirement in
favor of alternative means of giving faculty security of position193
might permit some schools, for example, to build a faculty of
practitioners who practice during the day and teach only at
night.194 Relaxing other standardssuch as the full-time faculty
and library requirements or the limitations on distance

192. See id. at 419
The more scholarly institutions may in time be glad to lighten their
own burden by throwing upon schools of other types responsibility for
certain portions of this broad field. Conveyancing, probate practice,
criminal law and trial work are examples of topics that seem
particularly appropriate for the relatively superficial schools. All this
is mere guesswork, however. It is not even certain that a rigorous
functional division of the bar will ever develop. The dividing line
between the different types of lawyers may be determined by the
economic status of the client rather than by the nature of the
professional service rendered. The general principle of a
differentiated profession is something that we already have, and
could not abolish if we would. The particular principle of a
functionally divided bar is something that we may or may not be able
eventually to introduce, as one means for making the general
principle work better.
193. See ABA STANDARDS AND INTERPRETATIONS ON FACULTY, Standard 405
(Discussion Draft 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/standards_review_docume
nts/july2011meeting/20110711_ch_4_faculty_terms_and_conditions_july_10_201
1_discussion_draft.authcheckdam.pdf (presenting two alternative proposals that
relax or eliminate the requirement of faculty tenure); see also Mark Hansen,
ABA Committee Considers Changes in Terms and Conditions of Law School
Employment Policies, A.B.A. J. (Jul. 11, 2011, 7:34 PM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/aba_committee_considers_changes_in_terms_and_cond
itions_of_law_school/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campai
gn=ABA+Journal+Daily+News&utm_content=Netvibes (last visited Aug. 31,
2012) (discussing ABA Standards Review Committee proposals to permit law
schools that do not offer tenure to demonstrate alternative sufficient means of
providing security of position) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
194. See, e.g., BIRMINGHAM SCH. OF L., http://www.bsol.com/ (last visited Aug.
24, 2012) (describing a non-ABA-accredited school taught by practicing lawyers
and judges whose graduates may sit for the Alabama bar exam) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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education195might similarly free law schools to deliver an
education sufficient to serve a different segment of the bar than
might a graduate of a national full-time law school.
The challenge would be on the licensing side; state licensing
authorities would be responsible for determining whether
graduates of all law schools were prepared to practice, something
most bar exams, as structured at the time, largely failed to do.196
Beyond making bar exams a better judge of practice-readiness
and legal competence,197 one could imagine a differentiated bar
with various levels of licensure. Such a system would not have to
mimic the barrister–solicitor distinction of England precisely,198
but that model at least could be an example of where to start the
thought process. Alternatively, phased licensure could be
195. Current ABA Standards limit the credit that students may receive
through distance education to four hours in any term and twelve hours overall.
2012–2013, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 306(d). The Standards Review Committee
considered revising this standard, but only to permit fifteen hours total of
distance education to count towards the J.D. degree. See AM. B. ASS’N SECTION
OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, Standard 311(f), (Proposed
Draft 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Proposed Draft], available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committ
ees/standards_review_documents/jan2012/20111222_standards_chapters_1_to_7
_post_nov11.authcheckdam.pdf. Currently, there is one completely online law
school, The Concord School of Law, which is ineligible for ABA approval due to
Standard 306. However, one of its graduates did successfully petition the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for permission to sit for that state’s bar
exam, which he passed. See Kristina Horton Flaherty, Court Win for Online Law
School Grad, CAL. B. J. (Jan. 2009), http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?
articleId=94802&categoryId=94651&month=1&year=2009 (last visited Aug. 31,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
196. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 59 (“The actual situation is that
neither the tests of the state nor those of the law schools serve to prevent
incompetents from flooding the profession.”).
197. See, e.g., ALI–ABA CONTINUING PROF. EDUC. & ASS’N OF CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC., EQUIPPING OUR LAWYERS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CRITICAL
ISSUES SUMMIT 8 (2010), available at http://www.equippingourlawyers.
org/documents/final_report.pdf (“Regulatory authorities should consider
restructuring one-time bar examinations into phased examinations over time,
linked in part to attainment of legal practice skills, with some parts of the
examination occurring as early as in the law school years.”).
198. See MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & CHRISTOPHER
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 546–49 (2d ed., 1994) (describing the
distinction between English barristers and solicitors).
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considered, with probationary or apprenticeship periods
preceding full admission, as is currently the approach in
Canada.199 Whatever the specifics might be, revising the ABA
standards in a way that permits flexibility while ensuring that
basic levels of quality are maintained—in tandem with improved
state bar admissions standards—seems to be the ideal that Reed
was endorsing and would seem to be a way to free law schools to
pursue their respective strengths without having to devote
resources toward compliance with standards that do not truly
speak to their core mission and the segment of the bar they serve.
But this was not to be; the Section rebuffed the Reed Report’s
recommendation to permit the development of fundamentally
different types of law schools in favor of a unitary set of
standards that required all law schools to aspire toward and
satisfy its vision of what was required to make a law school
educationally sound.200 There was notable opposition to the

199. See Articling Program: What You Need to Know, L. SOC’Y OF UPPER CAN.
(May 2012), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/ArticlingNeedtoKnowInfo/ (last visited Aug.
24, 2012) (describing the ten-month articling program in the Canadian licensing
process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
200. See Special Committee Report, 44 AM. BAR ASS’N REP., supra note 183,
at 683. The committee noted that:
To require a law-school education without setting standards for the
law schools would be worse than useless. Any man or group of men
professing to teach law to students may be said to be conducting a
law school, no matter how inferior may be the abilities of the
students, the nature of the instruction or the physical facilities of the
plant . . . . We, therefore, propose not only that a law school education
shall be required, but that such education must be obtained in a
school complying with certain prescribed standards.
Id.; see also Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, 46 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 678 (1923). The Council came to the following
conclusion:
[T]hat a school, to be in the approved list, must comply as to all of its
students. Some schools or some institutions conduct classes both for
full time and part time students. Some of these have arranged to
comply with the standards of the American Bar Association or
announced that they will in the near future comply with such
standards as to their full time students, but have not arranged to so
comply as to their part time students. The Council has concluded that
such schools cannot be placed on the approved list.
Id.
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standards proposed by the Section; Dean Edward T. Lee of the
John Marshall Law School of Chicago argued:
The effect of the adoption of the recommendations would be to
place the control of legal education through the country in the
hands of the deans of a few large day law schools who have the
fate of law teachers in their hands. It would close the
profession of the law to all save the leisure class of youth with
means sufficient to obtain college and law school
training . . . .201

Nonetheless, the ABA approved the Section’s recommendations at
its 1921 meeting202 and they were subsequently approved by the
Conference of Bar Association Delegates held in Washington,
D.C. in 1922.203
C. Twentieth Century Critiques and Reforms
“[I]s it not plain that, without giving up entirely the case-book
system or the growing and valuable alliance with the so-called
social sciences, the law schools should once more get in
intimate contact with what clients need and with what courts
and lawyers actually do?”
—Jerome Frank, 1933204

The ABA’s determination to impose its unitary vision of law
schools based on the Langdell model—three years of full-time
study (or its equivalent if part-time), centered around large
physical libraries, and classes taught by full-time faculty
members removed from the practice of law—was a victory for the
full-time national law schools that furthered the Harvardization
of legal education.205 It was not long, however, before another
201. Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, 44 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 668 (1921) (discussing the report of the Special
Committee).
202. See Transactions of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, 44 AM. B. ASS’N REP. 37–47 (1921).
203. See Proceedings of the Special Conference on Legal Education, 45 AM. B.
ASS’N REP. 482–84, 582 (1922).
204. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
907, 913 (1933–1934) [hereinafter Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?].
205. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at 410 (“The path indicated by
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major threat to the Langdellian model for the study of law in the
first half of the twentieth century reared its head. This challenge
came from what came to be referred to as the legal Realists, who
challenged “the Langdellian notion of law as an exact science,
based on the objectivity of black-letter rules.”206 Instead, the
Realists posited that the operation of the law in the real world
was less coherent and objective than Langdell’s scientific vision of
the law suggested.207 With law as a value-laden process more so
than a neutral and consistent body of enduring principles,
Langdell’s belief in cases as the vehicle for learning legal doctrine
and in the mastery of doctrine and principles as the route to
becoming a good lawyer became subject to doubt.208
In 1933, Jerome Frank reflected the Realists’ view in his
withering critique of the Langdellian case method:
Ostensibly, the students were to study cases. But they did not
and they do not study cases. They do not even study the
printed records of cases (although that would be little enough),
let alone cases as living processes. Their attention is restricted
to judicial opinions. But an opinion is not a decision. A decision
is a specific judgment, or order or decree entered after a trial
of a specific lawsuit between specific litigants. There are a
multitude of factors which [sic] induce a jury to return a
verdict, or a judge to enter a decree. Of those numerous
factors, but few are set forth in judicial opinions. And those
factors, not expressed in the opinions, frequently are the most
important in the real causal explanation of the decisions.209

Harvard . . . has been followed by all the schools. Their main activities are
devoted to instruction in the relatively narrow . . . field of the judge-made
technical law.”); see also id. at 411–12 (describing innovations in legal education
emanating from Harvard that took hold, including the focus on “national” law,
introduction of the case method, and imposition of the requirement of
preliminary college training before entering law school). For a fuller account of
the standardization movement by the ABA and the AALS, see STEVENS, supra
note 123, at 205–13.
206. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 156.
207. See id. (“The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of ‘the
system’ altogether. All legal logic came under suspicion. American law became
increasingly purposive, increasingly secularized, and increasingly atomized.”).
208. See id. at 156–57 (“This change inevitably caused the predictive value
of doctrine to be seriously questioned.”).
209. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 910.
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From the Realist perspective, the law in books—particularly
books limited to reports of appellate opinions—was not the sum
total of what constituted the law nor even the best source for
understanding law or legal practice.210 Frank argued for the
study of complete case files—not simply appellate opinions—and
for study of the work of lawyers in practice and the work of the
courts:
[T]he study of cases . . . should be based to a very marked
extent on reading and analysis of complete records of cases—
beginning with the filing of the first papers, through the trial
in the trial court and to and through the upper courts. Six
months properly spent on one or two elaborate court records,
including the briefs (and supplemented by reading of text-books
as well as upper court opinions) will teach a student more than
two years spent on going through twenty of the case-books now
in use.211

Karl Llewellyn, during his time at Columbia Law School, raised
similar points, suggesting the case approach used in business
schools as a way of improving on the Langdellian case method.212
Another Realist critique was of the abstract focus and dearth
of practical training that characterized law schools. Fred Rodell
210. See Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19
A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1933) [hereinafter Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal
Education?] (noting the advantages of studying case files over court opinions).
Frank noted:
The law student should learn, while in school, the art of legal
practice. And to that end, the law schools should boldly, not slyly and
evasively, repudiate the false dogmas of Langdell . . . . They must
decide not to exclude, as did Langdell, but to include the “methods of
learning law by work in the lawyer’s office and attendance upon the
proceedings of courts of justice. . . .” They must repudiate the absurd
notions that the heart of a law school is its library . . . .
Id. (citations omitted)
211. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 916.
212. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948–1949) (“Consider, for example, the possibility of
building up our so-called cases out beyond the judicial opinion into something
resembling the completeness of the cases gathered for the Harvard Business
School.”). For an exposure to the Harvard Business School case method, see The
Case Method at HBS, HARVARD BUS. SCH., http://www.hbs.edu/teaching/insidehbs/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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of Yale found fault with the focus on abstractions rather than on
practical legal problem-solving when he wrote, “[T]hus, law
school courses, since they are cut out of the pseudo-science of
Law, inevitably focus on generalities and abstractions rather
than on the solution of specific problems.”213 In 1928, Alfred Reed
of the Carnegie Foundation commented on the need for more
practical instruction in his second report on legal education in
which he faulted the law schools for their failure to provide
students with practical experience:
[A]ll the activities of the school are necessarily conducted
under artificial conditions. The hurly-burly of actual practice
is systemized for the student in a manner that it never is when
an authentic client begins to tell him his woes. This
systemization is indispensable as a means of ensuring him
adequate resources of information and of developed reasoning
power upon which to draw. But there still remains the task of
marshaling these resources, of focusing his scattered
acquisitions upon the unlabeled and multifarious collection of
facts and aims with which he will be called upon to deal.
Skilled ability to do this is what distinguishes the lawyer from
the legal scholar, the expert practitioner from the man who
knows, or who is qualified to ascertain, the law.214

Reed favored further experimentation with legal clinics
associated with law schools as a way of ameliorating this
condition.215 Jerome Frank suggested the same only a few years
later.216
These points were well taken; however, they did not lead to a
wholesale overhaul of legal education away from the Langdellian
model. Instead, law schools responded by supplementing their
curricula with practice courses in the form of legal clinics.217 By
213. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 207 (1939).
214. REED REPORT II, supra note 167, at 215.
215. See id. at 216–21 (“If by this method lawyers who enter the legal
profession through the law schools can acquire even a small amount of that
practical experience which they now so sadly lack, the plan is certainly worth
putting into operation.”).
216. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 917
(“Suppose, however, that there were in each law school a legal clinic or
dispensary.”).
217. See STEVENS, supra note 123, at 214–16 (“Of all aspects of the renewed
interest in skills, the particular interest in the skills embraced in the concept of
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1951, there were twenty-eight clinics maintained by law schools,
independent legal aid societies, or public defender offices.218 The
movement grew stronger over the next two decades, resulting in
clinical programs at nearly half of the law schools in the country
by the early 1970s.219
Although the rise of clinical legal education was a major
innovation in how law schools prepared their students for
practice, very little change in the law school program had
occurred overall.220 Indeed, criticism of the legal profession
persisted in the 1970s, a critique that extended to law schools as
the near exclusive route to practice.221 As the second and third
years of law school had become largely elective and focused on
courses not necessarily oriented towards practice, bar admissions
authorities began considering imposing practice course
requirements as prerequisites to admission.222 In 1971, the AALS
issued the report of its Curriculum Study Project—known as the
Carrington Report—which called for a curriculum that
emphasized practice-oriented courses in the first year.223 A 1972
clinical legal education was to prove the most important.”). Other reforms were
implemented during the post-World War II period as well, including the
introduction of elective courses, seminar courses, introductory law courses,
writing programs, small group discussions, reduced class sizes, and the like. See
id. at 211–14 (“[T]here had been a realization that there were important skills
other than those inculcated by the case method . . . . Discussions of curricular
reform increasingly centered on skills such as negotiation, drafting, and
counseling—legal skills that had had no place in the Langdellian scheme of
things.”).
218. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 215.
219. Id. at 216.
220. See id. at 232 (“[B]y the mid-1960s . . . [t]here had been much talk of
change, but little change had occurred.”). Readers should consult Stevens’s book
on the history of legal education for a much more complete account of what
transpired in legal education during this time period.
221. See id. at 232–38 (“Increasingly, the leaders of the bar expressed
concern that the law schools were not living up to their expectations . . . . The
bar was irritated by an apparent reluctance on the part of leading schools to be
concerned with those skills that the profession regarded as important . . . .”).
222. See id. at 238–39 (discussing the Second Circuit’s proposal to require
that applicants have taken evidence, civil procedure, criminal procedure,
professional responsibility, and trial advocacy); see also id. at 239–40 (discussing
efforts of other jurisdictions to impose law school course prerequisites to bar
admission).
223. See Paul D. Carrington, Ass’n Am. L. Schs., Training for the Public
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report sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education noted the encouraging expansion in clinical legal
education but cautioned that proper supervision and instruction
were required to make real life experiences edifying and
educationally sound, and doubted whether clinical education
ultimately could be “the solution” to the host of ills that plagued
legal education given its costs.224
In 1979, the ABA entered the dialogue by publishing the
report of its Task Force on Lawyer Competency entitled The Role
of Law Schools, in which it observed, “Law schools, have not . . .
undertaken to provide such comprehensive training that
individuals emerge upon graduation as fully competent ready-topractice lawyers.”225 The Task Force then emphasized the need
for improvement in the following areas:
(a) developing some of the fundamental skills underemphasized
by traditional legal education; (b) shaping attitudes, values, and
work habits critical to the individual’s ability to translate
knowledge and relevant skills into adequate professional
performance; and (c) providing integrated learning experiences
focused on particular fields of lawyer practice, including but not
limited to trial practice.226

Toward that end, the Task Force recommended that law schools
provide instruction in fundamental skills critical to lawyer
competence: effective writing, oral communication skills, factgathering, interviewing, counseling, and negotiation skills.227 It
went on to recommend teaching these fundamental lawyer skills
in small classes, that schedules be adjusted to “provide [the]
opportunity for periods of intensive instruction in fundamental
Professions of the Law: 1971, Part One, Section II (1971), reprinted in HERBERT
L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION 93, 110–17
(1972) [hereinafter CARRINGTON REPORT] (including, among others, a course
entitled legal advocacy to be completed in the first year of law school where
“[e]mphasis is placed on the need to develop and use professional skills”).
224. See PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 223, at 42–43, 46 (“We prefer to
think that the path of improvement lies in experimentation with many modest
ideas, one of which is clinical education.”).
225. CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 22, at 11.
226. Id. at 14.
227. Id. at 3.
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lawyer skills,” that law schools encourage more cooperative law
student work, and that “law schools should make more extensive
instructional use of experienced and able lawyers and judges.”228
Also noteworthy was its recommendation that law schools
“develop and use more comprehensive methods of measuring law
student performance than the typical end-of-the-term
examination” and that “[s]tudents should be given detailed
critiques of their performance.”229 Finally, with respect to the
academic program, the Task Force urged law schools to “seek to
achieve greater coherence in their curriculum,” noting that “the
three-year program should build in a structured way.”230
Notwithstanding these recommendations, when a proposal to
require that law schools offer practical skills instruction as a
condition of accreditation was presented to the ABA by the
Council of the Section on Legal Education, the ABA softened the
proposal by limiting it to an interpretative paragraph calling for
skills training rather than an approval standard mandating such
training.231
More than a decade later, legal education still was perceived
as inadequately preparing students for practice, as little had
changed in how law schools educated their students.232 The ABA
spoke to this concern in a 1992 report known as the MacCrate
Report.233 The MacCrate Report outlined a series of skills and
values that were deemed to be essential for competent
representation, and then recommended that law schools offer
courses that effectively instruct students in those areas.234 The
fundamental lawyering skills outlined included problem solving,
228. Id. at 4.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. STEVENS, supra note 123, at 240, 257 nn.88–89.
232. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 93 (“[T]hese efforts failed to change
the standard pattern of law school education.”).
233. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22.
234. See id. at 330–34 (identifying three characteristics of effective
lawyering skills teaching including: the “development of concepts and theories
underlying the skills and values being taught; opportunity for students to
perform lawyering tasks with appropriate feedback and self-evaluation; [and]
reflective evaluation of the students’ performance by a qualified assessor”).
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legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual
investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, knowledge
of litigation and ADR procedures, law-practice management, and
the ability to recognize and resolve ethical dilemmas.235 The four
values suggested by the report were the provision of competent
representation, striving to promote justice, fairness, and
morality, striving to improve the profession, and professional selfdevelopment.236 The report also explored the state of skills
instruction offered in law schools at the time, finding that a
majority of law graduates had only one or no professional skills
courses beyond basic legal research and writing courses, trial
advocacy, or moot court experiences.237 The report found that
clinical programs were generally available to only thirty percent
of law students at schools where such courses were offered, with
skills training courses occupying only nine percent of the total
instructional time at law schools.238
An important perspective offered by the MacCrate Report
was the importance of the entire legal educational continuum—
pre-law, law school, bar admissions, and continuing legal
education—and it addressed the need for improvements to occur
at each stage.239 Ultimately, the report concluded that greater
attention should be paid to “the linkage between the several
phases of lawyers’ education” if the gaps in professional legal
education are to be filled.240 Although the report spawned some
efforts to increase skills instruction in law schools, such training
has remained peripheral to legal education241 and no grand effort
235. Id. at 138–40.
236. Id. at 140–41.
237. Id. at 240.
238. Id. at 240–41.
239. See id. at 3–8 (“The skills and values of the competent lawyer are
developed along a continuum that starts before law school, reaches its most
formative and intensive stage during the law school experience, and continues
throughout a lawyer’s professional career.”).
240. Id. at 320–21. The report proposed the creation of a national institute
to attend to this coordination. Id.
241. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 94 (“[S]kills training will
continue to face an uphill battle unless it is linked with an accepted theory of
lawyering that could provide a bridge between theory and practice and perhaps
establish a rationale for more systemic continuing education beyond law
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to coordinate the various phases of legal education has
materialized.
D. Contemporary Critiques
In 2007, a group of researchers compiled a report entitled
Best Practices for Legal Education (Best Practices) that began by
echoing the MacCrate Report’s charge that multiple stages along
the legal education continuum had substantial room for
improvement.242 Specifically, the report noted that law graduates
“are not sufficiently competent to provide legal services to clients
or even to perform the work expected of them in large firms” and
that survey after survey has reported a decline in lawyer
professionalism.243 However, the true focus of Best Practices was
on how law schools could better design and deliver a curriculum
that prepared students for practice.244 As the MacCrate Report
had done a decade before, Best Practices spoke of the need for
skills and values training by calling for “context-based education”
as the means for giving students the problem-solving
opportunities they need to become competent and effective legal
practitioners.245 The report also dug into what is wrong with
traditional law school teaching and assessment methods,
proposing the use of a diversity of approaches that are connected
with developing competent and thoughtful practitioners.246
school.”).
242. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 11–36 (noting a compelling need
to improve legal education because, among other reasons: the licensing process
is not protecting the public, and because law schools are not fully committed to
preparing their students for bar exams or practice).
243. Id.
244. See id. at 8–9 (“Law schools should organize their curriculums to
develop knowledge, skills, and values progressively; integrate the teaching of
theory, doctrine, and practice; and teach professionalism pervasively throughout
all three years of law school.”).
245. See id. at 141 (“Legal education would be more effective if law teachers
used context-based education throughout the curriculum.”).
246. See id. at 207–63 (noting that “many teachers use the case method
exclusively even when other methods of instruction would accomplish their
educational objectives more effectively,” and that “the end-of-the-semester essay
exam is an inadequate method for assessing student learning . . . [that] is
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Overall, the report’s core concern was that law schools should
recognize the broad array of skills and attributes that successful
lawyers need to have beyond legal knowledge and analytical
ability and incorporate courses and methods that attend to those
competencies.247
Following closely on the heels of the Best Practices report in
2007 was another major critique of legal education, a report of
the Carnegie Foundation entitled Educating Lawyers:
Preparation for the Profession of Law (Carnegie Report).248 The
report was the product of a two-year study that included an
extensive literature review, consultation with the AALS and the
Law School Admissions Council, and site visits to a
representative sample of sixteen American and Canadian law
schools, including public and private schools, more selective and
less selective schools, freestanding schools, and schools that
served certain ethnic minority groups.249 A central premise of the
Carnegie Report is that the education of professionals is a
complex and unique enterprise that cannot simply focus on the
transmission of expert knowledge, but must also focus on
instilling the specialized skills, standards, judgment, and values
that define practice in a profession.250 The challenge for
professional education is to weave the various components of
professional training into a whole that attends to the interests of
educators, practitioners, and the public to be served by the
profession.251
According to the Carnegie Report, this has been the singular
challenge of legal education, as its modern linkage with the
research university has stood in tension with the historical
neither valid, nor reliable, nor fair”).
247. See id. at 7–10 (“While law schools help students acquire some of the
essential skills and knowledge required for law practice, most law schools are
not committed to preparing students for practice . . . . [M]ost law school
graduates are not as prepared for law practice as they could be and should be.”).
248. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22.
249. Id. at 15–16.
250. See id. at 3–4 (noting that professional schools “are perhaps the sole
site where the professions’ standards of good work set the agenda for learning”).
251. See id. at 4 (“This is a complex educational process . . . and its value
depends, in large part, on how well the several aspects of professional training
are understood and woven into a whole.”).
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connection between the community of practitioners and young
legal apprentices.252 The university connection has made legal
education predominately academic in character, focusing on
teaching and studying law as a science, “put[ting] a premium on
formal knowledge, abstracted from context.”253 This positivist
orientation—which, as we have seen, characterized the views of
Langdell254—led to a view that the traditions of practice—such as
craft, judgment, and professional responsibility—were too
subjective and uncritical, a perspective that “undermined the
academic legitimacy of practical knowledge” and “spelled the
eclipse of traditional forms of practitioner-directed apprenticeship
by academic instruction given by scholar-teachers.”255
The triumph of the academy in legal education has resulted
in a focus on training in legal knowledge and legal analysis
rather than on learning to practice.256 Complete professional
education, however, must be defined by “three apprenticeships”
that the Carnegie Report authors describe: the cognitive
apprenticeship focused on expert knowledge and modes of
thinking; the apprenticeship of practice, which trains students in
“the forms of expert practice shared by competent practitioners;”
and the apprenticeship of identity and purpose, which “introduces
students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the
values for which the professional community is responsible.”257 To
be successful in their goal of educating lawyers, law schools must
“initiate
learners
into
all
three
apprenticeships.”258
Unfortunately, law schools focus heavily on the cognitive
252. See id. (“[L]aw schools are hybrid institutions. One parent is the
historic community of practitioners, deeply immersed in the common law and
carrying on traditions of craft, judgment, and public responsibility. The other
heritage is that of the modern research university.”).
253. Id. at 4–5.
254. See supra Part II.E (summarizing Langdell’s theory of American legal
education).
255. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 4–5.
256. See id. at 6–7 (“In its quest for academic respectability, legal education
would come to emphasize legal knowledge and reasoning at the expense of
attention to practice skills, while the relations of legal activity to morality and
public responsibility received even less direct attention in the curriculum.”).
257. Id. at 28.
258. Id.
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apprenticeship: “For many students, neither practical skills nor
reflection on professional responsibility figure significantly in
their legal education. The academic setting clearly tilts the
balance toward the cognitive and intellectual.”259 The Carnegie
Report contrasts this tilt in legal education with the laboratory
experience that characterizes engineering education260 and the
extensive clinical work that is the hallmark of medical
education.261
The academic focus of professional legal education has
resulted in a shift in teaching methods, away from
“apprenticeship, with its intimate pedagogy of modeling and
coaching, toward reliance on the methods of academic instruction,
with its emphasis on classroom teaching and learning.”262
Further, the Carnegie Report notes that the “signature pedagogy”
of law school—the Socratic case-dialogue method—leads to two
major weaknesses of typical law school education: “[T]he casual
attention that most law schools give to teaching students how to
use legal thinking in the complexity of actual law practice” and
“law schools’ failure to complement the focus on skill in legal
analysis with effective support for developing the ethical and
social dimensions of the profession.”263 These weaknesses
“prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather
than an apprentice practitioner”264 and leave students with an
259. Id. at 79.
260. Although engineering education does include lab work, the Carnegie
Foundation—in a separate report—has critiqued engineering programs for how
labs are poorly designed and integrated into a curriculum that remains
dominated by formal knowledge and analysis. SHERI D. SHEPPARD ET AL.,
EDUCATING ENGINEERS: DESIGNING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FIELD 16, 74 (2009).
261. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 79–81 (“The distinguishing
feature of medical training . . . is that most of it is carried out in settings of
actual patient care. The consequence is to provide medicine a real advantage,
compared to engineering or law, for integrating its forms of apprenticeship.”).
Clinical clerkships in medical education are a legacy of the Flexner Report, a
product of the Carnegie Foundation. See COOKE ET AL., supra note 147, at 13, 82
(“The third year [of medical school], dedicated to patient care and investigation
of clinical problems presented by hospitalized patients, is a legacy of the
Flexnerian reforms . . . .”).
262. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25.
263. Id. at 188.
264. Id.
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underdeveloped
sense
of
professional
judgment
and
265
responsibility.
Although there have been successful efforts in recent decades
to expand practice-oriented education and apprenticeship
learning methods in law schools, these experiences tend to be
disconnected from the main curriculum, meaning that the three
critical
elements
of
legal
professionalism—“conceptual
knowledge, skill, and moral discernment”266—remain artificially
distinct and, thus, are insufficiently transmitted to novice
professionals:
[T]he threefold movement between law as doctrine and
precedent (the focus of the case-dialogue classroom) to
attention to performance skills (the aim of the apprenticeship
of practice) and then to responsible engagement with solving
clients’ legal problems—a back-and-forth cycle of action and
reflection—also characterizes most legal practice. The
separation of these phases into distinct areas of the
curriculum, or as separate apprenticeships, is always an
artificial “decomposition” of practice. The pedagogical cycle is
not completed unless these segregated domains are
reconnected.267

Ultimately, it is these deficits—insufficient education in the skills
and values of professional legal practice, an overuse of the
academic case-dialogue method of instruction, and the poor
integration of practical and professionalism instruction into the
dominant cognitive curriculum—that are contemporary legal
education’s greatest weaknesses.
Recent studies and practitioner surveys reflect the sense that
the Langdellian law school is insufficiently connected with the
realities of modern practice. The NALP’s After the JD: First
Results of a National Study of Legal Careers Survey reports only
265. See id. (“[L]ack of attention to practice and the weakness of concern
with professional responsibility—are the unintended consequences of reliance
on a single, heavily academic pedagogy to provide the crucial initiation into
legal education.”); see also id. at 140 (“Insofar as law schools choose not to place
ethical-social values within the inner circle . . . legal education may
inadvertently contribute to the demoralization of the legal profession and its
loss of a moral compass . . . .”).
266. Id. at 12.
267. Id. at 124.
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moderate satisfaction with the level of practice preparedness that
law graduates received in law school:
When [survey respondents were] asked to reflect on their legal
education, however, most were not especially enthusiastic
about the specific role of their law schools in the transition to
practice. On the question of whether law school prepared them
well for their legal careers, the median response is exactly in
the middle (neither agree nor disagree). Respondents tended to
agree—but not strongly—with the proposition that law school
teaching is too theoretical and unconcerned with real-life
practice. They also evinced a desire for more practical training
in their assessment of the most helpful law school courses.
Both clinical and legal writing courses received higher ratings
than more conventional law school offerings. Most helpful in
the transition to practice, however, was experience working
during law school summers and during the year.268

Respondents to the Law School Survey of Student Engagement
(LSSSE Survey) corroborate these findings, showing that “[f]orty
percent of law students felt that their legal education had so far
contributed only some or very little to their acquisition of job- or
work-related knowledge and skills.”269
Respondents to the LSSSE Survey also indicated that the
Carnegie Report’s assessment regarding the insufficient
professionalism and ethical training in law schools has some
validity: “[O]nly half of students reported that law school
prepared them well . . . to deal with ethical dilemmas that may
arise as part of law practice.”270 Further, survey results showed
that clinical participation and pro bono work was correlated with
a higher degree of preparation in the areas of “understanding the
needs of future clients, working cooperatively with colleagues as
part of a legal team, serving the public good through their
profession, and understanding professional values that will serve
them in their legal careers.”271 With only a third of law students

268.
269.

NALP, AFTER THE JD, supra note 5, at 79.
LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY
RESULTS, NAVIGATING LAW SCHOOL: PATHS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 9 (2011).
270. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY
RESULTS, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW SCHOOL: IN CLASS AND BEYOND 8 (2010).
271. Id.
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engaging in clinical work during law school,272 these lessons are
not being fully diffused across all matriculants. Recent surveys of
corporate general counsels confirm the unsatisfactory state of
lawyer professionalism;273 a majority of those surveyed reported
being dissatisfied with outside counsel because of a failure to
keep the client adequately informed, non-responsiveness to client
interests, making decisions without client authorization, and the
failure to give clear advice.274
We see, then, that the critique of legal education has a long
pedigree, traversing the twentieth century and enduring through
the present day. Indeed, the nature of the critique has been
remarkably consistent, focusing on the poor connection between
traditional legal education and legal practice.
IV. The Current State of Legal Education
“[T]he [law] schools . . . must be brought into a closer
sympathy and contact with the profession than is now to be
found . . . . It is unjust to students, and a fraud on the public,
to recommend them as practitioners until they reach some
creditable degree at least of skill and knowledge.”
—ABA Comm. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, 1879275

Has contemporary legal education moved beyond this
history? Although still fundamentally consonant with the
272. See NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS, supra note 31, at 6 (showing 30.2% of survey
respondents had participated in at least one legal clinic).
273. See, e.g., COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ILL. SUPREME COURT, SURVEY ON
PROFESSIONALISM 26 (2007), available at http://www.ilsccp.org/pdfs/surveyon
professionalism_final.pdf (showing that corporate and in-house counsel reported
encountering unprofessional behavior from lawyers).
274. See Clark D. Cunningham & W. Lee Burge, What Do Clients Want from
their Lawyers? 8 (Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Working
Paper No. 2010-04) (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://law.gsu.edu/
ccunningham/PDF/WhatClientsWant-13Oct09.pdf
(reporting
unfavorable
results pertaining to lawyer professionalism (citing BTI CONSULTING, HOW
CLIENTS HIRE, FIRE AND SPEND: LANDING THE WORLD'S BEST CLIENTS (2007),
available at http://www.bticonsulting.com/PDFs/HireFireSpend_2007_Executive
Summary.pdf)).
275. Hunt, 2 AM. BAR ASS’N REP., supra note 134, at 219.
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Langdellian model, law schools have reformed in many ways
since Langdell’s time. Professors have varied their teaching
methods in ways that build on or depart from the case method.
Law schools have pursued and implemented many of the reforms
suggested in the reports reviewed above, offering basic legal
research and writing training in the first year,276 requiring upperlevel extensive writing experiences277 in line with the current
ABA Standards,278 and ensuring that students have some
opportunity to experience small class sizes279 and group work
with other students.280 The relevance of other disciplines to the
study of law has been recognized and incorporated into the
curriculum through the introduction of interdisciplinary subjects
276. See, e.g., Climenko Fellowship and First-Year Legal Research and
Writing Program, HARVARD LAW SCH. (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.law.harvard.
edu/academics/degrees/jd/fylrwp/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (“The First-Year
Legal Research and Writing Program (LRW) is a series of sequenced,
interrelated exercises introducing students to the way lawyers conduct legal
research, analyze and frame legal positions, and present their work in writing
and in oral argument.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
277. See, e.g., JD Writing Requirement, COLUMBIA L. SCH., http://www.
law.columbia.edu/academics/registrar/writing (last visited Sept. 14, 2012)
(describing the details of its J.D. writing requirement) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Writing Requirement, NYU SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academicservices/degreerequirements/jdprogram/writ
ingrequirements/index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“In order to graduate, a
student must produce an original analytic paper of substantial length
(ordinarily at least 10,000 words in length and undergoes a comment and draft
process) under the supervision of a faculty member who may augment these
requirements.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. See 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 302(a) (requiring “at least
one rigorous writing experience in the first year and at least one additional
rigorous writing experience after the first year”).
279. The Cramton Report noted that some upper-level class sizes are small
“simply because they furnish instruction relevant to a less heavily chosen career
alternative or are less frequently elected for other reasons” and added that
“[t]he instruction can be, but typically is not, significantly different in nature
and method from that furnished in large classes.” CRAMTON REPORT, supra note
22, at 23.
280. See, e.g., Judith Romero, Stanford Law School Advances New Model for
Legal Education, SLS NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/news
feed/2012/02/13/stanford-law-school-advances-new-model-for-legal-education/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“The law school has developed a range of sophisticated
team-oriented, problem-solving courses . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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or the infusion of such learning into traditional law courses.281
The clinical legal training movement has successfully imported
live-client practice experiences into the law school framework,282
affording students the opportunity to opt for such an
experience.283 And, increasingly, law schools are offering practical
skills training courses that teach students the skills they will
need to have to practice law.284 Indeed, curricular reform is the
order of the day, as schools rush to outdo each other in adjusting
their programs in various ways to improve their ability to
produce practice-capable graduates.
Although these contemporary reforms are appropriate moves
in the right direction that will yield results on the margins, to
this point, they have not resulted in a wholesale change in the
practice-readiness of American law school graduates, a failing
that was reflected and explored in the 2007 Carnegie Report and
281. See, e.g., First-Year Curriculum, Academics, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH.
L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/1lplan.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2012) (describing “the graduation requirement that every student take
at least one course offering an interdisciplinary perspective on law and the legal
system”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See, e.g., Clinics—Lawyering and Learning in the New World, NYU
SCH. OF L., http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2012) (describing its clinical program supported by 15 clinical faculty
and 35 clinics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
283. Harvard Law School has recently expanded its clinical courses and
faculty. See Elana Kagan, The Harvard Law School Revisited, 11 GREEN BAG 2D
475, 480 (2008) (“Over the past five years, we’ve hired eight new clinical faculty
members, and the number of students enrolling in clinical work has more than
doubled.”). Washington and Lee University School of Law is an example of a
school that has broadly embraced extensive experiential learning as a
requirement for all of its students. See Washington and Lee School of Law
Announces Dramatic Third Year Reform, WASHINGTON & LEE SCH. OF L. (Mar.
10, 2008), http://www.law.wlu.edu/news/storydetail.asp?id=376 (last visited
Sept. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Dramatic Third Year Reform] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Northeastern University School of Law
requires its students to work full time in live-client settings in alternate
quarters during the second and third years of law school. See Cooperative Legal
Education Program, NORTHEASTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.north
eastern.edu/law/co-op/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
284. See, e.g., Dramatic Third Year Reform, supra note 283 (“Traditional
classroom instruction will be replaced by practice simulations, real-client
interactions and the development of law practice skills.”).
OF
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other recent studies.285 Indeed, the numerous shortcomings of the
American model of legal education have been documented
extensively: Law school does not routinely provide training in
many of the practice skill areas—such as drafting, counseling,
planning, client development, and client management—needed to
be a successful practitioner;286 only a tiny percentage of law
schools require clinical training and the majority of students
graduate with no clinical experience;287 its primary pedagogical
approach (the case-dialogue method) is ineffective288 and
demoralizing;289 its main approach to assessment remains the
final essay exam, which reflects little about the professional
competency of students290 and comes too late to allow self285. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 11–13 (explaining that law school
programs cannot fully prepare students for law practice and should be viewed as
only one step in the training process).
286. See John O. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education Renaissance: A
Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303,
335–37 (2007) (explaining that law schools often graduate unskilled students,
who must develop practical skills outside of school and after graduation); see
also John M. Burman, Oral Examinations as a Method of Evaluating Law
Students, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 132 (2001) (“[T]he required curriculum at
many, if not most, American law schools virtually ignores at least half of the
fundamental skills every lawyer should have.”).
287. See NALP, 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS, supra note 31, at 6 (showing 30.2% of survey
respondents had participated in at least one legal clinic, 36.2% of respondents
had taken part in an externship, and 40% of respondents had taken three or
more practice skills courses).
288. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 132–41 (stating that the case
method is encumbered with significant problems as an instructional tool, as its
impact on students is sporadic, it fails to provide feedback to address skill
deficiencies, and it neglects portions of the cognitive process); Bernard D.
Meltzer, The University of Chicago Law School: Ruminations and
Reminiscences, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 241 (2003) (arguing that the Socratic
method is “notoriously inefficient” at teaching black letter law).
289. See Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392,
407 (1971) (“Socratic teaching has been attacked as infantilizing, demeaning,
dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for promoting hostility and competition among
students, self-serving, and destructive of positive ideological values.”).
290. See Sonsteng et al., supra note 286, at 347 (“The traditional assessment
system creates an illusion of higher achievement when there may actually be a
deficiency in actual lawyering skills. Professors routinely observe students excel
in written exams, but then watch as they struggle with interviewing and
counseling clients.”).
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improvement;291 faculty incentives promote scholarship over the
needs of students;292 many professors (particularly the more
recent ones) have little or even no experience practicing law and
lack membership in the bar;293 and law school costs so
291. See id. at 337–38 (“[T]he traditional law school model does not provide
regular or relevant performance feedback, so students have little opportunity to
improve.”).
292. See James Lindgren & Allison Nagelberg, Are Scholars Better
Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 827–29 (1998) (explaining data showing
that major scholars, despite teaching larger and more classes, are perceived as
better teachers than less-cited scholars); see also Deborah Jones Merritt,
Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Exploration, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 765, 807 (1998) (showing that faculty who taught at prestigious
universities taught fewer credit hours than faculty at less prestigious
institutions); Fred R. Shapiro, They Published, Not Perished, But Were They
Good Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 839 (1998) (observing that “while,
generally, praise of teaching is a nearly universal feature of tributes to law
faculty, for the most highly cited scholars, it is often completely absent from
their tributes, and this despite the fact that such scholars typically are accorded
much longer tributes than is the norm”).
293. A review of the faculty profiles at the more “elite” law schools reveals
faculty members who have doctoral degrees in other disciplines but have no
practice experience whatsoever, which cannot put such faculty in a strong
position to train their students in the skills needed for practice. See Joni Hersch
& W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education 2–4
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907760##. A 2003 study
based on AALS data revealed that for those law professors hired between 1996
and 2000, of those with any practice experience (86.6% of the hires), the average
number of years of experience was 3.7. Richard E. Redding, Where Did You Go
to Law School? Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and its Implications for Legal
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 601 (2003); see also Harry T. Edwards, A
New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567, 571 (1997). Edwards
notes:
[A] number of young lawyers flee the ‘rat race’ after only a short stay.
Often, very bright young lawyers seek to move from law practice to
law teaching as quickly as possible, with little practical knowledge or
professional experience. This creates a conundrum whereby many of
these smart young people who escape to academia have nothing good
to say about practice, though they are the ‘teachers’ of the next
generation of the legal profession.
Id.; see also Ann Juergens, Using the MacCrate Report to Strengthen Live-Client
Clinics, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 411, 412–13 (1994) (“[An] excellent academic record
at an ‘elite’ law school, law review, clerkship for an appellate judge, perhaps a
few years at a big law firm, but relatively little first-hand knowledge of dealing
with clients, transactions, the courtroom, real-life conflict and problem
solving.”).
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much294 that most graduates have mammoth, mortgage-like debts
that limit their economically viable options after graduating.295
This is no way to produce competent legal professionals. A closer
look at some of the pillars of law school education—its
curriculum, its pedagogy, its assessment methods, and its
faculty—reveal that what is past is not only prologue, but it is
largely our present, a fact that is problematic given the death of
the apprenticeship and the dramatic changes in the law and legal
practice since the time of Langdell.
A. The Curriculum
Contemporary law school curricula are dominated by legal
doctrine, as was the case during the nineteenth century.
Currently, law school is typically a three-year program (when
pursued full-time)296 that offers roughly the same basic set of
294. Average private law school tuition in 2009 was $35,743, while in-state
tuition at public law schools averaged $18,472. Am. B. Ass’n, Law School
Tuition 1985–2009, at 1, 3, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.
authcheckdam.pdf.
295. Am. B. Ass’n, Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001–2010 at
1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2001_2010_avg_a
mt_borrowed.pdf.
296. Northwestern offers an exception with its two-year Accelerated J.D.
Program. See Accelerated JD, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/ajd/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2012)
(outlining the requirements of the accelerated two-year J.D. program) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The University of Dayton School of
Law offers a two-year option as well. See Two-Year Juris Doctor Program, UNIV.
OF DAYTON SCH. OF L., http://www.udayton.edu/learn/law/juris_doctor_two_
year_option.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Part-time programs tend to run four years. See, e.g., Full- and
Part-Time Programs, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. L. SCH., http://www.
law.gwu.edu/Admissions/JD/Pages/ FT_PT.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“A
part-time student normally will take eight semesters, or four academic years,
and one summer session [to complete the JD degree].”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Part-Time Program, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L.
CTR., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/jd-program/
part-time-program/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“The part-time
program is designed to allow part-time students to complete the J.D. degree
requirements in eight academic semesters.”) (on file with the Washington and

THE LAW SCHOOL CRITIQUE

2021

first-year doctrinal courses297—featuring traditional common law
subjects298—and legal research and writing instruction, followed
by electives that offer doctrinal, skills, or professional/clinical
instruction at the election of the student, culminating with a
major writing requirement of some kind.299 Students generally
are not required to take particular courses beyond the first
year300—professional responsibility or “PR” being a typical
exception301—nor is their course load typically organized around
tracks or concentrations, though many schools do offer the option
Lee Law Review).
297. Virtually every American law school requires the following courses in
the first year of study: contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and civil
procedure. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM. B. ASS’N, A
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 25 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 SURVEY OF LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULA]. Law schools vary in the courses they require in the first
year beyond this basic diet, with many requiring additional doctrinal courses
like constitutional law, administrative law, or transnational law, and some
requiring practically-oriented courses focusing on lawyering or problem solving
skills. See, e.g., Problem Solving Workshop, HARVARD L. SCH. (Dec. 21, 2009),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/registrar/winter-term/problem-solvingworkshop.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
298. The common law focus of the first-year curriculum is an inheritance
from Langdell, who believed that the common law was the core feature of the
American legal system, representing a coherent set of enduring principles that
transcended politics and provided a rational guide for human behavior. See
Rubin, supra note 101, at 624, 626.
299. Supra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Second and Third Year Curriculum, NORTHWESTERN UNIV.
SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/2l_3lplan.html (last
visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“After first year, your educational plan is largely in your
hands as there is only one mandatory class. You must take Legal Ethics, but all
other courses are elective.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
The Program—Courses—Overview, STANFORD L. SCH., http://www. law.stanford.
edu/courses/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“During the second and third year of
law school students are encouraged to follow an academic curriculum
customized to their individual interests.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
301. The ABA Standards impose a requirement of giving students some
legal ethics or professionalism training. 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Interpretation
302-9 (“The substantial instruction in the history, structure, values, rules, and
responsibilities of the legal profession and its members required by Standard
302(a)(5) includes instruction in matters such as the law of lawyering and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.”).
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of pursuing courses within a specified area of focus.302 Although
experiential learning is becoming something that many law
schools are requiring students to have at least one encounter
with,303 few schools require extensive practical skills and clinical
training.304 Under this traditional approach, the primary focus
within the law school curriculum is on doctrinal courses and the
302. Many schools offer the opportunity to pursue a concentration, which
may or may not lead to a certification to that effect. See, e.g., Programs of Study,
HARVARD L. SCH. (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/
degrees/jd/pos/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Harvard explains:
To guide you in pursuing deepening knowledge and progression as
you move through the three years of law school and to create a tool
for better coordination and collaboration between faculty members,
the faculty has developed ‘programs of study.’ Students do not sign up
for any program; nor should any student feel compelled to adhere to
one.
Id. However, the author is unaware of any school that requires all of its
students to organize their courses around a substantive concentration.
303. For example, Gonzaga University School of Law imposes what they call
an “Experiential Learning Requirement,” which they describe as “a capstone
experience” completed through a clinical course or an externship. Curriculum,
GONZAGA UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/Academic-Program/
curriculum/default.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also, e.g., Clinics, UNIV. OF CAL., IRVINE SCH. OF L.,
http://www. law.uci.edu/clinics/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“Prior to
graduation, each student will complete at least one semester of clinical
education . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The
Lawyering Program, NYU SCH. OF L., http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/
lawyeringprogram/index.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (“Lawyering
introduces first-year students to the skills and the theory of the law in use
through two semesters of simulated exercises in legal problem solving.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Data from a 2004 ABA report
indicate that at that time, only 29% of law schools responding to a survey
required some form of skills, clinical, or simulation course for graduation. 2004
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA, supra note 297, at 20.
304. Exceptions, of course, do exist and were mentioned previously. See
supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing experiential learning
opportunities at Washington and Lee and Northeastern). Gonzaga University
School of Law provides more practical skills training than is typical by
supplementing its basic first-year legal research and writing courses with a
“Litigation Skills & Professionalism Lab” (the life of a case) in the fall and a
“Transactional Skills & Professionalism Lab” (the life of a commercial
transaction) in the spring. Course Descriptions and Frequency, GONZAGA UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW (Spring 2010), http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/files/coursedescriptions.pdf.
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transmission of substantive knowledge, with experiential or
clinical courses aimed at transmitting practice skills being
elective offerings305 mostly taught by a separate group of faculty
members (clinical or adjunct professors) with different titles and
status.306
This focus on academic instruction is a legacy of the
importation of legal education into the traditional university and
the desire of early reformers such as Langdell and Harvard’s
President Eliot,307 and later the ABA and the Association of
American Law Schools,308 to raise the standards and status of
legal education from its apprenticeship roots.309 One consequence
of this doctrinal approach is that the study of law is
conceptualized as the study of legal rules—a Langdellian
innovation310—rather than a broader study of legal practice
305. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 87 (“These lawyering courses
cover a wide range, from research and legal writing in the first year, through
trial advocacy and practice negotiation to clinical experience with actual clients.
Typically, these are elective courses, optional for students.”).
306. See id. at 87–88 (“[T]hey are most often taught by faculty other than
those teaching the so-called substantive or doctrinal courses of the curriculum—
a faculty that is not typically tenured and that has lower academic status.”).
307. See supra Part II.E. President Eliot once remarked that “law is to be
learned almost exclusively from the books in which its principles and precedents
are recorded, digested, and explained,” not from “the court or the law office.” 1
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 54, at 391–92.
308. See infra Part III.C; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 93
Today’s standard model—the three-year curriculum, an emphasis on
analytical training through the case-dialogue method, and work on a
law review journal—took a long time to achieve dominance in
preparation for legal practice. This model was promoted by the
American Bar Association and the Association of American Law
Schools as a way to raise standards, in order to protect the public
and, not incidentally, to enhance the status of the profession.
See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *33 (“The inconveniences [of an
exclusively apprenticeship-based legal education] can never be effectually
prevented, but by making academical education a previous step to the profession
of the common law . . . .”).
309. Supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text (explaining Langdell’s
belief that law is most effectively taught through the study of legal principles in
their purest form: as they appear in court opinions); see also John Henry
Schlegel, Walt Was Right, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 599, 600 (2001) (“[W]ere Langdell
to reflect on modern casebooks . . . he [would] recognize[] that the essential
substance of these newfangled books was the same as in his first casebook, the
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involving the study of legal regulation as a social phenomenon311
and training in the full array of methods and techniques that
legal practitioners must be able to employ. Another consequence
of this academic, doctrinal dominance is that law faculties built to
deliver such curricula tend not to consist of experienced
practitioners but rather career academics focused on legal
scholarship.312
However, as the 2007 Carnegie Report and other reports and
commentators have emphasized, substantive legal knowledge—
although a critical element of professional training—is not the
sole or principal component of learning to be a practicing
lawyer,313 nor is it realistic to expect that law school can impart
the sum total of substantive knowledge needed for practice.314 To
the contrary, there are several related but distinct levels of
training that are necessary to become a competent legal
professional: the acquisition of foundational knowledge and
analytical abilities, the development of certain practical skills,
and the formation of the professional values and judgment that
define legal practice.315 The traditional law school curriculum
one on contracts—the patient explication of legal doctrine, the rule of law as the
law of rules.”).
311. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 640 (“[S]ocial science has taught us to
regard law as a social practice . . . . While law . . . may be understood as
definitive statements by authoritative sources, legal practice is the total set of
behaviors that are prevalent among those trained professionals.”).
312. See Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice:
Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 712 (1996) (“[L]aw schools are often highly reluctant to
hire ‘the practitioner,’ and . . . particularly at elite law schools, professors often
sneer at books and articles oriented toward practice, doctrine or (perhaps worse)
teaching.” (citation omitted)).
313. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25–29 (describing necessary
components of legal education that are lacking in the current system).
314. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW
AND ITS STUDY 93 (1930) (“No, the nature of our system of multiple jurisdictions,
the accidental constellation of our statutes, the inductive concrete method of our
case-materials—these make the learning of our law entire, as information,
hopeless.”(emphasis added)); see also Frank, Why Not a Clinical LawyerSchool?, supra note 204, at 726 (“Of course it is impossible in three years, or
indeed in thirty-three years, to give or take courses in all the subjects into which
the subject we call ‘law’ can be subdivided.”).
315. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 27 (“For the sake of their
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does not reflect the relative importance of each of these levels of
learning because it focuses the lion’s share of attention on
doctrinal instruction.316 Fixing that imbalance does not mean
that law school should be entirely handed over to “vocational” or
skills training, the reflexive critique seemingly lodged at any
effort to make legal education more relevant to legal practice.317
Rather, it means that the current relationship between doctrinal,
practical, and professional instruction must become more
integrated and balanced: Skills-based and practice-centered
instruction and training should be a more substantial part of the
law school experience, with substantive knowledge instruction
serving as the foundation for and compliment to practical
professional education. Further, to facilitate the transition from
student to practitioner, doctrinal instruction must move more
quickly into being taught in context from the operational
perspective,318 rather than more abstractly through the prism of
judicial opinions and the case method.319 Finally, students must
future practice, students must gain a basic mastery of specialized knowledge,
begin acquiring competence at manipulating this knowledge under the
constrained and uncertain conditions of practice, and identify themselves with
the best standards and in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
profession.”); see also Lon L. Fuller, What Law Schools Can Contribute to the
Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190, 193–95 (1948–1949) (arguing that the
current method of legal education is ineffective because it only focuses on one
form of adjudication, the appellate decision, while neglecting all other forms of
adjudication, as well as the entire legislative process).
316. See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This
Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) (“The analysis of
legal doctrine as presented in appellate decisions digested in casebooks . . .
continues to frame most classroom discourse . . . .”).
317. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *32 (“If practice be the whole he is
taught, practice must also be the whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed
in the elements and first principles upon which the rule of practice is founded,
the least variation from established precedents will totally distract and bewilder
him.”); see also Fuller, supra note 315, at 191 (“[A]s soon as an attempt is made
to employ the skills-and-techniques conception as the exclusive standard for
organizing legal education, the whole educational process is disoriented and
cheapened.”).
318. Kristen Holmquist refers to this as “applied learning opportunities.”
Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 357 (2012).
319. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 99 (“Law schools cannot prepare
students for practice until they teach doctrine, theory, and practice as part of a
unified, coordinated program of instruction.”).
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have more opportunities to collaborate in team settings and to
work on solving problems that blend legal and other issues in a
single setting.320 Many law schools seem to be making moves in
these directions,321 though how thorough and effective these
changes will be at each school remains to be seen.
B. The “Signature Pedagogy” of Law School
“[I]t is obvious that man could hardly devise a more wasteful
method of imparting information about subject matter than
the case-class.”
—Karl Llewellyn, 1948–1949322

Although the case-dialogue method has been criticized and
modified in many ways over the years,323 it retains its basic hold
as the fundamental framework for teaching law students legal
doctrine and analysis to this day.324 Indeed, notwithstanding the
320. See MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS,
TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN: ENGAGING STUDENTS FROM THE SYLLABUS TO THE
FINAL EXAM 7 (2009) (“Students engage in crucial mental activity when they
negotiate meaning and seek to synthesize their personal understandings. The
hundreds of studies demonstrating the superiority of cooperative learning
groups compared to all other teaching methods support this assertion.”).
321. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 280 (announcing that Stanford Law
School is “transforming its traditional law degree into a multi-dimensional J.D.,
which combines the study of other disciplines with team-oriented, problemsolving techniques together with expanded clinical training that enables
students to represent clients and litigate cases while in law school”).
322. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, supra note 212, at
215.
323. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 56–59 (describing the
case-dialogue method as insufficiently connected with practical context and
ethical values); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
“THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 190, 202 (2007) (explaining that the current methods
used in law schools to get students “thinking like lawyers” have disparate effects
depending on students’ race and gender); REDLICH, supra note 95 (criticizing the
case method for failing to give students a picture of the law in its entirety);
STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 41–47, 132–34 (noting the negative impacts of
the case-dialogue method on the students’ education).
324. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 50 (“[L]aw schools use casedialogue teaching almost exclusively in the first phase of doctrinal instruction.”);
see also MERTZ, supra note 323, at 41 (describing the Socratic method of
teaching as the “discourse for which law school is famous”). Edward Rubin has
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myriad changes in the legal profession and in our understanding
of how people learn,325 the contemporary law school remains
remarkably Langdellian326 in its design as a three-year system in
which doctrinal legal knowledge and legal analytical abilities are
transmitted to students mostly via a traditional or modified casedialogue approach,327 supplemented with optional or mandatory
experiential learning components.328 It must be acknowledged,
however, that most professors vary from a pure Socratic method
in their doctrinal courses,329 and that the method has virtually no
place in experiential courses.330 Thus, it would simply be
written that the case method has reached venerated status, making any
critiques a threat to an esteemed tradition:
Continuing on for another seventy years or so, [the Langdellian
model] has ceased to be viewed as a particular approach to legal
education—as last generation’s innovation—and has become a
venerable institution that gains gravity and prestige from its
antiquity. As such, this approach has the remarkable capacity to
make suggested changes seem jejune and to reduce reform initiatives
to quixotic ventures that can be dismissed with knowing guffaws from
its wiser, more experienced supporters.
Rubin, supra note 101, at 613.
325. See infra notes 350–53 and accompanying text (explaining and
differentiating learning techniques).
326. See LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 314, at 145 (“Our
teaching technique we have . . . carried for the most part unaltered into wholly
changed conditions . . . .”); see also Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for
Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 597 (2007) (“The plain fact is that
American legal education, and especially its formative first year, remains
remarkably similar to the curriculum invented at the Harvard Law School by
Christopher Columbus Langdell over a century and a quarter ago.” (citation
omitted)).
327. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 610 (“[T]he basic educational approach
that law schools use remains essentially unchanged from the one that C.C.
Langdell introduced at Harvard in the years following the Civil War.”).
328. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 34–43 (describing programs at
NYU and CUNY designed to provide students with practical, hands-on legal
experience during law school).
329. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 142 (indicating that “pure” Socratic
teaching was encountered in only one class within the study); see also id. at
142–69 (describing variations of the Socratic teaching style as “pure” or
“traditional,” “modified,” a mixed method of “dialogue, lecture, and
conversation,” and a “dialogic” lecture method).
330. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 59 (“[C]ase-dialogue teaching is
seldom explicitly connected with clinical teaching . . . .”).
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inaccurate to characterize all of law school education as merely a
sequence of ineffectual classically Socratic experiences. That said,
it is true that traditional doctrinal courses—which do in fact
dominate the curricula at virtually all law schools—tend to
involve the study of doctrine through the lens of cases and
casebooks331—even in statutory courses332—and that professors
typically use a mix of lecture and Socratic questioning as the
principal means of covering the material in their courses
throughout law school.333
While there may be strengths to the case-dialogue method,334
there are several shortcomings worth noting here. It is often said
that the virtue of the case method is the training it can impart in
the skills of legal reasoning and analysis—“thinking like a
lawyer”—that are critical components of professional

331. See id. at 55 (“The legal texts that form the basis for the case-dialogue
method are found in a unique invention of legal pedagogy—the case book.”). The
material used in a typical doctrinal law school course is some variant of a
casebook—a text collecting edited cases organized by topic and supplemented
with notes and questions—rather than a legal treatise or traditional textbook of
the kind found in other disciplines such as biology, history, or accounting. The
inclusion of such “materials” (notes, questions, article excerpts, etc.) in modern
casebooks is what distinguishes them from the very first casebook, which was
developed by Langdell himself and solely consisted of cases organized by the
legal principles to which they related. See C. C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Neil H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics
Library 1983) (1871).
332. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (2009); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C.
HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2008).
333. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3 (“Law schools use Socratic
case-dialogue instruction in the first phase of their students’ legal education.
During the second two years, most schools continue to teach, by the same
method, a number of elective courses in legal doctrine.”); see also MERTZ, supra
note 323, at 144–69 (finding, among the classrooms contained in the study, that
most professors used variations of the Socratic method that blended questioning
about cases with discussion and lecture).
334. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 326, at 598
The Langdellian case method afforded a way to communicate
information; to cultivate a style of reasoning and questioning that
was intellectually respectable, yet also well-suited to the
paradigmatic law practice of adjudication; and to engage the
attention and interests of large numbers of students at relatively
little expense for instruction and materials.
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development.335 These are skills that all law students must
acquire if they are to become fluent in the language of the law,
jurisprudence, and the art of using cases to derive and develop
legal principles.336 However, the ability of the case-dialogue
method to transmit analytical skills effectively has never been
demonstrated. Indeed, Elizabeth Mertz, in her seminal study of
the case method, The Language of Law School, describes studies
of teaching methods that fail to show any connection between the
method used and the ability of students to engage in effective
legal analysis.337 Additionally, the type of thinking promoted by
the method is limited to certain kinds of legal analysis, neglecting
some of the basic problem-solving skills that today’s practitioners
need to develop solutions to their clients’ problems.338
335. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53 (describing the “deep
structure” of the case-dialogue pedagogy as “the teaching of legal reasoning”); id.
at 54 (indicating that the “dispositions and attitudes” modeled by the casedialogue pedagogy are “habits of legal thinking” such as distancing from
extraneous detail to focus on points of legal argument); CRAMTON REPORT, supra
note 22, at 13 (“The traditional ‘socratic method’ of legal instruction continues to
be used in first year law classes as an extremely effective technique for
developing analytical skills . . . .”); LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note
314, at 116 (“The first year . . . aims, in the old phrase, to get you to ‘thinking
like a lawyer.’”); but see Rubin, supra note 101, at 610–11
What one sometimes hears is that the current law school curriculum
teaches students to ‘think like lawyers.’ Any systematic
demonstration that such an outdated approach to legal education
develops skills that are central to the very different world of modern
legal practice would be interesting to see, but no such demonstration
has been offered. (citation omitted).
336. See, e.g., Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at
910 (“[N]o sane person will deny that a knowledge of those rules and principles,
of how to ‘distinguish’ cases, and of how to make an argument as to the true
ratio decidendi of an opinion, is part of the indispensable equipment of the
future lawyer.”).
337. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 28 (“[C]ontrolled experiments in which
first-year classes were divided into separate groups, some taught Socratically
and others not, resulted in generally similar performances.” (citing Edward
Kimball & Larry Farmer, Comparative Results of Teaching Evidence Three
Ways, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 196, 196–212 (1979); Willard Lorenson, Concentrating
on a Single Jurisdiction to Teach Criminal Law—An Experiment, 20 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 361, 361–65 (1968))).
338. See Kagan, supra note 283, at 477 (“[W]hile the case method does a
great job teaching students a certain type of legal reasoning, it fails to equip
them fully to serve as active problem solvers, able to engage a range of resources
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Another weakness of the case-dialogue method, as currently
employed in law schools, is that whatever benefits might accrue
from the method are difficult to achieve among large groups of
students. When the method is used in the context of large
classes—which is typical339it tends to focus attention on a
discussion between a few students and the professor.340 Although
the students involved may benefit to some extent, the method is
less effective in instilling legal analytical skills vicariously to
observers not involved in the discussion,341 creating diminishing
returns as the class grows in size.342 Relatedly, large classes
conducted under the Socratic method involve sizeable audiences
of peer onlookers, potentially contributing to the stress and
anxiety of students expected to respond to the professor’s
questioning343 and creating an intimidating environment that
and strategies to come up with creative solutions.”).
339. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 7 (“Although many law schools are now
experimenting with smaller first-year classes, it is still common to find the bulk
of a first-year student’s time spent in larger classes of seventy to one hundred
students.”); id. at 202 (identifying patterns in her study linking “increased class
participation and classroom presence with traditional insiders . . . ; that is,
white male students tend to predominate.”); id. at 177 (“Use of recitation (the
closest analogue to Socratic dialogue), with its intensely public potential for
evaluation of responses (both by teachers and peers), tends to encourage the
formation of entrenched, segregated groups.” (citing STEVEN BOSSERT, TASKS AND
SOCIAL RELATIONS IN CLASSROOMS: A STUDY OF INSTRUCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1979))).
340. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning
Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 347, 351 (2001) (“[L]aw professors structure classroom
interactions as one-on-one, professor-on-student dialogues.”).
341. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 222 (“[I]nevitably, many students
have not participated in the dialogue; some, overwhelmed by the relief that they
were not the one called on, have not even listened attentively.” (citation
omitted)); Schwarz, supra note 340, at 351 (“[L]aw teaching requires students to
learn vicariously.”).
342. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 134 (“The potential value of the
Socratic dialogue and case method is diminished, however, because we use it in
large classroom settings . . . .”).
343. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, The Last Taboo: Breaking Law Students with
Mental Illnesses and Disabilities Out of the Stigma Straitjacket, 79 UMKC L.
REV. 123, 144 (2010) (“[D]ue to the nature of a legal education, such as stress,
competition, and longstanding traditions including the Socratic Method and
grading policies, depression and anxiety may develop.”); see also Lawrence
Silver, Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 WIS. L.
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may be more discouraging to women344 and students of color.345
These dual challenges surrounding the use of the method in large
groups indicate that law schools take what theoretically may be a
sound pedagogical approach and dilute it, suggesting that moving
the Socratic case-dialogue out of the large classroom into a much
smaller setting with only a handful of students might be a
structural alteration that would allow the approach to bear its
fullest fruit.
Next, the case-dialogue method is an inefficient means of
transmitting substantive information and is limited in its ability
to impart the full range of competencies that students need to
become successful legal professionals.346 There have been many
advances in learning theory and pedagogy since Langdell’s time
with which the case-dialogue method is out of step.347 Yet the
REV. 1201, 1203–05 (describing the anxiety inducing effects of the Socratic
method).
344. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 190 (“Our data tend to confirm the
findings of previous studies . . . that male law students generally participate at
greater rates than females.”); see also LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE
BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
49 (1997) (“The pedagogical structure of the first year—large classes, often
constrained by limits on student participation, fierce competition, a mandatory
grading curve, and few women faculty—produces alienation and a genderstratified hierarchy.”).
345. See Carol J. Buckner, Realizing Grutter v. Bollinger’s “Compelling
Educational Benefits of Diversity”—Transforming Aspirational Rhetoric into
Experience, 72 UMKC L. REV. 877, 911 (2004) (“The academic achievement of
African American students improves when teachers use cooperative rather than
competitive learning strategies . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 905
Hispanic students do not like to be singled out; they function more
effectively working in groups to achieve a common goal and are
receptive and susceptible to thoughts and attitudes expressed by
others. Encouragement, group work and establishing a sense of
‘belonging’ all help to create a positive learning experience for
Hispanic students. These learning preferences describe the direct
antithesis of the typical law school environment, and explain the
dysfunction and disparate achievement of Hispanic students.
(citations omitted).
346. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 58–59 (“[L]earning the law is
an ensemble experience . . . . [T]he apprenticeships of cognition, performance,
and identity are not freestanding . . . . Because case-dialogue teaching is seldom
explicitly connected with clinical teaching, few law schools achieve the full
impact that an integrated ensemble could provide.”).
347. See Schwarz, supra note 340, at 383
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Langdellian case-dialogue method—a relic of a bygone era348—
persists.349 Insights from learning theory reveal that teaching
focused mainly on purely abstract concepts divorced from their
context—something that fairly characterizes the case method—is
less effective than teaching that recognizes that we experience
information in many different ways and at different levels of
abstraction. Edgar Dale visualized these various levels of
encountering information with his Cone of Experience, which
depicted “a range of experience from firsthand action to
observation
(iconic
experiences)
on
to
symbolic
communication.”350 For example, one can understand what a knot
is directly by tying the knot (referred to by Dale as an “enactive”
experience), visually by simply seeing a picture of a knot (an
“iconic” experience), or abstractly by simply hearing or seeing the
word “knot” or a verbal description of the phenomenon (a
“symbolic” experience).351 Learning often moves from direct
experience or iconic experience toward abstractions as words or
symbols whose meaning we come to understand,352 although this
All three learning theories discussed—behaviorism, cognitivism, and
constructivism—are relevant to law school instruction, yet, for the
most part, the legal academy has ignored these theories. Together,
the theories suggest that instruction should cause students both to
build their skills from base levels to the highest levels, and to move
from simply knowledge of information to the creative problem-solving
contemplated by the constructivist model.
348. See Rubin, supra note 101, at 611 (“Langdell’s design for legal
education, although innovative in its own time and on its own terms, is more
closely connected to modes of thought that prevailed in the Renaissance, the
Middle Ages, and ancient Greece and Rome than to our current ways of
thinking.”).
349. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 26 (“[D]espite a number of arguably
successful attacks on the substantive underpinnings of Langdell’s approach, the
method itself appears to have outlasted its theoretical rationale.”).
350. EDGAR DALE, AUDIOVISUAL METHODS IN TEACHING 110 (3d ed. 1969). The
levels of the Cone, from bottom to the top, are direct purposeful experiences,
contrived experiences, dramatized experiences, demonstrations, study trips,
exhibits, educational television, motion pictures, recordings, radio and still
pictures, visual symbols, and verbal symbols. See id. at 107 (illustrating the
eleven levels of Dale’s “Cone of Experience”).
351. Id. at 108. Dale borrows these terms from JEROME S. BRUNER, TOWARD A
THEORY OF INSTRUCTION, 10–11 (Harvard Univ. 1966).
352. Id. at 108–09.
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is not always the case.353 However, when learning consists solely
of abstractions untethered from lower-order experience, problems
can arise:
Difficulties arise when abstractions have inadequate
foundations. If a learner has had too little enactive or iconic
experience in acquiring a particular summarizing idea, the
word or formula will probably have no real meaning for him.
Because a verbal symbol does not resemble anything the
[student] can do or see, he may have difficulty in relating it to
his own experience. If a symbol is to stand for something, it
must stand on something—a firm foundation of relevant
experience.354

This is not to say that enactive or iconic experiences must always
precede abstract learning;355 rather, abstract learning can be
enhanced by direct or visual experiences that can concretize and
deepen the understanding of the abstract concept at issue.356
The application of Dale’s insights to legal education is clear:
Law school learning exclusively rooted in symbolic, abstract
experience is less likely to be effective in giving students the
depth of understanding requisite for moving towards proficient
legal practice. Further, to the extent that legal learning is
exclusively at the abstract level, it becomes difficult for students
to synthesize learning from different areas or to operationalize
concepts for practical application and the resolution of real-world
legal problems.357 To be clear, this is not an argument that the
353. See id. at 128 (“Does the Cone device mean that all teaching and
learning must move systematically from base to pinnacle? Emphatically no . . . .
We continually shuttle back and forth among various kinds of experiences.”).
354. Id. at 109.
355. See id. at 128–29
In our teaching, then, we do not always begin with direct experience
at the base of the Cone. Rather, we begin with the kind of experience
that is most appropriate to the needs and abilities of a particular
learner in a particular learning situation. Then, of course, we vary
this experience with many other types of learning activities.
356. See id. at 132 (“Even the most advanced student, therefore, can deepen
his understanding of concepts . . . by participating in experiences all along [the]
Cone.”).
357. See id. at 134
A teacher may move students so swiftly to the symbolic level of
thought, and with so little preparation, that their concepts will lack

2034

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012)

best learning occurs at the lower, more direct experience levels of
Dale’s Cone, nor is it the often misattributed notion that we
remember more of the things that we learn from direct
experience.358 Rather, the claim is that different types of learning
experiences are possible and that legal teaching needs to make an
intelligent use of a mix of these experiences to give students the
level of understanding needed for effective learning and
translation into practical application.359
These deficits of the case-dialogue method become harder to
tolerate once students have acquired the legal analytical skills
that the method is designed to impart.360 Indeed, there may be
deep roots in direct experience. These rootless experiences will not
have the generative power to produce additional concepts and will not
enable the learner to deal with the new situations that he faces.
358. Many have misappropriated Dale’s Cone of Experience to present a
revised pyramidal image that depicts the levels of experience with indications of
the percent of information retained when learned through each approach. See,
e.g., Learning Objectives, MINN. STATE UNIV. MOORHEAD, http://web.mnstate.
edu/instrtech/SCModules/LearningObjectives/index.html (follow “Dale’s Cone of
Experience” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Dale himself never attributed such percentages of
retention to his Cone nor did he support the implication that experiential
learning was necessarily superior to more abstract learning. See DALE, supra
note 350, at 128–30; see also Michael Molenda, Cone of Experience, in
EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 161, 164 (Ann Kovalchick &
Kara Dawson, eds., 2003) (discussing the common misappropriation of the
theory, noting that “[a]t some point[,] someone conflated Dale’s Cone of
Experience with a spurious chart that purports to show what percentage of
information people remember under different learning conditions”). This
misrepresentation of Dale’s Cone was unfortunately featured in a recent article
on legal education reform. See Sonsteng et al., supra note 286, at 309
(attributing to Dale the idea that “the least effective methods of instruction
include reading text and listening to lectures,” notions that Dale himself
expressly disavowed in the very work cited by Sonsteng).
359. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 132 (“Law teachers need to be
multi-modal in our teaching and reduce our reliance on the Socratic dialogue
and case method. There are many tools for reaching students than one finds in
the typical law school classroom.”).
360. Jerome Frank estimated that students could be taught the dialectical
method of legal analysis imparted by the case-dialogue method within six
months, after which time other more effective methods of instruction should be
used. See Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, supra note 210, at
726
Intelligent men can learn that dialectical technique in about six
months . . . . Teach them the dialectic devices as applied to one or two
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declining benefits associated with a continued employment of the
case-dialogue method throughout the second and third years of
law school.361 Thus, once this point has passed and basic
foundational legal principles have been explored using the
method in the first year, the pedagogy should shift toward
alternative methods that help students acquire knowledge and
skills in the manner and contexts that will be required of them as
legal practitioners.362 In other words, a thorough understanding
of legal principles and the ability to “think like a lawyer” need to
become the foundation for the next step in professional
development—developing the ability to handle complex problems
of clients in a skilled and professional manner.
Finally,363 the case-dialogue method presents the law
through the lens of litigation, most of which is appellate
fields and they will have no trouble applying them to other fields. But
in the law schools, much of the three years is squandered in applying
that technique over and over again to a variety of subject
matters . . . .
See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 77 (speaking of the “diminishing
returns” problem in legal education characterized by the “drop-off in interest
and effort in classroom learning as students move through law school”).
361. See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 140 (“Unfortunately, many
law teachers continue to rely exclusively on the Socratic dialogue and case
method, not just in the first year, but also in the second and third year courses
long after students become competent in case analysis and ‘thinking like a
lawyer.’ This contributes to student boredom and loss of interest in learning.”).
This is not a new observation; Harvard students in 1935 complained that after
the first year, the benefits of the case method were dramatically reduced. See
STEVENS, supra note 123, at 161 (“After the first year the case method allegedly
lost its value; the students thought it should be dropped or modified in the
second and third years.”); see also id. at 246 (“In the early 1970s, there was
extensive evidence that outside those working on law review there was a
dramatic falloff in energy levels and work at the end of the first year, if not in
the first semester.” (citation omitted)).
362. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 82 (“Practice requires not the
distanced stance of the observer and critic but an engagement with situations.”).
363. This term is not used here to suggest that the universe of critiques of
the case-dialogue method have been exhausted. Quite to the contrary, extensive
critiques of the method abound. Elizabeth Mertz’s work helpfully summarizes
the most pertinent of these and offers an extensive argument in favor of her own
critique. See MERTZ, supra note 323. One of her most incisive observations is
that “thinking like a lawyer” is not a superior mode of analysis but rather is a
kind of analysis that preferences certain bases for authority, modes of
understanding, sources of knowledge, and types of arguments over others for
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litigation, and does so in a highly formalized and acontextual
manner that skews students’ perspective away from the realities
and complexities of raw facts, clients, and professional
responsibility.364 The “thinking like a lawyer” modeled by the
case-dialogue method often strips disputes from their context and
emphasizes formal and procedural issues over other moral or
personal factors that might bear on reaching a more complete
appraisal of the justice of an outcome.365 Further, by being rooted
in court decisions, the law is learned as the product of conflict, as
a battle among adversaries that yields legal pronouncements and
interpretations. But law today is not developed simply or even
largely through litigation but through legislation, regulation, and
negotiated
agreements.
These
aspects
of
law
are
underappreciated in the existing curriculum, as even the bodies
of law that emanate from these latter sources are studied through
the eyes of court decisions interpreting them.
culturally driven reasons:
The phrase “thinking like a lawyer” is often used in a way that . . .
characteriz[es] lawyers as possessors of an overarching and superior
analytic ability rather than as experts in one profession’s specialized
way of processing relevant information. Like all professional
epistemologies (and accompanying discourses), legal thought is
socially and institutionally grounded in specific practices and power
relationships. It asks some kinds of questions while neglecting others
and makes sharp demands for proof in some places where elsewhere
it accepts unproven assumptions. The first-year classroom is a key
location for examining the shift to this particular professional
language.
Id. at 98–99; see also id. at 132 (“In converting virtually every possible event or
conflict into a shared rhetoric, legal language generates an appearance of
neutrality that belies its often deeply skewed institutional workings.”).
364. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 53 (“[S]tudents tend to think of
legally relevant facts as they are presented in the appellate opinions that they
typically read for class discussion . . . . As a first encounter with legal facts, this
can give the misleading impression that facts are typically easy to ‘discover,’
rather than resulting from complex processes of interpretation that are shaped
by pressures of litigation.”); see also MERTZ, supra note 323, at 95 (“[P]rofessors
are conveying a linguistic ideology centered on the crucial structuring role of
layers of authority, discernable in the text. Emotion, morality, and social context
are semiotically peripheralized in this process.”).
365. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 52 (summarizing Mertz’s
description of an ethos “that emphasizes the formal, procedural aspects of legal
reasoning as the central focus, making other aspects of cases peripheral or
ancillary”).
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In the mid-twentieth century, a faculty committee at
Harvard Law School described some of the benefits of the case
method when it wrote:
The problems most naturally raised by reading a series of
appellate cases are: Were these cases “rightly” decided? Are
they consistent with one another? Can a pattern of decision be
discerned that will reconcile them, even though their language
is in conflict? On the basis of these decisions, how would this
hypothetical case be decided? All of these inquiries are
eminently worthwhile, and afford a useful training for the
lawyer.366

This view is sound; the study of cases can be a worthy vehicle for
learning about the law and legal analysis. However, the case
method as practiced focuses on appellate opinions of judges,
which do not reflect the sum total of what factored into the how
particular cases were litigated or decided,367 including
considerations of basic justice and fairness.368 Omitted is any
consideration of the underlying record, including documents,
evidence, pleadings, trial transcripts, trial court rulings, and the
like, or the raw client narratives and other facts that faced the
practitioner at the pre-litigation, problem-solving phase of the
representation,369 in favor of a retrospective view that stymies the
366. FULLER ET AL., Preliminary Statement, supra note 26, at 39–40.
367. See id. at 35–36
In general American legal education with its emphasis on the
appellate phase of litigation trains the lawyer in testing the validity
of a position already taken, not in the problem of deciding what
position to take or what course to follow . . . . Because law school
instruction is largely based on appellate decisions, its focus is
inevitably upon this last phase of a controversy, and the student
receives little direct training in the choices that have to be made
before this final phase is reached.
368. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 236
Too often, the Socratic method of teaching emphasizes qualities that
have little to do with justice, fairness, and morality in daily practice.
Students too easily gain the impression that wit, sharp responses,
and dazzling performance are more important that the personal
moral values that lawyers must possess and that the profession must
espouse.
369. See FULLER ET AL., supra note 26, at 41 (“The rapid exchange of
intellectual repartee that has characterized some of the best case-method
instruction in the past may be excellent training for the appellate advocate, but
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development of the “legal imagination”370 needed to develop
solutions to legal problems prospectively.371 A true case method,
as Jerome Frank recognized long ago, would entail a study of the
entire “case” rather than the edited and refined representation of
a dispute one finds in appellate opinions.372 Such an approach
would permit students to assess how facts, legal doctrine, and
other factors such as arguments raised, questions asked, and
strategic decisions made all combined to yield a given result in
one case versus another, as well as permitting them to think
about how they would use the facts and the law to shape an
alternate approach to the matter that might have led it down a
different path entirely. Additional alternative approaches to
teaching the law have been richly covered by other critics
including those detailed in the 2007 Best Practices Report373 as
well as in work such as Teaching Law by Design by Professors
Schwartz, Sparrow, and Hess.374 However, these alternatives
have not permeated the law school culture, where the legacy of
the Langdellian case-dialogue method retains its sway.

it hardly furnishes the appropriate atmosphere for a discussion of the soundest
solution for a practical problem of legal planning.”).
370. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 326, at 602 (describing “legal
imagination” as “the ability to generate the multiple characterizations, multiple
versions, multiple pathways, and multiple solutions, to which [students] could
apply their very well honed analytic skills”).
371. See id. at 600
By taking a retrospective view of facts already found and procedures
already used by a court, the appellate decision does little to orient
students to the reality of unfolding problems with facts still to be
enacted, client conduct still to take place, and procedural settings still
to be chosen and framed.
372. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 916.
373. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 105–234 (suggesting the use of
multiple methods of instruction, including context-based instruction, to teach
law school courses).
374. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 320, at 107–34 (discussing a mixture of
modeling, coaching, lecture, questioning, story-telling, visual-aids, and
simulations to teach law school classes).
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C. Assessment in Law School375
“Our machinery for checking our results [of our teaching] with
you [the students] would set an intelligent ass to braying.”
—Karl Llewellyn, 1930376

Karl Llewellyn, who in the above quote in no uncertain terms
said that law schools put the “ass” in “assessment,” recognized
over sixty years ago that the traditional method of assessing
student performance in law school was an ineffective means of
measuring student learning. More specifically, there was and still
is a gap between the professed learning objectives of many law
school classes—teaching students to think like lawyers and to
master certain legal doctrines—and the dominant method of
measuring students’ attainment of that learning—the final essay
exam, which tests more so what a student knows rather than
what a student can do.377 Recall that the Carnegie Report
emphasized the multiple apprenticeships of professional legal
education—the
cognitive,
the
practical,
and
the
professional/ethical.378 Becoming a competent practitioner
requires training in all three areas, though—as has been
discussed—law school is disproportionately oriented towards the
cognitive. Thus, the single final essay exam is typically drafted in
a manner that requires students to display their mastery of legal
concepts and doctrines learned during the semester through the
analysis of various hypothetical problems drafted by the
375. Here, I am referring to the individualized assessment of student
learning. Supplemental to such assessment is the law school’s assessment of its
own institutional effectiveness, which can be measured in several ways. See
2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Interpretation 305-2 (listing reviewing
individual student assessment, evaluation of student portfolios, student
surveys, student performance in capstone courses or other skills courses, bar
exam passage rates, and bench and bar surveys of student performance as
acceptable methods of measuring institutional effectiveness).
376. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 314, at 139.
377. See David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 480 (1984) (“There is, then, a serious dissonance between
our higher aspirations as teachers and our examination and grading practices.
We aspire to teach mental habits that transcend substantive law but we do not
try very hard to find out how well we are succeeding.”).
378. See supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text.
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professor. These exams will either put the student in the role of a
judge who must resolve a particular legal question, as an
advocate who must argue in support of a particular position or
decide on a course of action, or sometimes in the role of a
policymaker who must decide how the law should be designed to
deal with a given situation. Such questions test the students’
understanding of the law and their ability to engage in proper
and rigorous legal analysis.
That said, the limitations of this type of assessment are
twofold. First, it is purely summative, in that it comes at the end
of a course and attempts to measure learning after the course has
been completed. In most courses, formative assessments—which
measure student learning along the way—are underutilized or
neglected entirely.379 But formative assessment is an important
component of the learning process, as students need to have the
opportunity to measure their understanding—or lack thereof—at
a point in time when they still have the opportunity to make
corrections and improvements. It is better to learn early on that
one’s understanding of a concept or doctrine is confused so that
the lessons of the remainder of the semester can build on a solid
foundation of understanding rather than simply cumulating atop
confusion and uncertainty. Formative assessment is critical to
coaching and guiding students through their exploration of a
topic, taking care to notice when a lesson has not been fully
learned and prodding them in the right direction as they proceed
through the course.380 Thus, law school courses should have
multiple assessment exercises along the way—graded or
ungraded—that permit the instructor to determine students’
learning levels and give feedback that will permit the student to
adapt and improve.
Second, while typical essay exams do, to some extent, engage
the analytical abilities needed of a judge or an advocate arguing a
379. Recall that unlike most law school courses today, legal instruction at
the Litchfield Law School in the early nineteenth century included regular
examinations every Saturday. Supra note 64 and accompanying text.
380. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 164–67 (discussing criticisms
of summative final exams and how students, “in the absence of feedback during
the semester, [have] no basis on which to gauge whether they [are] mastering
the material”).
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legal point, such skills are not the sole or principal skills required
of most competent practitioners. In the litigation context,
practitioners often begin with an unfiltered narrative from a
client, which must be distilled into a coherent set of facts that can
then be translated into potential legal claims. As an attorney
proceeds with or responds to a claim, legal doctrine is not the only
determinant of how the case should be litigated or of how issues
that arise should be resolved. There are ethical and strategic
considerations as well as intangible factors such as the profile of
the parties and the judge, the nature of the claims, what happens
to be at stake in the case, the relevance of issues in this case to
other cases, or other larger policy concerns. All of these factors,
and more, must be taken into account as an attorney decides
what actions to take and what arguments to make. Engaging in
this process certainly requires a good grasp of the relevant and
applicable legal doctrine. But sensitivity to the full range of
pertinent factors that bear on legal strategy and judicial decisionmaking takes practical experience and the development of sound
professional judgment. Traditional doctrinal courses and their
associated final exams tend to abstract all of these things out of
legal problems, isolating doctrinal (and perhaps policy) analysis
as the key to how any given issue is resolved.381 That is an
unrealistic picture of most legal practice that hardly suffices to
prepare a student for actual practice.
Compounding the deficiencies of summative assessments in
law school is the accompanying system of grading that
characterizes most law school programs. A student’s grade in a
course is typically determined by his or her performance on a
381. See MERTZ, supra note 323, at 10
At the end of your first semester comes exam time. Now you have a
chance to demonstrate your newly acquired legal vision of the world.
In exam after exam, you are asked to respond to hypotheticals, stories
made up by your professors. These stories are often replete with
pathos and drama. Your job is to ignore as much of the emotional
content as you can while hunting for the details that are relevant to
the legal tests and frames, steadfastly averting your gaze from the
human perfidy, misery, justice, or injustice found in the story. Once
you’ve done that, if you’re very careful, you can throw in a little
discussion of fairness, disguised as a “policy” argument, and
sometimes get some extra points.
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single final exam (perhaps with some credit or demerit for class
participation), and that grade is constrained by grade
normalization policies: Law schools enforce a grade distribution
around a predetermined course mean (the curve). The forced
distribution converts grading from an evaluation of the students’
achievement to a system of ranking among course peers. The set
mean—typically a B+ or 3.3 at most elite law schools382—
determines the label used to signal an average performance,
divorcing traditional A through F letter grades from their
essentialist identities (that is, A is excellent, B is good, C is
average, D is below average, and F is a failure) and creating an
alternative, discordant world in which high letter grades are used
to give a faux sense of achievement that would be absent were the
traditional labels for excellent, average, and below average used.
This is quintessential grade inflation.383 Indeed, the forced mean
all but guarantees that the grades for all students will hover
around the upper echelon; actual failures will be rare or
nonexistent,384 even if a student’s performance in truth reflects a
failure to demonstrate proficiency with reference to the desired
learning objectives for the course.
What are the problems with such an approach to grading?
The principal problem is that what starts off as a poor
assessment of the knowledge, skills, and values that an attorney
must have to perform competently in any given situation becomes
not even that; in reality the assessment is one of relative merit,385
382. See, e.g., Grading Policy, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME L. SCH.,
http://law.nd.edu/careers/employers/policies/grading-policy/ (last visited Sept. 1,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also List of Law
School GPA Curves, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_law_school_
GPA_curves (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
383. See Catherine Rampell, In Law Schools, Grades Go Up, Just Like That,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A1 (describing how several law schools have
retroactively increased the mean G.P.A. in an effort to improve the students’
chances with employers and the schools’ reputation).
384. When there is a forced B+ mean, giving failing grades or D grades
create such a drag on the course mean that more top grades have to be given to
more people, weakening the distinction between top performers and aboveaverage or mediocre performers.
385. Are there good reasons to measure relative merit from an institutional
perspective? If there is a system of rewards the distribution of which depends on
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not of learning or achievement.386 That is, in a B+ curve grading
system, an A- does not represent any particular level of
competence or understanding but rather is a mere indication that
the student outperformed her average peers but was not among
the very top performers in the class. Indeed, such a student may
have been deficient in many respects in her performance on the
exam, but so long as most students were even more deficient, she
is able to earn the label given to those who moderately
outperform, an A-. This grade tells an observer nothing about the
student’s mastery or competence in a given topical area, a fact
that is dissonant with our essentialist notions of the level of
quality that an A- label represents. The result is that legal
educatorsand prospective employerslack any true measure of
the learning or capabilities of their students.
Proper assessment is about evaluating a student’s
attainment of specified learning objectives.387 It involves the
setting of clear goals regarding what students are supposed to
learn and know how to do after completing a course, followed by
the administration of an instrument that measures their
performance against those stated objectives. For example, in a
civil procedure course, a learning objective might be that a
student is able to determine whether a federal court would have
subject matter jurisdiction over various claims that are asserted
in an action. The assessment tool could describe the nature of
certain claims asserted by a set of fictitious parties and ask for an
analysis of each claim, or the exam might ask a student to take a
certain factual situation and make a determination of where to
assert the claims and how to respond to any ensuing
relative merit, the answer is yes. However, facilitating a reward system—
whether it be for the allocation of law journal positions or of jobs after
graduation—should not yield a grading system that completely supplants a
rationalized and appropriate system of assessment, the proper purpose of which
is to measure achievement of learning objectives and teaching outcomes, not
mere class standing.
386. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30, at 237 (“The scaled grading system
allows law schools to sort students for legal employers, but it impedes learning,
community building, and moral development.”).
387. See id. at 235 (“The main purpose of assessments in educational
institutions is to discover if students have achieved the learning outcomes of the
course studied.” (citation omitted)).
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jurisdictional challenges. If the student were able to engage in
that analysis or make those determinations correctly, the student
would be entitled to be judged proficient in that area, having
achieved the learning objective. A standard would have to be set
for what level of success the student must achieve to warrant a
conclusion that he or she was proficient in the area—perhaps
based on a certain percentage of correct responses or, if the
assessment instrument is more oriented toward performance,
there might need to be a more qualitative standard for
proficiency. With each topic or subject matter, professors would
have to make ex ante determinations of what a minimum
acceptable level of performance would be in any given situation;
after such line-drawing, the instructor’s task would be to
determine whether that level was achieved or not.
Ultimately, then, what we know about proper assessment—
that it must be focused on measuring performance against clear
learning objectives—points towards the development of a series of
such objectives within each course, the development of formative
and summative assessment measures that permit students to
demonstrate their attainment of those goals, and the use of
something approaching a binary or three-level388 pass-fail system
that reflects achievement rather than relative merit,389 where
388. The Appalachian School of Law uses a pass–fail system that consists of
the designations of “Proficient,” “Not Proficient,” and “Fail.” Clinton W. Shinn,
Lessening Stress of the 1L Year: Implementing an Alternative to Traditional
Grading, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 355, 368 (2010). The problem with that approach is
that the “Not Proficient” category is treated as a passing grade, even though the
student is only marginally competent. Id. Further, this category is hardly a
grade that will put the student in good stead with prospective employers. I
would thus label not-proficient performers as failures; if distinguishing among
passers is desired, “Proficient” and “Highly Proficient” categories might better
serve the students.
389. There are risks to moving to a pass–fail system—particularly for nonelite law schools—which include the muddled signals employers receive about
students’ ability without grades. One possibility if a school is committed to using
letter grades as a proxy for the pass-fail categories would be to simplify the
grading system by having only A, B+, and B- grades to reflect exemplary,
proficient, and marginal performances, reserving a C for failures. But it is also
critical that there are ways beyond grades that students are able to demonstrate
their value to prospective employers, such as with portfolios that include work
done by the student and more meaningful faculty evaluations and
recommendations. Of course, evaluating such qualitative materials will take
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failure is a real possibility for substandard performances.390
Rather than a single final essay exam, doctrinal courses should
be characterized by a series of opportunities for formative
assessment—graded or ungraded—consummated by a summative
evaluation designed to mirror more closely what will be expected
of a student once he enters practice and confronts such
situations.391 That means that not only is analytical ability and
facility with doctrine assessed, but also students’ ability to
gather, interpret, and present facts or to assess a situation to
determine what action should be taken to achieve a particular
goal for one’s client. Quizzes, problems, and other meaningful
more effort and commitment on the part of employers who may be accustomed
to relying on grades as simple proxies for merit.
390. See Shinn, supra note 388, at 369 (explaining that at least 15% of
students in 1L classes at Appalachian School of Law must receive grades of “Not
Proficient” or “Fail,” but that professors are not required to give any grades of
“Fail”). Therefore, for this system to be meaningful, a “Fail” or “Not Proficient”
grade would have to be real, meaning that professors were willing and able to
assign that grade to students whose performance fell short of a predetermined
level of sufficiency. Although other disciplines such as medicine exhibit less
hesitation in awarding failing grades to students, law schools are institutionally
averse to failures, which is likely for at least three reasons.
First, it may be that an F grade is seen as deserved only for a complete lack
of knowledge or competence—scoring near zero percent correct if you will—
rather than as being appropriate for poor performances that include instances of
lucidity—let us say a 60% or 50% performance.
Second, because of the forced mean, if an F grade is given to a student,
many very high grades must be given to offset the downward pull such a grade
has on the class average. For example, in a class of ten students, it would be
mathematically impossible to give more than one student an F grade if the
required mean were B+ or a 3.33; even if eight students were given A grades,
giving the remaining two students F grades would result in a mean of 3.2 [(8 x
4.0 + 2 x 0)/10 = 3.2].
Finally, failures mean that courses must be repeated, a consequence that
law schools are not designed to accommodate in large numbers. Further, were
students to regularly be subjected to failing grades across courses, they would
have to leave the law school. Such attrition, were it to be of a significant number
of students, would not be consistent with the business model of most law
schools, which rely on maintaining a certain level of enrollment to support their
budgets.
391. See 2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Standard 304 (showing that a
revision to the American Bar Association Standards recently under
consideration would require law schools to “apply a variety of formative and
summative assessment methods across the curriculum to provide meaningful
feedback to students”).
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assignments along the way will help the professor gauge
students’ understanding and progress throughout the term.392
Although achievement-based assessment and grading is
preferred, enforced means are an important tool for equalizing
grades across courses taught by different professors who may
have varying views of what level of performance deserves a given
grade. A similar problem could arise under a pass-fail system,
where different professors reach different judgments about what
level of performance is necessary to demonstrate proficiency in a
topical area. However, enforcing a mean across all courses is not
the solution to this problem because of the impact such means
have on moving assessment away from being an evaluation of
achievement against learning goals towards a system that signals
relative merit. A more appropriate solution would be to have
learning objectives and determinations of proficiency levels
centrally or collectively determined.393 That is, a law school
would—either through a group of professors394 who teach the
same subjects or collaboratively among relevant professors and
administrators—be responsible for setting and/or scrutinizing the
learning objectives identified by professors and for setting or
approving of the standards for proficiency and distinctiveness
applied to all assessment instruments, rather than leaving such
determinations solely to the discretion of the individual professor.
The professor would certainly be the originator of these standards
and should have a say in their ultimate form. However, there
must be collective agreement across the faculty regarding these
matters to ensure that a performance that earns a “pass” in one
course would not earn a “fail” in another course. As setting such
standards for achievement is an inherently subjective process,
392. For a fuller discussion of more effective assessment methods in legal
education, see SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 320, at 135–63; STUCKEY ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 235–63.
393. See 2011 Proposed Draft, supra note 195, Standard 302 (showing that a
revision to the American Bar Association Standards recently under
consideration would require law schools to “apply a variety of formative and
summative assessment methods across the curriculum to provide meaningful
feedback to students”).
394. If this would not be the province of any existing law faculty committee,
perhaps a new “assessment” or “institutional standards” committee could be
established.
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doing so collectively across different types of courses will be
challenging.395 But such an approach is superior to the blunt
instrument of an enforced curve because it makes assessment
and grading a measure of substantive versus relative
achievement, something that is much more meaningful and the
true mark of quality assessment in education.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that forced means also are
a bulwark against substandard professor instruction, which
might result in many students being deficient in their knowledge
in part due to the failures of the professor. If a modified pass–fail
or simplified letter-grade system is pursued, professors would
have to use more formative assessments with feedback to make
sure that their students were learning and progressing along the
way. They would also need to make sure that the final
assessment is properly calibrated to measure what was
successfully taught and learned during the course. That said,
there would be no guarantee that student performance would
collectively rise to the proficient level. Under such circumstances,
the professor’s teaching abilities would have to be evaluated but
so too would the content and pace of the educational program
being delivered to the students to make sure that it is
commensurate with their aptitude to learn.
D. Law School Faculty
“How can we expect law students to become competent
practitioners if the core of full-time law faculties,
notwithstanding its scholarly prowess, does not itself possess
even the basic skills required to practice the type of law about
which it teaches and writes?”
—Brent E. Newton, 2010396
395. Within a particular subject, one could imagine the possibility of having
school-wide, standardized exams for the basic required courses that are graded
by a common rubric. This would make grade normalization more rational across
different sections. However, such an approach would require each professor to
cover the same material in the same courses, which would impinge on individual
professors’ freedom to select areas of emphasis.
396. Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law
Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of
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As we have seen, Langdell introduced the idea that full-time
academics with little or no experience were to be preferred when
staffing a law school faculty.397 More or less true to this vision,
contemporary law school faculties are dominated by tenured and
tenure-track professors who are less experienced practitioners
than they are highly credentialed legal scholars.398 Traditional
doctrinal law faculty currently maintain an obligation to
contribute in the areas of teaching, scholarship, and service,399
carrying a typical teaching load of three to four courses per
year400 and being expected to produce scholarly publications on a
regular basis.401 In return, this category of professors is highly
compensated,402 in an effort to attract the most highly
Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV.
105, 147–48 (2010).
397. Supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
398. See infra note 407 and accompanying text (providing data on the
average practice experience of law professors).
399. See, e.g., Lewis & Clark College Faculty Handbook, LEWIS & CLARK
COLL., 50 http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/10303-faculty-handbook-section-1--5
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (“To receive tenure, a faculty member must
demonstrate excellence in teaching, scholarship, and service . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
400. In 2006, Jennifer Collins, at Wake Forest University School of Law,
posted a request regarding teaching loads at law schools, to which there have
been multiple comments suggesting loads in the three to four course range, also
articulated in credit hours per year as anywhere from nine to twelve credit
hours. Jennifer Collins, Teaching Loads, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 11, 2006),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/12/teaching_loads.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also Gordon Smith, Law Professor Teaching Loads, THE CONGLOMERATE,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/04/law_professor_t.html (last visited Sept.
2, 2012) (providing information on teaching loads from 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
401. See, e.g., University of Richmond Faculty Handbook, at Appendix: The
T.C. Williams School of Law Personnel Policies and Procedures, Standards and
Procedures for Reappointment, Promotion, and Tenure, UNIV. OF RICHMOND,
http://facultyhandbook.richmond.edu/Ch_VI/law.html#tenure (last visited Sept.
3, 2012) (“As part of the application for promotion from Associate Professor to
Professor and for the award of tenure, the applicant must submit at least four
published scholarly works of high quality.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
402. The Chronicle of Higher Education reports that for the 2010–2011
school year law professor salaries were the highest of all disciplines, varying
positively 59.5% above the average full-time professor of English language and
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credentialed and most capable scholars to a school. Why is hiring
expensive, inexperienced high-quality legal scholars important to
the modern American law school? As the Carnegie Report
explains:
Within academic circles, legitimacy and respectability accrued
to whatever could be assimilated to the model of formal,
science-like discourse . . . . Since the coin of that realm is
productivity in scholarship and research, it is not surprising
that law schools have increasingly emphasized this dimension
of their faculties’ work and identity.403

Certainly, hiring in this manner is instrumental to achieving a
mission oriented toward producing legal scholarship, which

literature, compared with a 50.9% figure for business school professors and
41.2% for economics professors, the next two highest paid disciplines. Faculty
Salaries Vary by Institution Type, Discipline, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Apr. 11, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Faculty-Salaries-Varyby/127073 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Although information about salaries at private law schools is difficult
to obtain, salary information for several public law schools is available online.
Salaries at these schools vary widely, from $90,000 to over $300,000. See, e.g.,
Paul L. Caron, Public Law School Faculty Salaries, TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 19,
2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/08/public-law.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Dean
Erwin Chemerinsky noted that when he was being recruited to become the Dean
of the newly created University of California, Irvine School of Law, he initially
rejected the proposed salaries for the Dean and the faculty, explaining as
follows:
[T]heir proposed dean’s salary was about half of what I was earning
as a professor at Duke Law School, and . . . their top faculty salaries
were about at the level of entry-level faculty hires. I was clear that I
would not be interested in the position if that were the level of
funding. I was candid that the law school could not be very good on
the proposed budget.
Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1. Chemerinsky was ultimately hired at a salary
of $350,000. See Comm. on Compensation, Appointment Salary for Erwin
Chemerinsky as Dean, DONALD BREN SCH. OF L., IRVINE CAMPUS,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compensation/chemerinsky0907.pdf.
Faculty salaries at U.C. Irvine School of Law were reported as ranging from
$131,200 to $199,300 in 2009, with summer research grants amounting to oneninth of one’s salary. Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Professor Series—Law School
Academic Year Rates (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.ap.uci.edu/salary/CurrentScales/
prof-Law.pdf.
403. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6–8.
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many, if not most, law schools embrace.404 More cynically but no
less verily, the U.S. News & World Report ranking system,405
with its heavy emphasis on peer reputation,406 makes it critical
that law schools attract and retain a faculty regarded as
productive of high quality scholarship if they wish to maintain or
enhance their position in these standings.
Are law facultiesas currently constitutedup to the task of
delivering the balanced, integrated curriculum suggested by the
2007 Carnegie Report? Unfortunately, there are two main
problems with relying on traditional law professors of this mold
to deliver a revised curriculum. First, as just mentioned,
traditional doctrinal professors are not typically hired for their
practice experience, of which they tend to have little407 or
404. See, e.g., Mission of the Law School, UNIV. OF CHICAGO SCH. OF L.,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/school/mission (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (“Since
its founding in 1902, a major component of the University of Chicago Law
School’s mission has been to develop and disseminate knowledge through
scholarly research that critically analyzes the development of the law and
related disciplines.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Mission and Vision, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCH. OF L., http://www.
stthomas.edu/law/missionvision/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (“The law school
will . . . participate in the improvement of legal institutions and other
organizations through recruitment and development of a faculty of outstanding
teachers and scholars, sponsorship of academic lectures and interdisciplinary
research activity, and establishment of a strong law library collection and
staff.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
405. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, BEST GRAD SCHOOLS 70–76 (2013),
available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduateschools/top-law-schools/law-rankings
(providing
rankings
and
general
information on law schools in the United States).
406. Under the methodology used by U.S. News & World Report, “peer
assessment score”—a rating by key figures at other law schools of the quality of
the school in question—accounts for 25% of a school’s overall score. Robert
Morse & Sam Flanigan, U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings
Methodology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/education/
best-graduate-schools/articles/2011/03/14/law-school-rankings-methodology2012 (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
407. See Redding, supra note 293, at 601 (showing that for those law
professors hired between 1996 and 2000, of those with any practice experience
(86.6% of the hires), the average number of years of experience was 3.7). A 1991
study found that all law professors at that time had an average of 4.3 years of
practice experience, with the experience of hires at law schools ranked in the top
25 being only 1.4 years. See Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note,
Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation’s Law
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none.408 Rather, law professors are hired mostly based on their
academic credentials and their promise as legal scholars.409 A
corps of instructors thusly qualified is not ideally suited for
delivering a curriculum of expanded practical experiential
learning,410 and arguably is not optimal for practice-oriented,
doctrinal instruction,411 meaning that adjuncts or differently
Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 218 (1991). One commentator’s
informal study of law professors hired between 2000 and 2009 revealed an
average of 1.79 years at U.S. News & World Report-ranked tier one schools but 7
years at tier four schools. See Newton, supra note 396, at 130.
408. See Newton, supra note 396, at 130 (“45.6% of entry-level, tenure-track
professors hired by [tier 1] schools since 2000 had no prior practical
experience.”); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 37 (1992) (“The
situation is even worse now . . . because now we see ‘law professors’ hired from
graduate schools, wholly lacking in legal experience or training . . . .”). It is not
unusual for elite law schools to hire law professors with no practice experience,
although such hires tend to have doctorates in another field in addition to their
law degrees. See, e.g., Northwestern Law Faculty Research & Achievement,
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/ (last
visited Sept. 13, 2012) (“Together, our faculty members combine to form what is,
we believe, the most eclectic and balanced mix of legal scholars among our
nation’s law schools.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Indeed, Northwestern University School of Law touts having the highest
percentage of PhD-trained full-time faculty members (47%) of all American law
schools. Id.
409. Columbia Law School advises its students interested in an academic
career as a law professor as follows:
[G]etting excellent grades at a distinguished law school, being a law
review member or (preferably) officer, and having a prestigious
clerkship after graduation have been the most important factors [that
make one a good candidate for a teaching job], especially at the top
schools. In recent years, however, scholarly achievement—not just
potential—is increasingly required . . . . Most law faculties still value
candidates who have practiced law, so a few years of experience . . .
can be useful.
Almost Everything You Need to Know About Law Teaching, COLUMBIA L. SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/careers/law_teaching/Everything
(last
visited
Sept. 13, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
410. See Newton, supra note 396, at 147 (“Because practical skills . . . are
honed by significant practical experience, it is highly unlikely that most tenuretrack professors—particularly the new breed of interdisciplinary theoreticians—
could effectively teach such a course.”).
411. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22, at 196 (“Both doctrinal and
practical courses are likely to be most effective if faculty who teach them have
some significant experience with the complementary area.”).
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viewed clinical faculty have to pick up the slack. Second,
traditional law faculty members are expensive from the
perspective of the law school, as their salaries account for a large
share of a law school’s budget412 and tend to be impervious to
dramatic reductions.413 Transforming law school to a system that
involves much greater skills training and a decrease in courses
taught through the large-class Socratic case-dialogue method
would require much smaller faculty-student ratios, a proposition
that would be quite expensive if the hiring of additional
traditional faculty were the means undertaken to achieve that
goal.
How, then, can law school faculties hope to offer an improved
curriculum? Some schools might favor relying on the heavy use of
adjunct professors for practice-oriented courses, given the meager
wages generally paid to such instructors.414 This is a sub-optimal
412. See Jack Crittenden, How Legal Education Is Changing, Albeit Slowly,
THE NAT’L JURIST (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/howlegal-education-changing-albeit-slowly (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (“[T]he single
biggest cost in legal education is ourselves. When will salaries do [sic] down and
tenure [be] abolished?” (quoting Dean Jim Chen of the University of Louisville
Brandeis School of Law)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
413. See, e.g., Jon Ralston, UNLV President Presents Cuts, Says They Are “A
Tragic Loss and a Giant Step Backward for Nevada,” LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 8,
2011, http://www.lasvegassun.com/blogs/ralstons-flash/2011/mar/08/unlv-presidentpresents-cuts-says-they-are-tragic-/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (sharing a
spreadsheet showing that out of over $47.5 million in budget cuts, zero was to be
cut from law school salaries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
University of Nevada, Las Vegas’s law school intended to cover these budget
cuts with tuition increases instead of faculty cuts. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Invest in Higher Education, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/dec/27/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-uc-tuition-20101221
(last
visited Sept. 3, 2012) (discussing that by “[p]aying significantly less than other
schools . . . the best faculty will leave and those with other choices will not come.
The quality of teaching and research will steadily decrease [making it] ever
harder to attract excellent students and faculty”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Univ. of Nev., Board of Regents Briefing Paper, 1
(June 16–17, 2011), http://www.scs.nevada.edu/tasks/sites/Nshe/assets/File/
BoardOfRegents/Agendas/11/june/main/BOR-10.pdf (requesting 19.5% and 4.5%
increases to resident and non-resident law student tuition, respectively).
414. Adjunct professors at law schools tend to earn “a four-figure stipend”
for teaching a class. Katherine Rosman, The Ultimate Power Hobby, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870411600457552
1800478591046.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_lifestyle (last visited Sept. 2,
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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solution, however, because adjuncts are typically unable to give
the time and attention necessary to provide high quality
experiential instruction to students compared with properly
qualified full-time instructors dedicated to such courses.415
Further, the ABA Standards strongly discourage the use of
adjuncts in the first-year curriculum and provide that “full-time
faculty shall teach the major portion of the law school’s
curriculum,”416 while also requiring that full-time law school
employees be the supervisors of all clinics.417 That said, adjuncts
can and must have some role in delivering experiential learning
given the reality of limited resources; the perfect scenario (using
all full-time faculty) should not be made the enemy of the good
scenario (using adjuncts), and the ABA standards should be
revised to permit a greater role for part-time faculty or adjunct
instructors. Another possibility would be to expand the ranks of
clinical faculty in proportion to the rest of the faculty. Their
salaries typically are lower than traditional doctrinal faculty,418
but their reach in terms of numbers of students is more limited
given the small size that clinics must be to be effective.
Ultimately, schools interested in moving their curriculum in
a more practice-oriented direction will have to give serious
thought to revising their hiring patterns to identify experienced
415. This differential flows largely from the fact that adjuncts will have
other full-time employment that will not necessarily accommodate the need to
dedicate large amounts of time to supervising law students and they are not
physically located at the law school where they would be more readily accessible
to their students. See id. Adjuncts may also be less experienced in teaching than
full-time faculty and, thus, may do a poorer job, although this is hardly a
universally true. Full-time faculty members are not necessarily outstanding
classroom teachers guided by the latest research on effective pedagogy nor may
they be qualified to guide students through simulations of practice scenarios
they have not themselves experienced.
416. 2012–2013, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 28, Standard 403(a).
417. Id. Standard 304, Interpretation 304-3(e).
418. For example, the highest-paid clinical faculty person at the University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill School of Law had a salary of $101,000 in 2011,
lower than the $110,500 salary paid to several Assistant Professors. University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Public Salaries, COLLEGIATE TIMES,
http://www.collegiatetimes.com/databases/salaries/university-of-north-carolinachapel-hill-2010?dept=Law (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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practitioners who have the potential to be great classroom
teachers.419 Although scholarly potential could remain a factor,
exalting that above the ability to deliver practice-relevant
training and experiences to students would not be sensible if this
type of curricular reform were the goal. To be clear, this is not a
goal all law schools may want to embrace; law schools should be
free to pursue a variety of missions, including serving as a
preeminent center of scholarly research on the law. But for those
schools wishing to emphasize a mission of preparing students for
practice, hiring differently—meaning a shift toward more
experienced lawyers—will have to be part of the equation.420
V. The Next Century in Legal Education
What have we learned? The four pillars of law school
education—its curriculum, its pedagogy, its mode of assessment,
and its facultyall have roots in the Langdellian reforms of the
late nineteenth century. The justification for the design of the
Langdellian law school—that law is a science best learned from
studying “original sources” at the feet of masters of learning
rather than masters of practicehas been called into question
ever since that time, but the basic model has endured. Its
resilience seems to be linked to a variety of factors: The
consonance of the Langdellian model with faculty backgrounds
and aspirations makes it fairly self-perpetuating; the economics
of the approach have been heretofore unquestionably superior to
more effective alternatives; students and employers have
historically been unresponsive to law school curricular reform as

419. A 1980 report of the ABA Special Committee for a Study of Legal
Education recommended “the law school recruitment process for full-time
faculty increasingly look to the practicing segment of the profession for its
potential faculty members.” AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL
EDUC. supra note 165, at 105.
420. Jerome Frank made a similar proposal to expand practice-experienced
faculty many years ago. See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra
note 204, at 914 (“A considerable proportion of law teachers in any law school
should be men with not less than five to ten years of varied experience in the
actual practice of law.”).
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they continue to prioritize school prestige421—not the quality of
training—in making enrollment and hiring decisions;422 and the
deficiencies of the approach were less consequential in a world in
which the bar understood and fulfilled its duty to complete the
training of lawyers during their first couple years of practice.
Unfortunately, the fraying of the foundation for the
justification and perpetuation of the Langdellian model is not
likely to usher in fundamental change with ease. Law faculty
benefit from the current structure of the course delivery system
and may be loath to take on work that will compromise time for
other pursuits or impose burdens without increasing
compensation.423 Further, the profile of current law faculty—
421. See NALP, AFTER THE JD, supra note 5, at 79 (reporting survey results
that “indicated that two credentials are crucial to finding the first job after law
school: the reputation of the school and law school grades”); see also Sloan,
supra note 9 (“The most prestigious law schools still dominate when it comes to
placing graduates.”); Leichter, supra note 17, (“Why aren’t California’s more
price-sensitive firms hiring grads directly from the People’s College of Law in
Los Angeles rather than from UCLA . . . ? Firms could do this but instead, they
prefer ABA grads from highly regarded law schools.”).
422. See, e.g., MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 6–7 (“[F]ew employers
appear interested in whether students have enrolled in [skills] courses or how
they perform in them.”); id. at 7 n.2 (“The American Bar Foundation survey of
hiring partners found . . . that this selection of particular courses has little or no
impact on hiring decisions.”). This stubborn fact, that legal employers complain
about the quality of legal education but do not alter their hiring patterns in
response to law school reforms, is a major contributor to the complacency among
many legal academics, particularly at elite schools. This commitment to
credentials—law school ranking and class ranking—as the determiners of hiring
decisions means that doing a better job of training lawyers for practice receives
little reward, at least in the short term. As a result, there is less incentive to
pursue such reforms, at least among top-tier schools, particularly to the extent
they raise the cost of legal education or place cherished school rankings at risk.
That said, the competition for students among such schools is fierce, particularly
in an environment of declining Law School Admission Test (LSAT) takers. See
David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at B1 (“In all, the number of test takers has fallen by
nearly 25 percent in the last two years.”). To the extent that curricular and
other reforms can attract more and better students to one’s school, an increasing
number of elite schools may begin to pursue reforms over time.
423. As Upton Sinclair once observed, “It is difficult to get a man to
understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it!”
UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT LICKED 109 (Univ.
of Cal. Press ed. 1994); see also David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at A1 (“Professor Rubin failed

2056

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012)

having been educated under the Langdellian system and having
had little to no practice experience—renders them less
sympathetic to the urge toward practice-relevance and less
competent to devise and deliver a program with such an
orientation.424 This point was apparent to Jerome Frank, who
long ago lamented that inexperienced teachers who learned only
the law in books—the so-called “book lawyer” or “library-law
teacher”—controlled law schools and, thus, could thwart the
reform process:
Unfortunately, attempted reform of legal pedagogy is
frequently in the hands of the “library-law” teacher. With the
best will in the world, such a teacher often finds it almost
impossible to warp over the old so-called case-system so as to
adapt it to the needs of the future practicing lawyer. For, as
above noted, that system is centered in books. So long as
teachers who know nothing except what they learned from
books under the old case-system are in control of a law school,
the actualities of the lawyer’s life are likely in that school to be
considered peripheral and as of secondary importance.425

Perhaps focusing on the “law in books” was appropriate in a time
when students would go on to learn the “law in action” during the
first years of practice; academic legal education was originally
meant to precede and supplement law office training, not
supplant it.426 Because that tandem relationship between the two
spheres has shifted—from formal, to informal, to optional, to
nonexistent—law schools must reform the Langdellian model to
fill the void.

to sell his faculty members on a retooled first-year Contracts class. ‘Some
members of the faculty got a little overstressed by all the change.’”).
424. See John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of
ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World
Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 247, 274 (2009)
[M]any law faculty members tend to have “conservative” attitudes
about reform. Law professors often value tradition. It is not unusual
for faculty to believe that the law school curriculum worked well for
them when they were law students and that it should work well for
current law students as well.
425. Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 204, at 915.
426. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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What should that reform look like? I have sketched out some
thoughts above—that schools should give some consideration to
expanding practical skills training,427 diversifying pedagogical
methods, developing more meaningful assessment techniques,
and considering the benefit that more experienced practitioners
could bring to a law school faculty—but these and other ideas
require much more thorough treatment than I have given them
here and will have to await future work.428 Further, beyond law
school, there are other improvements that need to be made in the
areas of pre-law education,429 bar admissions standards,430 and
continuing legal education while in practice.
427. A survey of judges by Judge Richard Posner and Professor Albert Yoon
revealed the opinion that “law schools should provide more course work oriented
to instilling practice-oriented skills.” Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What
Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 338
(2010–2011).
428. That said, the work of the Best Practices Report, the Carnegie Report,
and those focusing on pedagogy such as Professors Schwartz, Sparrow, and Hess
in Teaching Law By Design, provide a solid vision of the direction legal
education needs to take going forward. See generally SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra
note 320; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 22; STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 30.
Washington University law professor Brian Tamanaha has also offered some
suggestions for the future, including giving schools the flexibility to pursue
differing objectives, such as a research-orientation or a practice-orientation,
which will result in their faculties having different backgrounds. See BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 173–80 (2012).
429. See HARNO, supra note 23, at 127 (“Many of the problems of legal
education owe their being to deficiencies in the pre-legal period.”); see also
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 22, at 230 (“Most prelaw counseling takes place
only after individuals have already decided to become lawyers . . . . The need for
advice at an earlier time in the decision-making process is apparent.”).
430. See, e.g., HARNO, supra note 23, at 155 (“[T]he bar examiners [should]
introduce examinations, in addition to those they now give, to test applicants for
admission on their proficiency in the simpler skills of the profession.”); see also
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note
21, at 68–69 (recommending that “the New York State Board of Bar Examiners
begin assessing professional skills”). California has long had a practice
component to its bar exam. See Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar
Exam Box: A Proposal to “Maccrate” Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV.
343, 410–11 (2003) (detailing the parts of the 1980 California Bar Experiment
that were adopted as part of the California bar exam). More recently, a
Multistate Performance Test (MPT) has been developed as part of the Uniform
Bar Exam (UBE), in an effort to universalize performance evaluation in the bar
admissions process. See Uniform Bar Examination (UBE), NAT’L CONF. OF B.
EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/ube/ (last visited Sept. 9,
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But our concern here has been the Langdellian model of law
school education. If that model is fundamentally broken—a
question that will likely remain the subject of great debate431—
then only fundamental change will do, rather than the
incremental change we have seen over the past 130 years.
Fundamental change means rethinking our categorization of
doctrinal subjects and commitment to them as the dominant
component of training for legal practice.432 It means
acknowledging what other disciplines seem to know about how
people learn, and giving in to the need to bring that knowledge
into our own classrooms.433 It means going beyond traditional
classroom dynamics and physical libraries to approaches that
leverage technology to deliver content while focusing face time on
meaningful discussions and problem solving.434 It means making
the effort to evaluate students against learning objectives in a
way that measures and supports their growth and development.
It means opening our minds to the notion that using experienced
lawyers to educate novice lawyers-in-training is not some radical
proposition, but an approach that bears a greater promise of
2012) (describing the different elements of the Uniform Bar Examination) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
431. Although there may be clear deficits with contemporary approaches to
legal education, the question is whether these fundamental problems adversely
affect law school graduates in an enduring manner or do the deficits simply
wear off over time as graduates gain experience through legal practice. If the
latter is the case, one could argue that this is a short-term problem for each
individual that does not warrant an overhaul of how we train lawyers.
432. For example, should we continue to teach contracts, property, torts,
criminal law, and civil procedure in the first year or should we be teaching
American legal system, introduction to the common law, transactional law,
business law concepts, American public law, transnational law, constitutional
rights, and civil litigation?
433. For example, having students learn by doing, in context, more so than
learning by reading and hearing alone.
434. See generally THOMSON, supra note 7 (discussing how technology can be
leveraged to improve legal education); see also Robert Talbert, Thoughts on the
Culture of an Inverted Classroom, CASTING OUT NINES (May 25, 2011, 8:23 AM),
http://chronicle.com/blognetwork/castingoutnines/2011/05/25/thoughts-on-theculture-of-an-inverted-classroom/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (discussing
“inverted classrooms,” in which lectures are offered online and classroom time is
used for discussion, working on problems, and helping individual students) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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inculcating students with the tools they need for practice. It
means freeing law schools to focus on their respective missions
and areas of strength, rather than playing to a unitary, Harvardbased model of legal education.435 And it means that legal
employers—who complain incessantly about the quality of legal
education—will have to start putting their jobs where their
mouths are, hire based more on the quality of training received
than on one’s class rank and school prestige,436 and reclaim some
responsibility for the continuing education of their new hires.437
435. This was one of the key observations of Alfred Reed in his 1921
Carnegie Foundation report on law school. See REED REPORT, supra note 1, at
417–18 (“Attempts by each type of law school to carry the entire burden of legal
education produce such unsuccessful results as to bring the entire body of
practitioners into disrepute.”). Of course, to realize this end, some reform would
have to take place in the U.S. News & World Report ranking system, which
ranks all law schools along a single scale. Perhaps moving toward the approach
U.S. News takes with undergraduate rankings—categorizing them as national
universities, national liberal arts colleges, regional universities, and regional
colleges—would be something that could be tried for law schools. Unfortunately,
no law school is likely to embrace the label “regional law school” or “local
teaching law school.”
436. A promising area for future research would be to examine the hiring
patterns of employers across and within law schools over time to see if there has
been any migration towards job applicants with more extensive practical
training; if not, the question of what they truly value in a potential hire—versus
what they say they value—arises.
437. Something else employers could consider would be to hire new
associates at dramatically reduced pay and offer them extensive practical
training experiences, akin to the apprenticeship model used in other countries
such as Canada (“articling”) and England (“pupilages” for barristers). See supra
notes 195–96 and accompanying text. Some American law firms have
experimented with this approach, although the model has not become
widespread. See Elie Mystal, Howrey First Years to $100K, ABOVE THE LAW
(June 22, 2009, 3:26 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/howrey-first-years-to100k/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (“[Howrey] is moving to more of an
apprenticeship model. New Howrey associates will receive an emphasis on
training and take a significant reduction in salary.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Elie Mystal, Salary Cut Watch:
Drinker Biddle Cuts Salaries AND Rates, ABOVE THE LAW (May 11, 2009, 4:22
PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/05/salary-cut-watch-drinker-biddle-cuts-salariesand-rates/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (“Rather than immediately assign the
incoming lawyers to client matters, [Drinker Biddle] will enroll its hires in a
new training program that will provide courses on taking depositions, writing
briefs, and meeting client needs.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Howrey was dissolved on March 15, 2011. See Brian Baxter, Howrey to
Dissolve Effective March 15, AMLAW DAILY (Mar. 9, 2011, 5:45 PM),

2060

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1949 (2012)

Many readers will want a bit more specific advice regarding
legal education reform than I have given here. I will thus offer
some reforms that a law school wanting to do a better job of
preparing its students to become practitioners could undertake:
•

Modernize the first year to include an introductory
overview of the legal system and the legal profession,
as well as subjects more pertinent to contemporary
legal practice such as transnational law and
administrative law;

•

Impose a live-client experience requirement, having all
students participate in either a clinical course or an
externship;

•

Extend legal research and writing education into the
second year, featuring more extensive simulation
training focused on certain areas such as litigation and
transactional skills;

•

Redesign the content of traditional courses away from
an emphasis on cases toward more source material and
practice documents, while redesigning the delivery of
courses around more group work and problem-solving
exercises in the lawyer role during class meetings;

•

Hire full-time, part-time, and adjunct faculty who can
bring more extensive and contemporary practice
experience to bear on the design and delivery of the
curriculum;

•

Develop capstone courses that enable third-year law
students to synthesize their learning across courses
and apply it in practice settings.

These are not steps that all law schools must take. Rather, these
are simply some possibilities that some schools could consider;
there are surely other ways to improve the ability of legal
education to prepare students, and schools should be free to
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/03/howrey-partners-vote.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Drinker Biddle carries on with its program. See First Year Associate
Development Program, DRINKER BIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/
careers/Summer%20Associates/First-Years (last visited Sept. 3, 2012) (outlining
the details of their first year associate development program) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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pursue them. Further, while the above reforms may be
worthwhile improvements, work remains to be done that can
demonstrate their efficacy in better preparing students for
practice, at least sufficiently to justify the cost and potential
disruption that might accompany some of these efforts.
Unfortunately, several external constraints facing law
schools make fundamental reforms difficult to embrace: ABA
standards limit the ability to use active practitioners as part-time
faculty, require the commitment of extensive resources to
physical libraries, and limit the amount of distance education
that students can apply toward their degrees; the U.S. News
rankings lump all schools into a unitary system that rewards
things like expenditures per student, faculty scholarship and
prestige, and LSAT scores rather than qualities that relate more
directly to a school’s ability to prepare its students for practice;
and bar exams continue to focus almost exclusively on
substantive knowledge rather than practice competency, a focus
that law schools must mirror to some extent if their graduates
are to be able to pass the bar. Hopefully over time these and other
external factors will evolve in ways that facilitate the more
effective legal education that reformers have been urging for the
past century.
VI. Conclusion
Traditional legal education remains bound up with many of
the fundamental attributes designed by Langdell at Harvard Law
School more than a century ago. It is a decidedly academic, or
cognitive, model of legal educationcentered on legal doctrine
and case lawwith varying degrees of elective opportunities to
attain practical and professional competence. To be truly
effective, however, professional legal education must give more
attention to transmitting the skills and values that are essential
compliments to doctrinal instruction. Mastering the cognitive,
practical, and ethical dimensions of legal practice are what
professional legal education must be about; focusing largely on
the law in books cannot do the job. Perhaps the late (and great)
Derrick Bell said it best when he wrote the following:
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By . . . giving priority to “learning by doing” simulations,
students mimic the kind of process that an attorney,
researching an unfamiliar area of law, might utilize to
investigate prior decisions. In practice, lawyers are called to
research and to write; to comprehend legal arguments; to
guess at the probable effect of and interaction between
judicial, statutory, legal and policy arguments in court; to
argue, persuade and debate; to work cooperatively with
colleagues; and for some, to judge those arguments and decide
cases and issues of law. This is as true in the practice of
constitutional law as in any other. Once their research skills
are in place, most students are aware that they have the
capacity to learn, relatively quickly, whatever they need or
want to know regarding any legal question.438

This full range of abilities gained through experiential learning is
what law schools should strive to deliver if their goal is to
produce competent attorneys. Students need to learn how to
“work like a lawyer,” not just how to “think like a lawyer.”439
This has been understood by many since the time of
Langdell, as evidenced by the continual criticism emanating from
the ABA, the Carnegie Foundation, and legal commentators since
the late nineteenth century. What makes change possible now is
that the unprecedented confluence of disintermediation440 in the
legal profession, the stagnation of incomes in the legal job
market, a bubble in law school tuition and attendant student
borrowing, and the prospect of a decline in law school
applications and enrollments that will require all but perhaps the
most elite and secure law schools to innovate or die. I have no
doubt that many law professors will react to these admonitions
much as most law professors have reacted to previous efforts to
438. Derrick Bell, Constitutional Conflicts, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1039,
1044–45 (1998).
439. Zandt, supra note 31, at 1133–34
The excellent legal analysis and advocacy skills that are the hallmark
of law school programs must remain an essential element of legal
education, but today’s law students also need a much more
sophisticated understanding of what it means to work as well as
think like lawyers in their multi-job careers.
440. See SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 6 (“Lawyers, like the rest of humanity,
face the threat of disintermediation (broadly, being cut out of some supply
chain) by advanced systems . . . .”).
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improve legal education—with denial or sighs of impossibility or
indifference—given the many obstacles to reform.441 It may
require bold leadership from deans to make the case for a new
vision of legal education and an insistence on the adoption of
certain measures, perhaps as a condition of their taking on or
continuing to serve in the dean role.442 Certainly, there may be
faculties that take the lead in responding to the need for
significant change. However we get there, it is clear that we need
to get beyond the Langdellian model toward a truly twenty-first
century program of professional legal education that prepares
graduates for practice; the time is ripe for getting there if we can
all collectively muster the will to take the first steps.

441. See Schwartz, supra note 340, at 360 (“The legal academy’s policies
regarding law school hiring, promotion, and tenure practices, law school
textbooks, law school accreditation practice, and law school economics have
created an environment in which change is very unlikely to occur.”).
442. Brian Tamanaha has suggested just such an approach in his “Dean’s
Vision” speech, in which he announces pay cuts and increased course loads as
norms that would characterize his deanship if hired. See Brian Tamanaha, My
“Dean’s Vision” Speech, Balkinization, (Nov. 16, 2010), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2010/11/my-deans-vision-speech.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

